



Thinking differently, acting in Europe

Number 1

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In March 2004, the Observatory of European Foreign Policy published a special monograph about *Spain in Europe (1996-2004)* in digital format. The objective of the monograph was to analyse Spain's foreign policy agenda and strategy during the period of the José María Aznar's presidency. As the title suggests, one of the initial suppositions of the analysis is the Europeanisation of Spanish foreign activities. Is that how it was? Did Aznar's Spain see the world and relate to it through Brussels? The publication was well received, considering the number of visits received and above all the institutions which asked to link the publication to their web pages. Among these, the *EUobserver* published the introduction to the piece in English entitled *Aznar: thinking locally, acting in Europe* (described by the *EUobserver* as a paper of utmost importance). The fact that the elections were held three days after the tragic events of the 11th of March dramatically increased interest in Spain and the implications for Europe. This publication is the second of its type, in this case analysing the period of the Zapatero government (2004-2008). Once again the starting premise (the Europeanisation of the agenda and the methods employed) has been considered by the analysts. And once again the articles collected in this publication serve to "triangulate" the analysis. Spain and Europe are two vertices (more or less distant, in essence and in form) which the authors handle in their analysis of the case (third vertex).

Why is "Thinking differently, acting in Europe" the title of this introduction? For two reasons, the first of which is, in 2004 "thinking locally, acting in Europe" - paraphrasing the classic "thinking globally, acting locally" - was used to transmit the idea of the strength of the Aznar era. That is to say, if there was anything that characterised the eight years of José María Aznar's political practices, it was the conversion of his domestic concerns into an exclusive factor of his European strategy, regardless of the context of the time and of the need to make national objectives fit into European objectives. In short, we continue paraphrasing the classic phrase when we use "Thinking differently, acting in Europe" The second reason is, if anything characterises the government of Rodríguez Zapatero in terms of international influence, it is these two things: one, thinking differently than the previous government (something that is stressed in many of the analyses in this publication), and two, insisting on "acting in Europe" as a differentiating objective (from the previous government) and not only in terms of manners (the friendly face of Zapatero replaced the difficult relationship Aznar had with many of his counterparts). The famous "return to Europe" of Rodríguez Zapatero's government was presented as a breaking point with the vision of the previous government of Aznar, who saw Europe as a means and not an end. A question immediately comes to mind, "Which Europe are we returning to?" This is where the Spanish government is going to find a critical conditioning factor to consider in the formulation of its policies and one which had not been counted on: the changing nature of the European milieu (international). And if anything has become evident in recent years, it is that the Europe "conceived" by the Zapatero government - based on the more traditional Europeanism of the German-Franco axis - has been shaken to its

foundations, above all due to the failure of the European constitution. "First with Europe", a slogan meant to characterise Spain as the first country to approve the Constitution by popular consent, was a way of reinforcing Spain's position in Europe and the role of Europe in Spain. The European milieu (international), it must be said, was not very auspicious for the implementation of the Zapatero government's programme. Instead of a world with no Bush and a Europe with a constitution they got a world with Bush and a Europe with no constitution (and furthermore, a Europe with 27 members, in which Spain had to learn to relate to new members, a topic which is discussed in this monograph).

A second conditioning factor for all European policies (international) is internal dynamics. And in this respect it is important to remember that the Zapatero government featured two factors which were quite different. First of all, it enjoyed a public opinion which, at the beginning, shared the majority of its opinions (identifying with the government's position on the war in Iraq). Second, an opposition party which (logically, taking the political practices of the Aznar period) fully clashed with the government. It isn't unusual then, that the PP and the PSOE have not aired a common view of a strong Spain in Europe. For Zapatero, the most important elements in the context of a new Europe are alliances with stronger countries (a topic dealt with here), while the PP insists on vying for more (voting) power on the council. Aznar's modern Europe (an Anglo-Saxon and liberal Europe) clashed with Zapatero's French-German course. And without a doubt, the place where this collision was most evident was in the arena of federalism (thinking of Europe and even of Spain) which is evidenced by the Zapatero government's decision to open the European Council and related bodies to the participation of the autonomous communities. This subject is also dealt with in this monograph. In short, the debate between the two large political forces on European (and international) issues is presented. If, as it is asserted in this publication, the Congress has not set out to deal with potentially controversial subjects (Spanish participation in military operations, the ESDP), judging from Spanish public opinion, one might conclude that this has had a profound effect on the first decision of the government – the withdrawal of troops from Iraq – even if the timing and the way it was done may have drawn certain criticism. The decision to withdraw troops is the Flagship for a foreign policy debate which insists on ethical limits and norms: the rule of law, democratic legitimacy, solidarity, social justice and multilateralism. The idea of Pacifism is, together with Europeanism, what the Spanish most commonly associate with the government of Rodríguez Zapatero. Developments in legislation in this area (participation with international forces) as well as in other areas have led to a political change of course towards a more pragmatic outlook. This can be seen in the case of relations with the United States, and is commonly justified through our Europeanness, as in the case of our joint participation with other European nations in the international deployment of reinforcements for UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006.

The process of Europeanisation is a complex process which brings with it constructions with which we can identify. These can affect our vision of international relations and the definition of national interests, such as adapting the national agenda so that it coincides with the European one, or extrapolating domestic issues and making them European ones in order to increase their scope of influence. There is lot about all this in this publication. If there is one idea that should be stressed from the beginning, it is that the Spanish government has completely adopted the European platform in terms of international security, to such a degree that the Spanish discourse is fully adapted to the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 (which is the case, for example, in the priority given to a resolution of a conflict in the Near East or in the centrality of effective multilateralism). One could speak of Spanish and European political identification, even on a personal level. In this vein, we should bear in mind that the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, and the Secretary of State for the European Union, Alberto Navarro, had previously undertaken actions for the formulation and implementation of EU common foreign and security policy as High Representative of the EU for the Middle East Peace Process and Head of the Cabinet of Javier Solana, respectively. As far as the political practices of the Zapatero's government are concerned, it must be said that the analyses collected in this monograph demonstrate to us situations of bottom-up Europeanization – in which Spain attempts to project its priorities and concerns onto the European agenda – as well as the top-down one, in which Spain adopts the dominant policies and priorities of the European Union. Before tackling this question, though, it is important to bear in mind one of the most significant factors influencing the Spanish agenda in the period from 2004 to 2008. This has been the sudden appearance of certain topics (such as immigration, energy, and Sub-Saharan Africa) which have led to transformation on a national level (the placing of Sub-Saharan Africa on the agenda, a leap forward in terms of cooperation and development) as well as the new dynamics of Europeanisation (energy, environment).

In this monograph, three important reflections on the Europeanization of the Spanish agenda are sketched out. First, there are references to the classic topics of bottom-up Europeanization of the Spanish agenda, as well as South America and the struggle against terrorism. In the case of the first two, the monograph deals with the question of the impact of the greater role of Spain as an agent for dynamisation in both areas, and other questions of interest. In this case, it must be said that in terms of the issue of South America, something which is glaringly missing from the EU agenda, Spain has encountered difficulties arising from new EU member states (the old soviet sphere of influence) in its attempts to continue to act as a leader of EU policy regarding Cuba (an area of special interest for Spain in the CFSP arena. To this we should add, as a contrast, that the expansion did not equate to a factor for change in terms of the opportunities or limits of the role of Spain as an agent for dynamisation in the Mediterranean or in the Middle East peace process (this has been very pronounced in the last four years). Furthermore, Spain's limitations in this theatre have come from the age-old sources (the UK, Germany and the US). In terms of the fight against terrorism, Spain has continued to play its traditional role as an agent for dynamisation (proposals in the framework of intergovernmental negotiations which led to the Treaty of Lisbon). Although in this period Spain would be characterised more as a member of a core group (Treaty of Prüm), as a sphere of development in the EU (police cooperation) than as a leader who wishes to export a national agenda to the European theatre (a situation that changed after the 11th of September).

Secondly, it is important to point out that the last four years have led to richer and more complex inter-relations between the Spanish agenda and the EU agenda, giving rise to a situation in which we can speak of a two-way Europeanisation (bottom-up and top-down) in terms of the context of transforming agendas. From the beginning, the agendas of the EU and Spain underwent changes in the period from 2004 to 2008. In the case of the EU, climate change and energy (linked to relations with Russia) have become priority issues. For Spain, immigration (related to relationships with Sub-Saharan Africa) has taken the spotlight on the agenda. In the case of energy security and global warming, Spain is dealing with a top-down process, one that has been interpreted in terms of private interest (for example, improvements in gas distribution in Europe), and has assumed a proactive role in the protection of these interests in the formulation of its European policy (linking, for example, the reduction of CO² emissions to per capita GDP). It lets us speak of a two-way Europeanisation in the last four years in issues in which the former role of Europe in Spain or Spain in Europe had been less. One could say, for example, that a priority issue on the European agenda, such as

relations with Russia, in which Spain traditionally has played a smaller role, has come in through the back door in terms of Spanish priorities (through gas agreements between Russia and Algeria). In the case of Spain, the most significant addition, and the one which has had most resonance in terms of the Spanish agenda influencing the European agenda (bottom-up), has been without a doubt controlling illegal immigration. This is not something new (in the Aznar era efforts had been made to this effect), but it has reached a much higher level, giving more sway to Spain for seeking a multilateral solution to the issue of border control, and it has also influenced the application of FRONTEX, in the scope of monitoring the waters between the Canary Islands and the African coast. Regarding these last items, it has to be said that during the Zapatero period illegal immigration became a priority item on the Spanish agenda. Again, we are dealing with a bottom-up process here (Euro-African conferences on migration and development) which can only be seen as Spain's assimilation of the EU strategy for Africa. This brings us to an issue which by itself constituted a large contribution of the Zapatero period in the formulation of Spanish foreign policy: cooperation and development. In this case, the turning point on this issue (ambitious strategic plans and the provision of resources) is related to, by definition, European directives on the issue. It was created and developed as a Europeanised policy. What we have to ask ourselves, and with this we move into the third and last reflection on this issue, is up to what point will it lead Spain to having a higher level of influence on the formulation of European foreign policy.

Thirdly, we have to consider that new issues in the Zapatero period had greater influence in terms of the role of Spain in the formulation of European foreign policy. This is evident in the case of the leap forward made in policies for cooperation and development. Another issue of lesser importance which is dealt with in this monograph is the role played by Spain during its chairmanship of the OSCE in 2007. Spain's capacity as an agent for multilateralism in the handling of conflicts in Central Asia, and also the incorporation of this vision in the Spanish agenda (where it did not previously exist) reinforced the multilateral identity of Spanish diplomacy. We will have to wait and see how the next government (to be elected in 2008) will handle these innovations, as well as the most problematic issue faced by Europe at the moment: the diplomatic recognition of the state of Kosovo. The legislature started with a problematic decision (at home and in Europe), the withdrawal of troops stationed in Iraq, and ended with an open and also problematic issue (at home and in Europe): the recognition of Kosovo. This issue awaits the president of the next government of Spain.



Zapatero's Spain among the large Member States? Between institutional weight and alliances

Number 2

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Introduction

"Hablar los quintos" -that is to say, to place their country on a basis of equality with the large Member States of the European Union (EU)¹- has long been one of the most eagerly sought objectives for Spanish politicians and diplomats. During the past 20 years or so in which it has been a member of the European club, Spain has been trying to keep up with France, Germany, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Italy, both in terms of power-sharing in EU institutions and of influence over the priorities of the European agenda. Thus it should come as no surprise that the weight granted to each state in the different institutions (e.g. number of votes in the Council of Ministers, representatives in the European Commission and seats in the European Parliament) has been a subject of debate and negotiation in which Spain has attempted to gain an advantage.

The main events during the 2004-2008 term of office have included the enlargement of Europe to include 25 states (May 2004), and subsequently to a total of 27 states (January 2007), as well as the constitutional paralysis that lasted for over two years. In April 2004, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero found himself in a European Union that had 15 Member States, a markedly French-German leadership (in the hands of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder) and the prospect of a Constitution for Europe. However, in just a few months, the situation changed. First of all, the accession of 10 new Member States had a direct effect on the Union's institutional functioning and priorities; after that, France's and Holland's rejection of the Constitutional Treaty left the Union blocked and without any Plan B available. Finally, the weakness of the French and German leaders in their respective countries also brought about a cooling of the two states as motors of Europe. It was not until Angela Merkel came to power in May 2005, followed by Nicolas Sarkozy two years later, that the two countries regained some of their former importance in Europe. Zapatero came to power extolling the virtues of "a return to Europe", but during the past four years, the question that has been increasingly asked is: a return to what Europe?

This article analyses the various intergovernmental debates and negotiations to reach a consensus on the new institutional balance in the EU. To understand the context in which this European and Spanish debate is taking place, we need to carry out a brief review of the evolution of Spain's importance and influence in EU institutions. Any analysis of the actions of the Zapatero government in this field has to be divided into two very differentiated stages: the first covers the actions taken by the socialist government to approve and ratify the Constitutional Treaty, while the second analyses the government's efforts to defend the main achievements of the Constitutional Treaty during intergovernmental negotiations for the drafting of the new Treaty which replaced the aborted Constitution. In this way, I will assess the strategies employed by Spain in its

efforts to place itself on an equal footing with the large Member States of the Union.

Aznar's Spain: "*Nice is not the Bible*", but even so...

From the very start, Spain's main demand with respect to power sharing in the EU has been the rebalancing of population and votes in the Council of Ministers. The institutional weight that was negotiated before Spain joined the EU granted the country two commissioners -the same number as the large countries- though Spain would have fewer votes (8 votes compared to the 10 votes of the large Member States). Later on, when the Treaty of Maastricht was revised at the Intergovernmental Conference held in 1996, in the first few months of José María Aznar's government, Spain expressed a need for a real institutional reform. However, the other countries turned a deaf ear to Spain's demand, and the issue was shelved until the following reform. Even so, Aznar's government did succeed in its bid to insert a protocol in the Treaty of Amsterdam stating that Spain should be viewed as a special case, and that it should maintain its influence in Europe's institutions.

José María Aznar's success at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000, where he achieved the same blocking capacity for Spain as a large state, marked the stance that Spain defended at the European Convention and in the subsequent intergovernmental negotiations for the European Constitution. For Spain, the Treaty of Nice represented the consolidation of its status as "a small actor among the big ones" thanks to Spain having obtained 27 votes in the Council (compared to the 29 votes granted to the large Member States) and the maintaining of the "one commissioner per state" system, even though all that came at the expense of a reduction of a considerable number of seats in the European Parliament. In short, for Spain, the Treaty of Nice represented verification that it was now a large Member State.

However, Spain's achievements were placed in doubt following the reorganisation of negotiation methods (national debates + European Convention + Intergovernmental Conference). In this new stage, the EU and its Member States sought to debate and reflect upon the Union's central objectives, and to draft a Constitutional Treaty that would simplify all preceding treaties. The Spanish governmental representatives at the European Convention (which opened in February 2002 and concluded in July 2003) defended the Treaty of Nice tooth and nail, and flatly rejected the proposal to establish a voting system based on a double majority brought together by a majority of Member States that represent less than 60% of the population of the Union. Ironically, with this rejection, Spain abandoned its traditional defence of the criterion of demography for deciding the way in which votes are shared out within the Council. At the Intergovernmental Conference, which opened on 4 October 2003, Spain firmly maintained this stance and as a result -together with Poland- paralysed the agreement on the signing of the Constitutional Treaty.

And so, when José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero attended his first European Council in June 2004 he already had an issue on his hands that was something of a hot potato. In spite of the fact that in its official declarations, the Partido Popular government had warned against taking the Treaty of Nice as gospel², the facts show that the party had preferred the Nice agreement to the agreements of the European Convention. The Conservative government had placed the defence of national interests -or rather, Spain's weight in EU institutions- before European interests in achieving an agreement about the European Constitution.

Zapatero's Spain: "a friend of the Constitution"

One of the central *leitmotifs* of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's foreign policy during the early stages of his term of office was a "return to the heart of Europe" (a memorable declaration that was only surpassed by his decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq). By accepting the voting system proposed by the Convention, the socialist government sought to emphasise its Europeist profile, at the same time as it assuaged the fears created by the Aznar government of a veto of the Constitutional Treaty. Finally, in October 2004, the 25 Member States signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Nevertheless, a protracted period of state ratifications promptly commenced, and which would grind to a halt following the "No" votes of France and Holland.

Spain became the first country to call a referendum on the ratification of the new European Treaty, and voting took place on 20 February 2005³. In fact, both the previous government and the current one had already publicly declared their intention to approve the new Treaty by referendum. The government's eloquent slogan for the campaign -"The first ones with Europe"- only confirmed the Zapatero government's determination to obtain political returns, on both internal and European levels. On one hand, thanks to the predictable victory of the "Yes" vote in Spain, a landslide effect was sought, especially in France (Chirac joined Zapatero for a campaign meeting in Barcelona), though in addition, efforts had been made to hold the referendum before the debate began on the Union's financial perspectives for the period 2007-2013, in order to minimise the effects of Spain's expected loss of European funds. The weakness of debate in the lead-up to the referendum and the low voter turnout (42%, of whom 76.73% were "Yes" votes), showed Spaniards' indifference with respect to the EU, even though Spain's participation in the European project had not been questioned.

Europe's paralysis following the French and Dutch "No" votes placed the supporters of the Treaty in a difficult position. Following a long period of reflection at state level, the "Yes-vote" countries, led by Spain and Luxembourg, decided to call a meeting of all the countries that had ratified the Constitution, as well as Ireland and Portugal, in order to assess the situation and reach an agreement that would satisfy everyone. Following José Ignacio Torreblanca, the aim was to "demonstrate that the longest stretch of the road to be taken should be covered by those who are the minority, and are further away from the most common denominator, and not the other way around" (Torreblanca, 2007: 5). Thus, when they met in Madrid on 26 January 2007, the Friends of the Constitution reaffirmed their willingness to "listen constructively to the proposals of the other Member States" in order to "reach an agreement that respects the substance and balance" of the Constitutional Treaty⁴. In this way, Spain showed an active, determined attitude as opposed to the paralysis of the other Member States.

Nevertheless, the defence of the Treaty did not only require an agreement among those who had already ratified it; a rapprochement would also have to be sought with the countries that had rejected or shelved it. Somehow, the gap between Spain's "Yes" and France's "No" had to be bridged. After winning the presidential elections, Nicolas Sarkozy made efforts to free up the European impasse by making contact with both Germany and Spain. In his first visit as the new President of the Republic of France to Madrid on 31 May, Sarkozy and Zapatero decided to join forces to seek an agreement that could unblock the situation⁵. This agreement was formalised in a joint document that was submitted to the

other EU Heads of States and Government some days before the European Council meeting. The document identified the advances that had been made at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, and which should be respected in the new Treaty. The "12 Commandments" contained in the Spanish-French proposal were: the Presidency of the European Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with two hats), the EU's single legal personality, the extension of qualified majority voting, the development of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the common policy on immigration, enhanced and structured cooperation, the progress made in governance in the Euro zone, the strengthening of policies on health, energy and civil protection, the solidarity clause, a linking reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the support of the ultra peripheral regions⁶.

And so the European Council meeting took place in June 2007, and which represented the definitive unblocking of the constitutional paralysis. The Spanish government's objective was to push forward a Treaty that would preserve the great achievements of the European Constitution, and which was acceptable to all Member States. Prime Minister Zapatero was involved in the process of unblocking the negotiation: together with Sarkozy and Prodi, he supported (and thus strengthened) the proposals of the German Presidency; together with Tony Blair, he negotiated the replacement of the title of "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" with that of "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" and, finally, with respect to the Council's voting system, the negotiations carried out with Poland by Spain, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom all helped to bring the new Reform Treaty into existence⁷. Speaking before parliament, the Spanish prime minister declared that it was "a success for Spain and for Spanish interests. Each and every one of the contents of the Constitutional Treaty that we consider to be unwaivable is included in the new treaty. This means that the more efficient, more democratic Europe that Spaniards voted for in the referendum will soon become a reality, as soon as the new Treaty comes into force"⁸.

In short, according to the Spanish government's evaluation, the Reform Treaty (or Treaty of Lisbon, signed in the Portuguese capital on 13 December 2007) maintains almost 90% of the innovations of the European Constitution, despite the fact that it waives the symbols of the Union (anthem, flag, motto and Europe Day) and it has not succeeded in unifying the series of previous Treaties or sufficiently simplifying them. It appears that the ratification process will be simpler, as there will be no referendums and all the Member States have recognised the need to accept the new Treaty as a lesser evil. As an article points out in *The Economist*, it seems paradoxical that José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Gordon Brown should have signed the same treaty⁹. For Spaniards, the Treaty opens up new horizons for the EU¹⁰, while the British consider the new Treaty to be of little significance, and play down its importance. These are just a few of the paradoxes of the European Union.

Conclusions

One of Spain's constant goals in the European Union has been to reach a situation where the country is on an equal footing with the large Member States, and the most recent term of office has been no exception. However, the European context has changed; one unexpected consequence of the EU-25/27 enlargement has been the increased weight and influence of the larger Member States¹¹. I agree with Vicente Palacio when he claims that "*hablar los quintos*" "has a greater relative value in a Europe that is enlarged to 27 Member

States, instead of one with only 12 or 15" (Palacio, 2008: 99). And so, while Spain's objective has been to achieve the status of one of the Union's large states, the strategy to achieve this end has changed, compared to that of previous governments. The Zapatero government has prioritised becoming an ally of the large Member States rather than fighting for greater weight within the institutions.

European practice has shown that a state's influence is not measured so much by the number of votes in the Council, or by the number of its Euro MPs, as by its ability to find necessary allies to execute out the reforms that are closest to its interests, and the interests of other EU members. In this 27-member Union, it is increasingly common for states to establish fluid, changing alliances (e.g. the Friends of the Constitution, the Mediterranean countries, the large Member States). We can now clearly see that the future of the European Union lies in variable geometry, and in this field, Spain is working on developing a profile of a country that is Europeist, Mediterranean and, if not "large", at least one that is minimally useful (and even necessary) for the negotiations between the large Member States. The role that Spain has played in the negotiations to (re)define the future framework of the European Union has demonstrated that if it has a specific, constructive agenda and seeks suitable allies, Spain can operate *de facto* as one of the Union's large Member States.

Notes

¹ The expression "*hablar los quintos*" – which expresses a situation in which Spain would be on an equal footing with France, Germany, the UK and Italy – was coined by Francisco Fernández-Ordóñez, Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister from 1985 to 1992.

² "Aznar: 'Niza no es la Biblia'", *El País*, 17 October 2003.

³ Spanish ratification of the Treaty required parliamentary approval following the referendum.

⁴ "Por una Europa mejor" ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Constitution, Madrid, 26 January 2007. Charter signed by Luxembourg, Germany, Slovenia, Italy, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Slovakia, Cyprus, Hungary, Estonia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Spain (who had all ratified the Constitution previously), and by Ireland and Portugal (who had not).

⁵ "Point de Presse conjoint de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, et de M. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Président du gouvernement du Royaume d'Espagne, à l'issue de leur entretien à Madrid", Madrid, 31 May 2007.

⁶ "Non Paper Hispano-francés", 17 June 2007.

⁷ Negotiations over institutional power sharing continued even after an agreement had been reached in the European Council in June 2007. Italy demanded that it should have the same weight as the United Kingdom in terms of seats at the European Parliament. This dispute over one seat could have been damaging to Spain, which had managed to increase its parliamentary representation by four more seats than the amount that the Treaty of Nice had granted to Spain. Finally, a Solomonic solution was found: one more seat was given to Italy without any other state losing any of theirs. As a result, the European Parliament is made up of 750 Euro MPs, plus its president.

⁸ "Comparecencia, a petición propia, del Presidente del Gobierno ante el Pleno de la Cámara para informar sobre el Consejo Europeo de los días 21 y 22 de junio de 2007, en Bruselas", *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 8th term of office, No. 267, Plenary meeting No. 249, 27 June 2007.

⁹ "Who are you going to call?" *The Economist*, 19 October 2007.

¹⁰ José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, "Un nouvel horizon pour l'Union européenne", *Le Figaro*, 18 October 2007.

¹¹ "España, Francia y Europa: Percepciones, sintonías y desajustes ", address by José Ignacio Torreblanca at the Spain-France Civil Forum, Paris, 10 January 2008.

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Relaciones del gobierno Zapatero con los nuevos estados miembros de la UE: un secreto muy bien guardado

Número 3

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Pocas semanas después de la victoria electoral del PSOE, tuvo lugar la adhesión a la UE de ocho países de Europa Central y Oriental (PECO) y dos países mediterráneos, culminando así el proceso de ampliación hacia el Este iniciado en los años noventa¹. En el contexto académico y político español, muchos análisis pronosticaban que la UE ampliada podría generar serios desafíos para España. Por ejemplo, en un informe del Real Instituto Elcano, se llegó a señalar la ampliación como factor que reforzaría, junto con otras tendencias de carácter internacional (globalización) y europeo (crisis económicas), el proceso de “revolución silenciosa” para la política española (Powell *et al.* 2005: 10-11). En particular, las consecuencias adversas de la ampliación se asociaban a tres ámbitos: político-institucional, económico y de la política exterior. En el primer ámbito, la ampliación podía causar una pérdida de peso político e institucional, y consecuentemente, capacidad de influencia en el proceso de toma de decisiones en la UE. En un segundo ámbito más tangible, España podría perder en transferencia de fondos en el marco de las políticas de cohesión y regional, que se desviarían hacia los nuevos estados miembros de la UE. En el tercer ámbito, se preveía que debido a la ampliación de la UE hacia el Este, España podría ver dificultada su labor de promoción de las prioridades de política exterior, centradas en áreas como el Mediterráneo o América Latina.

Una incógnita transversal a todos estos ámbitos era cómo funcionaría España en la nueva Unión ampliada en términos de “alianzas”. Aun antes de la ampliación, el último gobierno de José María Aznar había empezado a tejer estrechas relaciones con los países en vías de adhesión, en temas clave de la agenda europea de España. Partiendo de este inicio prometedor de relaciones entre España y los PECO, este artículo examina la senda escogida por el gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero en su relación con estos países. En concreto, se analiza hasta qué punto los nuevos estados miembros han formado parte de la estrategia de alianzas de España en las tres áreas mencionadas anteriormente.

Aznar y los PECO: ¿El principio de una buena amistad?

A pesar de los supuestos desafíos y riesgos para los intereses españoles, cabe destacar que el gobierno del Partido Popular, igual que el gobierno anterior de Felipe González, respaldó la ampliación de la UE hacia el Este. Además, dado que el punto de partida en el nivel de relación con los países candidatos era muy deficiente, los gobiernos populares intentaron reforzar los lazos políticos y económicos de España con los países de la adhesión. Con esta finalidad, el gobierno de Partido Popular elaboró el Plan de Ampliación dirigido a intensificar las relaciones económicas entre España y los países candidatos a la UE y, posteriormente, el Plan Marco dirigido a reforzar e intensificar las relaciones políticas bilaterales en materia de defensa y seguridad así como en temas de defensa e interior (Herranz, 2004).

Pero fue sobre todo a partir del momento en que concluyeron las negociaciones de adhesión en diciembre de 2002, que el gobierno español empezó a considerar a los países de la adhesión como socios relevantes para defender sus preferencias en la UE en diferentes materias. En lo que respecta a la política exterior europea, uno de los ejemplos más palmarios fue, sin duda, el patronazgo español de la "carta de los Ocho" firmada también por tres de los países candidatos de mayor relieve (Polonia, República Checa y Hungría). Esta carta aunaba a aquellos países que darían su apoyo a la política de Estados Unidos respecto a Irak y que apostaban por el refuerzo de las relaciones transatlánticas².

En términos de poder político-institucional, otro caso paradigmático fue la oposición conjunta de Polonia y España al nuevo sistema de votos propuesto por el proyecto de Tratado Constitucional. Este sistema de votación, basado en la doble mayoría de estados y población, sustituía al sistema de votos adoptado en el Tratado de Niza, cuyo mecanismo era más favorable para España y Polonia, dado que se equiparaba su poder decisorio con los cuatro países grandes de la UE³.

Finalmente, en materia económica también encontramos muestras tempranas de sintonía entre el gobierno de Aznar y los países en vías de adhesión. Por ejemplo, en enero de 2004 España, junto con Polonia, Estonia, Portugal, Italia y Holanda firmaron una carta defendiendo la estricta aplicación del Pacto de Estabilidad presupuestaria, elemento de la Unión Económica y Monetaria, incumplido en aquellas fechas por Alemania y Francia. Dicha carta se interpretó políticamente como un intento de estrechar la coalición de estados miembros con preferencias económicas más liberales.

Nuevo gobierno, nuevas alianzas: ¿Cambio de rumbo en relaciones con los PECO?

Las primeras declaraciones del gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero anunciaban un cambio de rumbo en la política exterior española en general (replanteamiento de las relaciones con Estados Unidos) y en la política europea en particular (desbloqueo de las negociaciones sobre la Constitución europea). Este giro se concretó en la doble decisión de adelantar el regreso de las tropas de Irak de la división multinacional compuesta por otros siete nuevos estados miembros de la UE (Eslovaquia, Hungría, Estonia, República Checa, Bulgaria, Rumania y Lituania) y la renuncia a la defensa del sistema de votos adoptado por el Tratado de Niza. Estas decisiones causaron evidente malestar en algunos de los nuevos miembros, sobre todo en Polonia, el país que más acusó el giro de la política española en estos dos aspectos⁴. Por otro lado, la apuesta española de basar su política europea en estrechas relaciones con Francia y Alemania, anunciadas como la "vuelta al núcleo de las decisiones europeas", no se presentaba como la más propicia para el estrechamiento de las relaciones con los nuevos estados miembros de la UE. El nuevo gobierno español tampoco promovió ningún tipo de programa gubernamental similar a los del gobierno de Aznar dirigido a reforzar los lazos políticos y económicos con los nuevos estados miembros. No obstante todo lo anterior, el análisis de la práctica de la política europea indica que, a pesar de las divergencias y preferencia por la alianza con los grandes estados miembros, el papel de los PECO en la agenda española ha sido más relevante de lo que podría parecer a primera vista.

Ámbito político-institucional. Una de las consecuencias inevitables del proceso de la ampliación de la UE hacia el Este fue una amplia reforma institucional que empezó a fraguarse ya a mediados de los años noventa. Como todos los gobiernos anteriores, el de Zapatero trató de participar activamente y contribuir con sus propuestas a las negociaciones y debates europeos, primero sobre el fallido Tratado Constitucional y

luego sobre el nuevo Tratado de Lisboa firmado finalmente en diciembre de 2007. Con este fin, el gobierno de PSOE contó en muchos casos con la colaboración de los nuevos estados miembros, igual que había hecho José María Aznar, aunque con propósitos y alianzas distintas.

Como ya se ha mencionado, el principal problema durante las negociaciones sobre el Tratado Constitucional fue el nuevo sistema de voto de doble mayoría (población y estados) que sustituía al sistema de votos establecidos en el Tratado de Niza defendido por el gobierno de José María Aznar. Después de las elecciones de marzo de 2004, el nuevo gobierno español abandonó la defensa de sistema de votos establecido por el Tratado de Niza y desbloqueó las negociaciones sobre el Tratado. Sin embargo, el gobierno continuó defendiendo una propuesta alternativa a la del Tratado Constitucional, basada en una doble mayoría de 55,5% de los estados miembros y 66,6% de la población europea. Finalmente, durante las negociaciones desarrolladas en junio de 2004 el gobierno español pudo contar únicamente con el respaldo del gobierno polaco a pesar de su malestar con el gobierno español por haber renunciado a la defensa del sistema de Niza⁵. Este apoyo polaco de última hora no bastó para defender la posición española, pero el resultado final de la negociación, basado en la propuesta de la presidencia irlandesa de establecer la mayoría a nivel de 55% de estados miembros y 65% de la población, fue cercano a las posiciones del gobierno español.

Tras el fracaso del Tratado Constitucional, el gobierno español se convirtió en un firme defensor del proceso de ratificaciones del Tratado Constitucional para lo cual contó con el apoyo de diferentes países nuevos. A corte de ejemplo, ya en junio de 2005, durante la visita oficial del Presidente de Lituania, ambos países se pronunciaron a favor de continuar este proceso. Asimismo, la iniciativa hispano-luxemburguesa de formar un grupo de países "amigos de la Constitución" contó con la participación de ocho nuevos estados miembros de la UE que ratificaron el Tratado Constitucional (de un total de 18 estados que ratificaron el Tratado y dos que tenía intención de hacerlo). Únicamente Polonia y la República Checa, al no haber ratificado este Tratado ni tener sus gobiernos intención de hacerlo, declinaron su participación en esta iniciativa de la diplomacia española.

Ámbito económico. Una de las cuestiones más relevantes para España y a la vez más sensibles para los intereses españoles en la UE ampliada era la cuestión del Nuevo Marco Financiero para el periodo 2007-2013. En principio el aumento de fondos para los nuevos Estados miembros planteaba una situación de incompatibilidad entre los intereses españoles y los de los nuevos países (Wojna, 2005). A pesar de ello, y en el contexto de una rotunda negativa de los contribuyentes netos a incrementar el nivel de fondos comunitarios, España impulsó la creación de una coalición de los estados llamados "amigos de la política de cohesión" formada por diez nuevos países miembros de la UE y España, Grecia y Portugal, cuyo principal objetivo era defender la propuesta de Perspectivas Financieras preparada por la Comisión Europea⁶.

Esta coalición dirigida a crear un contrapeso para la política de los contribuyentes netos al presupuesto comunitario fue muy frágil, como lo demostró el conflicto diplomático entre España y Polonia unos días después de la primera reunión de este grupo en diciembre de 2004. Después de la cancelación por el presidente del gobierno español de la II cumbre informal polaco-española estalló un conflicto bilateral sobre la declaración del Consejo Europeo de diciembre de 2004 cuando España se opuso a incluir en la declaración de la Presidencia un párrafo sobre el principio de solidaridad en reparto de los fondos y respecto a "las necesidades particulares de los nuevos Estados miembros". Por otro lado, España se oponía a estas formulaciones y defendía la mención de los principios de sostenibilidad, gradualismo en la pérdida de los fondos y su reparto

equitativo⁷. Finalmente, la formulación final de que el Nuevo Marco Financiero “deberá proporcionar los medios financieros necesarios para hacer frente de manera eficaz y equitativa a los retos futuros, incluidos los que se derivan de disparidades en los niveles de desarrollo de la Unión ampliada”⁸ fue el fruto del compromiso acordado por Polonia y España durante una reunión bilateral y aceptado por el resto de países miembros⁹.

A pesar de esta ambivalente política española en el tema presupuestario, España coincidió en cooperar con los nuevos estados miembros en otros temas prioritarios de la agenda económica de la UE. Por ejemplo, a principios de 2006 Gran Bretaña, España, Holanda, la República Checa, Hungría y Polonia emitieron una carta oponiéndose a ciertos cambios introducidos en el proyecto de la Directiva sobre servicios en el mercado interno (Directiva Bolkestein) durante los debates del Parlamento Europeo y llamando a la Comisión Europea a defender la sustancia de las propuestas iniciales¹⁰. De manera similar, España respaldó las ideas polacas de reforzar la seguridad energética de la UE así como también decidió no prolongar el periodo transitorio para la libre circulación de trabajadores provenientes de los nuevos estados miembros, anunciándolo durante la tercera cumbre polaco-española en Granada en marzo de 2006¹¹.

Ámbito de política exterior europea. Como se mencionaba al inicio de este artículo, una de las tradicionales preocupaciones de España en relación con la ampliación fue siempre la posibilidad de marginalización geopolítica y pérdida de relevancia de las prioridades españolas en la política exterior de la UE, cuyo centro de gravedad podía verse trasladado hacia el centro del continente. Ya a mediados de los años noventa, este desafío constituyó uno de los elementos que llevaron al gobierno español a priorizar la dimensión mediterránea de la política exterior europea, como lo demostró el inicio de Proceso de Barcelona en 1995 y el posterior apoyo a incluir los países mediterráneos en la Política Europea de Vecindad, concebida inicialmente para reforzar la dimensión oriental de la UE. Pero paradójicamente, las ampliaciones 2004/2007 de la UE han contribuido más bien a reforzar la dinámica de trabajo entre los países miembros de la UE interesados en la dimensión mediterránea de la UE.

Después de la crisis migratoria registrada en verano de 2006 en las Islas Canarias, el gobierno español impulsó una cooperación entre los países mediterráneos de la UE, inicialmente para desarrollar unas nuevas medidas comunitarias de la gestión de flujos migratorios a través de las fronteras exteriores marítimas mediterráneas¹². Sin embargo, esta iniciativa evolucionó hacia una cooperación permanente, más amplia, pero informal entre un total de 10 países miembros de la UE, incluidos 5 nuevos estados miembros (Eslovenia, Chipre, Malta, Rumania y Bulgaria; estos dos últimos desde 2007). Esta cooperación adoptó el formato de reuniones semestrales informales de los jefes de diplomacia de los estados mediterráneos que debaten y tratan de coordinar en este formato más restringido sus posiciones en temas como el proceso de paz en el Oriente Medio, la dimensión sur de la Política Europea de Vecindad, mecanismos de gestión de crisis (incluidos desastres naturales), reformas institucionales de la UE, inmigración a la UE y la idea francesa de la Unión Mediterránea¹³. Este marco de cooperación es uno de los ejemplos que vienen a matizar los temores de que la ampliación pudiera debilitar la política mediterránea de la UE.

En cambio, para sorpresa de algunos observadores españoles, la ampliación constituyó un desafío mucho más relevante para otra prioridad tradicional de la diplomacia española en la UE: las relaciones con Cuba. Es en este ámbito donde el liderazgo español de marcar la política común de la UE encontró el desacuerdo de la mayoría de los nuevos estados miembros de la UE, que se opusieron a la progresiva supresión de las sanciones diplomáticas de la UE introducidas contra Cuba en 2003, flexibilización promovida por el gobierno español desde 2004. En este aspecto, no sólo la diplomacia

de estos países cuestionó el liderazgo español en este tema, sino que también la opinión pública en general y figuras tan simbólicas como Lech Walesa o Vaclav Havel promovieron iniciativas en defensa de la oposición cubana y del mantenimiento de las restricciones diplomáticas contra Cuba, criticando la posición española en este aspecto.

¿Socios convenientes pero no imprescindibles?

El presente análisis demuestra que el gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero no sólo basó su estrategia de alianzas en los grandes socios fundadores de las Comunidades Europeas, sino que trató también de encontrar espacios de cooperación con los estados medianos y pequeños, incluyendo aquellos que entraron más recientemente a la UE. En algunos casos, el apoyo de los nuevos estados miembros fue necesario, pero ciertamente, no suficiente para poder promover las iniciativas políticas españolas en los ámbitos político-institucional, económico y de política exterior. Por ello, el gobierno de Zapatero ha continuado la tendencia del gobierno predecesor de buscar espacios de actuación común con los nuevos socios, pero sin dejar de enfatizar, a veces más bien retóricamente que real, la "tradicional" apuesta española por las relaciones con los países grandes de la UE¹⁴. La diplomacia española mantuvo el compromiso del gobierno predecesor de celebrar las cumbres bilaterales con Polonia y continuar la dinámica de relaciones bilaterales con los nuevos estados miembros a través de intercambio de visitas de líderes. A lo largo de la última legislatura España fue visitada como mínimo una vez por los 11 líderes de los nuevos estados miembros de la UE (excepto Eslovenia), pero en el discurso doméstico parlamentario apenas encontramos referencias sobre ellos. En la práctica, España se sitúa en diferentes debates y negociaciones de la UE como un "país puente" entre diferentes *cleavages* existentes en la UE ampliada: nuevos/viejos; países pobres beneficiarios de la ayudas/países ricos contribuyentes netos; pequeños/grandes; mediterráneos/países del Norte y Este de Europa; y países favorables al método comunitario de la integración/países favorables al método intergubernamental. Esta situación refleja la tendencia de transformación del papel de España en la UE y un progresivo reajuste de las preferencias y tácticas negociadoras españolas para adaptarlas al contexto de la UE ampliada.

En este contexto de transformación del papel de España, las relaciones con Polonia, institucionalizadas a través de las cumbres anuales de los gobiernos de ambos países, constituyen el nudo a través del cual el gobierno español realiza su política hacia los nuevos estados miembros. Sin embargo, esta cooperación no funcionó con la misma intensidad que durante el último gobierno de José María Aznar¹⁵. Esto se debe a dos motivos principales. En primer lugar, el gobierno del PSOE decidió inicialmente basar su política europea sobre todo en la alianza con Alemania y Francia y trató las relaciones con Polonia como una herencia del gobierno Aznar¹⁶. En segundo lugar, una vez corregida esta tendencia, se buscó definir una agenda compartida de las relaciones bilaterales con Polonia basada en una colaboración activa pragmática (Chico, 2006), pero el giro en la política doméstica polaca expresada en la inestabilidad gubernamental y la deriva nacionalista y anti-europeísta de los líderes de Ley y Justicia durante el periodo 2006-2007 convirtieron a Polonia en un socio inservible en la UE.

Al margen de estos altibajos en las relaciones polaco-españolas, el gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, a través de las relaciones con otros nuevos estados miembros de la UE, ha podido constatar a la práctica que los nuevos países de la UE no pueden ser considerados como un grupo homogéneo, disipando en cierto modo los miedos de España a la creación de alianzas estables contra las preferencias españolas. Al contrario, en el nuevo contexto institucional de la UE, el gobierno español ha tenido que encontrar

ámbitos de convergencia de preferencias con estados muy diferentes con indiferencia de sus fechas de adhesión.

Notas

¹ La primera fase de la gran ampliación incluyó diez nuevos estados: Estonia, Lituania, Letonia, Polonia, República Checa, Eslovenia, Eslovaquia, Hungría, Malta y Chipre. Esta primera fase de ampliación fue acompañada por la adhesión de Bulgaria y Rumania en 2007.

² "United We Stand, Eight European leaders are as one with President Bush", *Wall Street Journal*, 30 de enero de 2003.

³ La expresión de esta alianza fue el artículo publicado por Ana Palacio y Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz en defensa del sistema de votos previstos en Tratado de Niza, "How to keep balance in Europe's new treaty", *Financial Times*, 23 de septiembre de 2003.

⁴ La acelerada retirada de las tropas españolas de Irak (incluso antes del plazo previsto inicialmente para junio de 2004) hizo cambiar bruscamente los planes iniciales del relevo del mando polaco de la división multinacional en Irak a favor de España y la reorganización del despliegue de esta división después de la retirada de las tropas de algunos países centroamericanos. Asimismo, en la cuestión del reparto de poder institucional, Polonia se vio obligada a buscar alternativas para su estrategia negociadora al verse aislada en la defensa del sistema de votación de Niza. El presidente Kwasniewski se sintió "doblemente decepcionado por los propósitos del PSOE". "Polonia advierte a Zapatero de que la retirada de tropas desestabilizaría más Irak", *El País*, 19 de marzo de 2004.

⁵ "Zapatero logra el apoyo de Polonia a la propuesta española sobre reparto de poder", *El País*, 18 de junio de 2004.

⁶ En posteriores actividades de este grupo participaron también representantes de Bélgica, Italia, Irlanda y Finlandia.

⁷ "Czy Hiszpania i Polska powinny trzymać się razem?", 15 de diciembre de 2005, *Analiza EuroPAP – Polska Agencja Prasowa*, <http://euro.pap.com.pl/cgi-bin/wapp.pl?grupa=11&ID=62408> (accedido 12 de octubre de 2005); "El presidente del Gobierno cancela a última hora la cumbre prevista para hoy con Polonia", *El País*, 14 de diciembre de 2004.

⁸ Consejo de la Unión Europea, *Consejo Europeo de Bruselas 16 y 17 de diciembre de 2004. Conclusiones de la Presidencia*, 16238/1/04, REV 1 Bruselas, 1 de febrero de 2005.

⁹ Los trabajos posteriores del grupo de los "amigos de la política de cohesión" (reuniones mensuales a nivel de altos funcionarios) sirvieron sobre todo como una plataforma de diálogo e intercambio de información durante las negociaciones desarrolladas a lo largo de las presidencias luxemburguesa y británica, pero sin llegar a erigirse en un frente común. Así que por ejemplo, España fue el único país de este grupo que vetó la propuesta de presupuesto en junio 2005 debido a los insatisfactorios niveles de ayudas (Gniazdowski y Wojna, 2005). Los progresivos trabajos sobre el Nuevo Marco Financiero llevaron a acentuar las divergencias de prioridades y tácticas negociadoras entre España y los países nuevos durante las decisivas negociaciones en diciembre de 2005.

¹⁰ Anna Slojewska, "Szesc krajow chce swobody uslug", *Rzeczpospolita*, 6 de febrero de 2006.

¹¹ *Wspolne stanowisko Rzadow Polski i Hiszpanii na temat europejskiego bezpieczenstwa energetycznego*, Warszawa-Madryt, 17 de marzo de 2006.

¹² "España convocará una cumbre sobre inmigración con los países mediterráneos de la UE", *El País*, 29 de agosto de 2006. *Reunión de Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y de Interior de los Países Mediterráneos miembros de la U.E. sobre la inmigración ilegal en las fronteras marítimas, 29 de septiembre de 2006*, fuente: http://www.la-moncloa.es/ServiciosdePrensa/NotasPrensa/MAE/_2006/ntpr20060929.01doc.htm

¹³ Hasta el inicio de 2008 se celebraron 5 reuniones ministeriales de este grupo.

¹⁴ Ver el artículo de Laia Mestres en esta misma publicación monográfica.

¹⁵ Durante el gobierno de José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero se celebraron tres cumbres polaco españolas con participación de diferentes ministros sectoriales: en febrero de 2005 en febrero, en marzo de 2006 en Grenada; y en junio de 2007 en Varsovia.

¹⁶ "Zapatero aborda en Polonia el reparto de las ayudas comunitarias", *El País*, 9 de febrero de 2005.

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The Congress and European security policy: how much parliamentary control?

Number 4

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The term of José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero has been concurrent with the development of two important security policy issues at the European level. First of all, the missions of the European Security and Defence Policy ESDP have become commonplace in European foreign actions, going from four missions in the second legislature of José María Aznar to 16 new operations (4 military and 12 civil) begun during the term of office of the socialist government. Secondly, since 2004 the EU has given significant impetus to police and intelligence cooperation, the primary goal of this being increased effectiveness in the fight against terrorism.

From an institutional point of view, ESDP issues and those of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters (PJC) share the common characteristic of being essentially intergovernmental and having developed rapidly, particularly in the late nineties. The combination of these factors has been decried as a cause for a growing "double democratic deficit" in European security policy¹. This deficit stems from the fact that decisions in this area are increasingly made at the European level, making control of these decisions by national parliaments more difficult without reverting to increased involvement by the European parliament. Looking at it from a different angle, the problem of parliamentary control of security policies can also be summarised in terms of a "double paradox": on the one hand, national parliaments have the power to hold their respective governments accountable, but their access to information and their overall vision of what is happening in the European arena is usually lacking; on the other hand, the European parliament receives direct and precise information from different authorities of the Council and the Commission, but they do not have the authority to control them in these political areas².

This article examines this debate to focus on the first part of the double deficit or the double paradox in order to analyse the degree to which the assertion that there is a lack of parliamentary control by member states (in this case the Congress of Deputies) is true. To do so, Congress activities related to the fields of ESDP operations and police cooperation in the fighting against terrorism will be examined. The article concludes with some succinct final observations on the possibilities of the role of the parliaments in the areas analysed.

Control of ESDP operations

"While this government is in office, not a single soldier will leave without the support of this parliament." These are the terms set down by the Prime Minister, José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero in September 2005, a few weeks before the approval of the new Organic Law on Defence, which introduced the prerogative of parliamentary approval for the participation of armed forces in foreign operations. With this, Spain became a country with string parliamentary control in terms of military peace operations, putting Spain ahead of other countries such as France or Britain in which the deployment of troops is the sole responsibility of the government.

The source of this significant extension of parliamentary powers can be found in the tense political atmosphere and social mobilisation that characterised José María Aznar's last legislature, caused by the deployment of troops in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. From the beginning of the attacks in March 2003, the opposition had demanded repeatedly that in any case where the deployment of troops to Iraq was being considered, parliament would be consulted, given the exceptional and significant nature of the issue, a military intervention that did not have the support of the U.N. and which had divided the EU. However, the government, considering the lack of legal provisions which would make consulting parliament obligatory, decided to send 1,200 soldiers to Iraq. These troops were deployed between July and August of 2003³. Criticisms of the government for having "placed Spain in an illegal war against the wishes of parliament" were repeated often on the benches of the opposition, and in the election campaign, the socialist party committed to reevaluate the role of parliament in foreign military operation if it were to win the election.

In point of fact, the Zapatero government did push for the new Organic Law of National Defence and it was approved on 17 November 2005. The law introduced a requirement for ex-ante "consultation" and "authorisation" by the parliament if troops were to be sent outside of the country, as well as other requirements⁴. The law also made it mandatory to hold an annual parliamentary debate about the development of international operations in which the armed forces were participating. It is also important to note that the law not only strengthened the criteria of legitimacy inside Spain for sending troops, but became a requirement for exterior legitimacy as well. That is to say, the law set down a series of conditions with which foreign missions must comply, among them the requirement that they be sanctioned by the U.N. or approved by international organisations in which Spain is a member, as well as conformity with the principals of international law.

These significant new developments in the Spanish peace operations policy as a whole did not, however, translate into great changes in ESDP missions. Since the law refers to Spanish armed forces, it only applies to military missions in which the army participates (see table 1 in the appendix). Of these, only once has an ESDP mission been given the prerogative of consultation and authorisation, the EUFOR Congo mission. The other two cases in which parliament has given authorisation in this legislature were missions led by NATO (ISAF in Afghanistan) and by the U.N. (UNIFIL in Lebanon). Of these two cases, the one which followed the spirit of rigorous parliamentary control more closely was the authorisation of Spanish participation in UNIFIL, since the congressional debates took place in manner that was almost parallel to decisions made by the international community concerning the crisis that was unfolding in the summer of 2006. However, in the other cases, authorisation was always done after approval had been given and the government had committed to contributing to the operation, leaving parliament with little chance of influencing the government's position⁵. The other three ESDP missions in which Spain participated under the Zapatero government did not require parliamentary approval⁶.

Except in the case of EUFOR Congo, a lack of debate in the Congress on ESDP missions has been the dominant trend. This can be seen clearly when we look at parliamentary questions relating to peace operations, of which only 10 percent have to do with ESDP missions (see table 2 in the appendix). The level of interest is almost directly proportional to the troops deployed and the amount of risk the troops must face. It is not very surprising then that ESDP missions occupy a relatively minor position compared to other missions such as ISAF or UNIFIL⁷. The debate about financial issues related to ESDP missions has also been very limited. Only in the case of EUFOR Congo

did some of the opposition deputies demand that the government provide explanations of costs. They also used this as an opportunity to request that the government accompany any further requests for deployment authorisation with a cost analysis, as in other countries such as Germany.

However, the lack of debate about ESDP missions in parliament is even more striking in the case of civil missions. The EU has undertaken 14 missions of this type, half of which have had Spanish participation. This usually means sending members of the Guardia Civil or the National Police, depending on the objectives of the mission. None of these missions has been the subject of parliamentary debate in the Congress in the four years of legislature. Parliamentary debate on the subject has been limited to isolated comments made "in passing" during the annual debates about missions which are the result of article 19 of the Organic Law on National Defence. Thus, Spain is one of the six member states of the EU 27 in which parliament does not discuss or approve ESDP civil missions⁸.

Control of European police and intelligence cooperation in the fight against terrorism

As far as the policies of Justice and Home Affairs is concerned, the second legislature of José María Aznar's government made progress in justice matters, introducing means of great importance, such as the establishment of Eurojust and rapid extradition procedures (Euro-order). The period of 2004 to 2008 was marked by notable advances in police and intelligence cooperation, in terms of operational as well as the exchange of information material inside and outside of the EU⁹. Following the trend established by the previous legislature, Parliament had a bit of a rough time with the accelerated development of PJC and EU policies. Congress and the Senate tried to deal with the issues as they presented themselves without getting into a deeper debate or trying to anticipate them.

An example of the passive role played by parliament was the development of the Treaty of Prüm, which was signed initially by seven member states, including Spain, and which in the near future will be incorporated in the legal framework of the EU¹⁰. The treaty was a police cooperation agreement with the primary objective of exchanging information (DNA, fingerprints and vehicle number plates) in order to fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration. The treaty was somewhat controversial; the European Parliament expressed its belief that the treaty weakened Community institutions, since it did not adhere to the framework set out by the enhanced cooperation agreement; rather it was initiated outside of the EU framework and behind the backs of the parliaments. Yet at the very end of the process, given the fact that it was an international treaty, it required ratification by the Congress and the Senate. Both chambers approved it in April and June of 2006, one year after its signature by the Spanish government and without further debate or proposals. Later some of the obligations from the treaty became more controversial and Congress participated in a more active manner. This was indeed the case of the Organic Law regulating police databases for DNA identification. Initiated as an ordinary law, the committee decided to make it an organic law because it dealt with questions related to fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy. This procedure led to intense debates among the parties who maintained more and less "guarantist" approaches. An agreement was reached on 21 June 2007; the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Left Republican Party of Catalonia) being the only party that held out for amendment until the final vote on the proposal.

Congress also paid a bit more attention to developing the power of Europol. The enquiry committee on the 11 March attack also contributed to this, albeit in a collateral manner; the issue of international police cooperation and the role of Europol was debated in depth by the committee. For example, the deputies of the committee had access to confidential Europol reports and even Europol's director of operations appeared before the committee. Here the difference between the prerogatives of the national and European parliaments is obvious in terms of the supervision of this organisation. For example, the European Parliament was not able to force Europol to appear before the well-known "Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners." The 11 March investigation commission was also able to get the previous European coordinator in the fight against terrorism, Gijs de Vries, to appear. With him they discussed questions such as problems with striking a balance between confidentiality and effectively fighting terrorism. Mr. de Vries also made documents available to the enquiry committee relating to problems with national legislation which impeded strengthening the operational capacity of Europol, calling on the deputies to debate the issues and collaborate with the government to implement them¹¹.

A last example of changes in terms of police cooperation which has not been discussed much by the Congress, despite its obvious significance, is the transfer of passenger data (an issue known as PNR, from "Passenger Name Record"). Controversy on this issue was precipitated in May of 2004, when the U.S. and the EU reached an agreement which would allow U.S. security services access to information from passengers travelling from the EU to the U.S. in order to identify people who were potentially dangerous and take appropriate measures. The Parliament, very sensible to measures that could violate privacy rights and data protection laws decided to use its legality control powers to challenge the agreement before the European Court of Justice¹². The Court gave a major political victory to the Parliament annulling the decisions authorising the PNR Agreement. However, the Council approved a very similar PNR agreement in June of 2007 making use of the third intergovernmental pillar, thus bypassing the European Parliament. This move from the Council was harshly criticised by the European Parliament for having proceeded with a "lack of any type of democratic supervision"¹³. Conversely, the Congress of Deputies kept its distance from the PNR issue, with the exception of a few comments on the subject during the appearances of the Interior Minister and the Director of the Agency for Data Protection. The Congress has also not dealt with the issue - which is already in the advanced stages - of implementing the PNR system in the EU, a decision which was being taken within the framework of the third pillar¹⁴.

Conclusions

In this article, we have seen that the role of the Congress in European security policies is not as good as it could be in terms of having proper democratic control of ESDP and PJCC. This can be seen in the low level of debate on these issues, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In ESDP operations –without underestimating the great advances introduced with the new Organic Law on National Defence– we must remember that the consultation and authorisation procedure has only been applied to one of the 16 missions initiated by the EU in this legislature. Furthermore, even in this example the debate did not take place before the approval of the EU joint action for the mission, meaning that the substantive debate concerning the mandate had already taken place. In the arena of police cooperation we have also seen a lack of debate and improvisation, which contrasts with the intense activity seen in European Parliament on some of these issues. The Congress has only concerned itself with these issues when they have

touched on very specific questions, such as creating legislation for police DNA databases or evaluating the role of police cooperation in cases such as the attack of 11 March.

It follows from the above conclusions that the Congress still has a considerable margin to better perform its control function within the reach of its existing powers¹⁵. This notwithstanding, the reflection should be made on whether the Congress and other national parliaments in general are well positioned to undertake a debate about European security policies from a global perspective and in the general interest of the EU. Up to now, the European Parliament has shown tenacity in the discussion of these issues, and despite its very limited powers in these areas, it has been able to hold the concerned European institutions to account. Therefore, without prejudice to the powers of national parliaments, the empowerment of the European Parliament on these issues could foster EU-wide parliamentary debates that are less symbolic and more about real political options, and hence, debates in which European electors can participate or feel some identification with. The Treaty of Lisbon can contribute to this in areas related to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters, since co-decision will become the normal procedure in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The next Spanish government should get actively involved in the effective implementation of this provision and in making sure that the future mechanisms for enhanced cooperation in JHA and CFSP are used as stipulated in the Treaty, instead of recurring to mechanisms outside the EU institutional framework, which may be faster, but also more slippery to democratic control.

Notes

¹ Ever since the mid 90s the debate about the legitimacy of European security policies has gained growing salience, both among scholarly and political circles. The European Parliament has been particularly active in denouncing the lack of adequate mechanisms for parliamentary control in the ESDP and JHA domains. The use of the term "double democratic deficit" was coined by Born and Hänggi (2005).

² This approach to the parliamentary control in terms of "double paradox" is specially underlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU Assembly "Contribution to the Peace Research Institute Workshop on Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy Frankfurt, 7-8 December 2007", non-published paper)

³ The parliamentary controversy grew in the subsequent months due to the polemic about the appearances of the government before the Congress. Between March 2003 and the end of the parliamentary term, the opposition presented to the government 31 requests of appearance in order to give account to the Parliament of the position of the government and role of Spain in the conflict. However, after the 26th of March 2003, the government only accepted one of these requests (that of the Ministry of Defence, Federico Trillo-Figueroa, who appeared before the Defence Committee the 17th of July 2003). Yet, the government responded a considerable number of parliamentary questions. In fact, the parliamentary activity related to the Iraq conflict was massive during that parliamentary term: 186 parliamentary questions, 13 urgent interpellations and 71 requests of appearance.

⁴ This prerogative has some exceptions, mainly the lack of mandatory authorisation of the missions directly related to the defence of Spain and the possibility to hold ex-post authorisation in case this was necessary for reasons of urgency (see article 17 of the Organic Law on National Defence).

⁵ The authorisation for the deployment of troops to EUFOR Congo was debated one month after the adoption of the EU Joint Action. The decision to send 52 additional troops to ISAF (Afghanistan) was taken one and half year after the 37 Ministers of the countries contributing to ISAF, Spain among them, had already reached the compromise to contribute to the ninth enlargement of the mission.

⁶ In the case of ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina, the military operation in which Spain has contribute a greater number of troops (a maximum of 580), was approved before the entry into

force of the Organic Law on National Defence. However it is striking that this deployment of troops was never debated in the Parliament. Likewise, the two remaining military operations, AMIS II in Sudan and EUFOR Chad, were neither debated nor authorised. In the case of AMIS II, the reason for the lack of authorisation was that the military troops deployed were not "forces", but "observer personnel" for which its authorisation is not mandatory; in the case of EUFOR Chad, Spain has only offered logistic material (see box 1 in the annex), so authorisation was not mandatory either.

⁷ For further argumentation on the scant attention paid by Spanish representatives to EU civil missions, see article by Maria A. Sabiote within this monograph.

⁸ See Born *et. al* (2007).

⁹ See article by Gemma Collantes within this monograph.

¹⁰ The full name of the Treaty is "Treaty on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration" signed in Prüm (Germany), on the 27th of May 2005. The preparative act for its inclusion into the EU legal Framework was the "Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to the adoption of a Council Decision 2007/.../JHA of ... on the implementation of Decision 2007/.../JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime", Official Journal of the European Union, C 267/4, 9.11.2007.

¹¹ The appearances of the two mentioned EU officials took place on the 3rd November of 2004 (session 29 of the Enquiry Committee) and on the 15th of November of 2004 (session 30 of the same Committee) respectively. The growing interest of the Congress in Europol can also be appreciated in the fact that its mentioning in debates and parliamentary questions was significant. For instance, 20 written parliamentary questions were posed, addressing issues such as the Spanish contribution to the European debate on the future operational capabilities of Europol or on how to upgrade this institution in order to better fight against terrorism.

¹² The Parliament considered that the Commission and the Council's decisions violated Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to family and private life; the EC Directive on data protection; and contained various inadequate and unjustified procedures, such as having imposed the urgent provision of article 300.3, whereby the Council can decide without consulting the Parliament.

¹³ *European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR agreement with the United States of America*, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0347, 12.07.2007.

¹⁴ *Proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes* COM(2007) 654 final, 6.11.2007.

¹⁵ For a large catalogue of good practices in the parliamentary control of ESDP missions, see the already cited report by Born *et al.* (2007) and other reports of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

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APENDIX

TABLE 1. Congress activity on ESDP missions (April 2004 - February 2008)

Mission	Information about the Mission		Parliamentary participation	
	Name/Type of mission	Duration	Maximum of personnel deployed	¿Authorisation?
Military Missions				
EUFOR RD Congo	June-December 2006	130 (units)*	YES (30.05.2006 in Defence Committee; after the EU Joint Action 27.04.06)	YES
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	December 2004-	580 (units)	NO	NO
Amis II (Darfur/Sudan)	April 2005-December 2007	7 (Observers)	NO	NO
EUFOR Chad	February 2008-	2 (Observers) 2 transport aircraft	NO	NO
Civil Missions				
EUJUST Themis (Georgia)	July 2005-July 2006	---	NO	NO
EUOPL Kinshasa (Congo)	April 2005-June 2007	1	NO	NO
EUSEC Congo	June 2005-	---	NO	NO
EUJUST Lex (Iraq)	July 2005-	Training courses	NO	NO
Mission of Observation in Aceh (Indonesia)	August 2005-September 2006	8	NO	NO
EUPOL COPS (Palestinian Territories)	November 2005-	2 (plus equipment material)	NO	NO
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)	November 2005-	12	NO	NO
EUPAT (ARYM)	December 2005-	---	NO	NO
EUPOL RD Congo	February 2005- June 2007	---	NO	NO
EUPOL Afghanistan	June 2007-	9	NO	NO
EU Planning Team (Kosovo)	April 2006-	---	NO	NO
EUBAM (Moldova)	October 2005-	---	NO	NO
EUSEC Guinea Bissau	Pending	---	NO	NO

* The Ministry of Defence distinguishes between the military personnel deployed as "military units" and as "observer personnel". Parliamentary authorisation of deployment is only mandatory if "military units" are involved.

Source: own elaboration, with information from the Records of Congress debates (*Diarios de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*), the website of the Ministry of Defence of Spain and the website of the Council of the European Union.

TABLE 2. Parliamentary questions about ESDP missions

Thematic area	Written questions	Oral questions	Geographic area	Written questions	Oral questions
Logistics and personnel	23	1	Afghanistan	29	9
Activity of the personnel	15	6	Lebanon	15	2
Security conditions	13	6	Iraq	10	4
Political statements	13	3	Darfur	8	2
Human Rights	10	0	Balkans	8	6
Assessment	9	5	Congo	4	1
Dates of troops deployment/withdrawal	5	4	Haiti	3	2
Economic matters	4	4	Other	8	6
Other	6	4	Without region	13	1
Total	98	33	Total	98	33

Source: own elaboration, from the records of Initiatives of Congress.



The Zapatero government and the role of regions within the European Union

Number 5

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The territorial organisation of the Spanish state possesses many of the characteristics of the federal model. In spite of this, the Autonomous Communities have difficulty in defending their interests before European institutions in areas for which they are considered responsible under the Spanish Constitution. These difficulties are also evident when analysing Spanish linguistic diversity in terms of European institutional reality. Consequently, the issue has been on the agenda of nationalist parties and the political authorities of the Autonomous Communities since the beginnings of our modern-day democracy.

To face these challenges, measures may be adopted at two levels –internally, within the Spanish state, and at EU level. However, neither the nature of the European construction process itself nor the faltering position on the subject of the successive Spanish governments have allowed for solutions to be adopted which meet existing demands in this connection.

Regions and the European Union: a task pending

From an institutional perspective, the process of European construction has not traditionally paid great attention to the regional and local characteristics of the member states. This is because the European Union is a union of states and it is these states that are guaranteed a role in European institutions. However, this institutional fact cannot disguise the great organisational variety which exists among member states nor the regional diversity within states themselves. In some cases, this diversity goes beyond the creation of sub-state level, self-governing institutions with legislative powers and extends to regions with particular cultural and linguistic factors. For many years, formal representation to the European Union of the interests of sub-state level entities has remained in the hands of the member states. Some member states have established internal mechanisms which guarantee the participation of regions and town councils in defining a state's position in the process of creating EU regulations.

However, tentative steps have been taken by the European Union itself to address this situation. These steps include: the creation of the Committee of the Regions; the opening of regional delegations of the European Commission and the European Parliament; the recognition of sub-state bodies as legal entities for the purposes of appeals of annulment and omission to the Court of Justice; frequent communication between the European Commission and the regional delegations based in Brussels; the translation of certain publications and documents issued by European institutions into languages of the EU which are not recognised as official EU languages; and the occasional use of non-official languages in public communications. All of these initiatives have favoured the progressive integration of regional diversity into the EU.

Within this context of facilitation of regional presence in European institutions, we should include the amendment of Article 203 of the Treaty of the European Community, applied under the Treaty of Maastricht. This Article establishes that the Council of the European Community "shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State". This amendment was put forward by the more decentralised member states in the EU and made it possible for a state's delegation to the Council to be in the hands of regional authorities whenever internal regulations permitted.

The position of the previous Spanish Government in relation to the role of regions in the European Union

The various Aznar governments did not disregard the issue of increasing participation by the Autonomous Communities in the preparation of EU law. Nonetheless, the solutions applied were of an imminently internal nature and were adopted during the first of President José María Aznar's two terms of office. This was a period in which the government of the *Partido Popular* ruled with the support of two nationalist parties, *Convergència i Unió* and the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, and that of the regionalist *Coalición Canaria*. This circumstance explains the decisions taken on the subject a few months after the start of Aznar's first term of office. This contrasts with the stagnation characteristic of Aznar's second term of office, in which the *Partido Popular* governed with an absolute majority - a stagnation which persisted in spite of the repeated demands of some Autonomous Communities and nationalist parties.

The strategy implemented was based on the revitalisation of the Conference for European Community Affairs (CARCE). During a period of just over a year, CARCE took different decisions which improved the participation of the Autonomous Communities in affairs relating to the European Communities. The first of these decisions was the result of an agreement of December 6th, 1996 to appoint a Counselor for Autonomous Affairs to the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union. The Counselor's functions included: channelling information about EU activities which could affect the Autonomous Communities; establishing relationships with the Autonomous Communities' delegations in Brussels or, where these did not exist, with the relevant authority within a Community; and participating in all meetings which dealt with matters directly affecting the competencies of the Autonomous Communities.

Later, the role and workings of the CARCE were strengthened, firstly by the implementation of *Ley 2/1997*, on March 13th, 1997, regulating the Conference for European Community Affairs (CARCE) and secondly by the CARCE's adoption of internal regulations.

These advances culminated in an agreement of the CARCE, on December 11th, 1997, relating to the participation of the Autonomous Communities in the proceedings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This agreement establishes the framework for cooperation with the central state administration in the filing and processing of appeals and proceedings before the ECJ. It complemented another agreement of 1990 which regulated the intervention of Autonomous Communities in actions by the state in pre-contentious proceedings of the European Communities and in those matters relating to the ECJ which affect the competencies of the aforementioned Autonomous Communities.

Finally, it is important to mention the first initiative that led to the end of the traditional intermediation by the central state administration in the defence of Autonomous

Community interests before European institutions. In 1998, Autonomous Community representatives were allowed to take part in the meetings of fifty-five European Commission executive committees. The positive outcome of this experience led this figure to rise to seventy-four in 2003.

The Zapatero government and the presence of the Autonomous Communities in the European Union

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's election as Spanish President was very similar to that of José María Aznar inasmuch as the winning party, in this case the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, did not obtain enough votes to govern alone. Consequently, they needed the support of the nationalist parties. However, this in itself was not a crucial factor in determining the new government's policy on Autonomous Communities. The reason for this was that the socialist candidate had already reiterated his inclinations towards federalism and his will to complete this process internally with a series of initiatives which would normalise the role of the Autonomous Communities within the various national and European institutions.

Accordingly, the new government continued to use the same internal mechanisms that were established by previous governments to include the Autonomous Communities positions in that of the Spanish representation to the European Union. What, however, has been the Zapatero government's main contribution to the process is the consolidation of the direct presence of Autonomous Community representatives in those EU bodies and institutions which are formed by representatives of the member states. What was introduced in a limited way by the Aznar administration has been developed during the socialist administration.

The participation of Autonomous Community representatives in the European Commission executive committees continued during the socialist government, increasing its presence to ninety-one committees between 2007 and 2011.

In addition, the Zapatero government has provided the Autonomous Communities with access to the Council of the European Union and its working groups through two agreements of the CARCE dated December 9th, 2004. The first of these agreements modifies the Department for Autonomous Affairs in the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union and regulates the participation of the Autonomous Communities in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. The second agreement establishes a system of Autonomous Community representation in Council of the European Union formations.

These two agreements helped to strengthen the defence of Autonomous Community interests in the Spanish Government's position before the European Union's inter-governmental bodies. They did this through two complementary strategies: by strengthening the liaison between the Government and the Autonomous Communities within the framework of the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union; and by establishing a mechanism that allows for the direct participation of Autonomous Community representatives in the Council of the European Union and its working groups. The latter agreement has taken shape through the presence of Autonomous Community representatives in four of the Council's formations (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; Education, Youth and Culture). However, several practical difficulties were encountered which led the CARCE to adopt best-practice guidelines (December 12th, 2006). The aims of these

guidelines are: to standardise the process of participation of the Autonomous Communities in the Council sessions; to respond to management problems; and to establish a framework which permits the maximum effectiveness of Autonomous Community contributions whilst taking into account the position of the state.

Without wishing to underestimate the importance of the decisions referred to above, we believe that the most innovative factor in the Zapatero government's policy has been the defence of the use of all the official languages of the Spanish state in the European Union's institutions and bodies due to the significant change that such a policy represents for the European Union itself.

In this particular case, the Spanish position has triggered a real change in EU policy regarding the use of official languages in its institutions and bodies. The aim of the memorandum (December 13th, 2004) put forward by the Spanish Government concerning the request for recognition in the European Union of all Spain's official languages was to amend Regulation 1/1958. This Regulation establishes the linguistic regime of EU institutions and the attempt to amend it was quite controversial within the heart of the EU. Firstly, it had significant financial implications in terms of budget. Secondly, bureaucracy would become more complex with the need for more languages to be used for simultaneous interpreting in meetings and in the translation of documents. Having submitted the memorandum, the Spanish Government intensified talks with other governments in search of sufficient support to achieve its goal.

The result was an intermediate solution which went a long way to meeting the Spanish Government's proposals but did so in a way different to that initially suggested. This solution was set out in the Conclusions of the Council (June 13th, 2005) relating to the official use of other languages in the Council and, where applicable, in other EU institutions and bodies.

The Council did not amend Regulation 1/1958. However, it authorised administrative agreements to be made between EU institutions and bodies and any member state that requested the official use of a language other than one stipulated in Regulation 1/1958. It stipulated that the language in question should belong to an Autonomous Community constituted by law and recognised in the Constitution of the member state for all or part of that state's territory and that the said language should be an official national language of that state. In practice, the Council's authorisation had several effects: the publication on the Internet of translations of measures adopted through joint-decision by the European Parliament and the Council; the oral use of one of these languages in Council sessions and, where applicable, in other EU institutions and bodies; and the use of these languages by citizens in their written communications with EU institutions and bodies, including the latter's replies in these languages. The Conclusions also established that the direct and indirect costs incurred by the application of the administrative agreements should be borne by the member state requesting such an agreement, as the Spanish Government had suggested in its memorandum.

Furthermore, the Conclusions have facilitated agreements with the Council of the European Union itself, the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Ombudsman. Contrasting with this is the European Parliament's resistance to subscribe to this process. The agreements establish that correspondence in any of Spain's official languages other than Castilian may not be directly addressed to the above bodies and institutions, but must be addressed to the relevant, competent body designated by the Spanish Government for their translation. They also establish that the replies to such correspondence will be in Castilian and will be addressed to the designated body for translation and forwarding to the sender. The

Commission will only directly accept correspondence in a language used by the sender if it possesses the resources necessary for its translation. In addition, the Council will permit the use of a language in its sessions whenever prior notification of at least seven weeks is given and the appropriate means exist for its passive translation. Finally, the Council will also provide on request the sworn translations supplied by the Spanish Government of joint-decisions taken and will connect its web site to the Spanish state's web site, where the electronic version of these translations will be stored.

Conclusion

The Zapatero government's policy on this issue represents an important qualitative step forward in the slow process of standardising the representation of Spain's institutional and cultural reality before the European Union. This is particularly true if comparisons are drawn with the progress made during previous governments.

However, an analysis of the extent of the achievements of the socialist government in the defence of the regions before the European Union leads to two further conclusions.

Firstly, Spain has joined the group of states which, like Austria, Belgium, Germany and The United Kingdom, have allowed representatives of sub-state level entities to attend Council meetings within the representational framework of their respective states. In this way, and although this group is still in a minority, Spain has contributed to the process of standardisation of this option in a European Union where the number of states opting for political decentralisation is increasing slowly but surely.

Secondly, Spain's initiative in defence of the use of non-official languages before European Union institutions and bodies has not only made it possible for any state to take advantage of this opportunity but has also had a collateral effect not initially intended. Given the results obtained by the Spanish Government, The Republic of Ireland requested the amendment of the two Regulations 1/1958 that establish the linguistic regime of the European Community and the European Community of Atomic Energy. The purpose of this amendment was to obtain the same status for the Irish language as the rest of official national languages of member states. Subsequently, both Regulations have been amended, which means that Irish Gaelic is now recognised as an official EU language. However, European institutions will not be required to use Irish Gaelic nor to publish their proceedings in this language in the Official Journal of the European Union until June 18th, 2010 (with the exception of those Regulations adopted jointly by the Council and the European Parliament). This situation is subject to review every five years.

We find, then, that a number of initiatives have been undertaken which are not likely to be undone at this stage, either internally within the Spanish context or within the framework of the European Union. Together they constitute a considerable contribution to the strengthening of the Autonomous Communities position before the institutions and bodies of the EU.

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The parliamentary session of dissent

Number 6

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The parliamentary session that is now finishing has been one of dissent over foreign policy. In the previous session, the consensus was broken as the government engaged in a war that was supported neither by the main opposition party nor Spanish public opinion as a whole. And in the current session, a new political stage has been set, which this article aims to describe in brief.

Today's dissent has its origins in the end of consensus that took place during the previous parliamentary session. In order to understand the extent of the process, we must start first by analysing the electoral campaign itself, prior to the elections of 14 March 2004. The 2004 campaign was defined by the foreign policy of Aznar's government. Almost for the first time in history, foreign policy became one of the main sources of confrontation between the government and the opposition - to the point where PSOE's foreign policy alternatives in the electoral programme featured notably as a primary priority for its alternative to government.

Following the Socialists' electoral victory on 14 March and taking power on 17 April, the programme priorities became political decisions. On Sunday 18th April, less than 24 hours after his government took power, President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, flanked by the vice-president and minister of defence and with the Spanish and European standards in the background, announced from the Palacio de la Moncloa that he had given "the order" to the minister of defence that he should use all "means necessary" to bring home Spanish troops stationed in Iraq "as quickly and as safely as possible".¹ It was a firm decision with important consequences both at home and abroad.

In terms of foreign policy, that was the fundamental moment in the parliamentary session and was to mark definitively the irresolvable confrontation between PP and PSOE with regard to the government's foreign policy.

In this article, we start with this event and analyse the relationship between PSOE and PP throughout the whole legislative period, in relation to the debate on the need, or not, to establish a new consensus around Spanish foreign policy.

The fragile bases of consensus

The foreign policy of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government has been marked by the fundamental moment when the troops were withdrawn from Iraq, which was completed on 24 May 2004, when the 1200 soldiers sent by the previous government came home - just before combat in the Arab country began to worsen from that summer onwards.

Throughout this parliamentary session, the Socialist government has accused the Popular Party of having unilaterally broken the consensus on foreign policy while

arguing that the government itself has once again positioned Spain on a path towards international legality, multilateralism and European unity while simultaneously giving a decided impulse to the fight against poverty and support of human rights.

However, the affirmation by the Socialist government that it was the Popular Party who had broken the consensus on foreign policy does not fit precisely with the reality of Spanish democratic foreign policy, given that in Spain for many years a fragile consensus existed, based on not discussing the government's foreign policy; during the initial democratic period there was real, deep dissension. We should not forget that in the early 1980s, the PSOE - at that time in opposition - openly disagreed with the foreign and security policy of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's government, and ended up proposing a popular referendum in order to prevent Spain from joining NATO - something that, once in government, it used to legitimise staying in the Atlantic Alliance.

In spite of this, it is true that since the middle of the 1980s, Spain's foreign policy has been built around plans that were accepted by the two major parties. However, these foreign policy plans became redundant during José Maria Aznar's second parliamentary session because Spain had been changing even more than the world around it. Twenty years, or even ten, years earlier, Spain had no alternatives as regards its decisions on the international stage: it had to be in the European Community; it had to be in NATO; it had to be in the Economic and Monetary Union. But from the moment Spain was firmly "in its place", without historic emergencies, the political forces realised that there was a wide range of possibilities for the nation's foreign policy - and even more so for its European policy.

Spain could commit to advance further within European integration, or stand up for a more intergovernmental Europe. It could promote a Europe that was constructed around the strategic alliance with the United States, or a more autonomous Europe. It could prioritise its relationships with Latin America above those of the Mediterranean, or vice versa. It could, in short, choose how best to defend its political, economic and cultural interests.

Faced with this situation, it is reasonable that Spain's two major parties should have defended different projects regarding the country's role in the world, and even interpreting the country's international position differently. After more than twenty years of broad consensus regarding Spanish foreign policy, based on its normalisation and Europeanisation, society and the country's political parties have in recent years faced up to the need to "act", to assume the responsibilities of a country with important interests in three regions of the world and to "choose" between different, and sometimes opposing, options. Spain has had to choose between different options on the international stage and this has brought about a necessary politicisation of foreign policy.

This process, however, has met with structural difficulties. In the first place, the lack of a tradition of thinking about foreign policy. Until very recently, different doctrines did not exist in Spain. Foreign policy was defined by government and not by the academic world or by the parties. Alternatives or real doctrines were never developed by the opposition. And when different alternatives arose in the public debate and the parties offered their own solutions, there was fear of confrontation. However, during this parliamentary session, reality has been increasingly imposed, with the government abandoning the rhetoric of consensus and starting to present Spain's international options as political decisions, decisions that the different parties disagree on, in the same way that they disagree on other public policies.

Two views of Spain and its role in the world

The Popular Party and the PSOE have two different views on international relations and Spain's interests in Europe and in the world. These two views were seen clearly in the electoral programmes presented at the last general election - and so they still are four years later. If we analyse the respective electoral programmes for the elections of 9 March, we can observe that the differences, whilst displaying some overlap, are clear. And this is in spite of foreign policy and security no longer being the pre-eminent topic that it was in 2004, with economic and fiscal policy being the focus of the current electoral campaign.

These two opposing views were brought into sharper focus during the first half of the parliamentary session. Since April 2004, when the Socialist government took power, relationships between both parties were marked by an important clash. This was based not only on the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and cooling of relations with the US, but also on the European elections of that June (which entailed making explicit the two forms of viewing Spain's European and foreign policies) and the negotiation of the new European Constitution, which was used by the Popular Party to accuse President Rodríguez Zapatero of failing to defend Spain's interests.

In the early months of 2005, this confrontation was put to one side during the European Constitution referendum campaign. In spite of their differences and the aim of part of the Media sympathetic to PP to subtly promote abstention, both parties campaigned for a "Yes" vote. In this case, it became evident that PSOE and PP were in agreement over the framework of European policy despite not agreeing fully on the specifics of the legal arrangement, as is common in a political democracy. Apart from this episode, however, taken as a whole the parliamentary session has been characterised by the constant opposition of two models of understanding Spain's position in Europe and in the world, although this has moderated as international policy has evolved. As the military intervention in Iraq became a nightmare for the Bush administration (mainly from 2005) and the European Constitution project ran aground as a result of the French and Dutch saying "No" in their respective referenda, PP and PSOE were forced to temper their positions.

The Socialist government was not only forced to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan (and even to extend it), but it actively participated in setting up an international military mission in the Lebanon following the war in the summer of 2006. Zapatero's peace policy had to adopt specific nuances despite continuing with its commitment to an Alliance of Civilisations – something that was constantly ridiculed by the Popular Party. In Europe, political change in Germany and the weakening of French President Jacques Chirac in his last two years in office forced the PSOE government to be more flexible about its alliances and to change its position on the European Constitution. This led to an aligning with the new consensus led by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy.

In this regard, the Socialist government was also obliged to re-start the discourse on the defence of Spanish interests at the heart of the European Union, especially in relation to the negotiation of the 2007-2013 financial framework - which will continue providing a positive balance of more than 16 billion euros - as well as European's policy on immigration, which has meant that the government has led a long-term strategy for Africa, by common agreement with countries in the neighbouring continent.

As far as the Popular Party goes, US President George Bush ceased being a role model and the party had to find other arguments with which to criticise the government. In

relation to the economic sphere, it is worth highlighting the sudden conversion of PP to economic Europeanism (symbolised by the creation of large European transnational companies) when, with Gas Natural making a bid to takeover Endesa, the party clearly supported German company E.On's takeover bid over the creation of a large Spanish gas and electricity company.

In spite of all of this, the impossibility of reaching a consensus on foreign policy has meant that, since 2006, both parties have progressively accepted that such an unreachable consensus must not be forced through on the basis of minimum imperatives. Rather it is a question of knowing how to manage dissent to make it possible for each party to apply its own foreign policy whenever they enjoy the trust of citizens through elections - in the same way that they apply their different economic, social and national policies. This "normalisation of dissent", as noted by Esther Barbé (2006), should enable a continuing in the next legislative session of the "normalising" of democratisation and a growing politicising of Spain's European and international policies. This will involve rejecting the establishment of new bases of consensus as well as defining new limits for dissent, which define the rules of the democratic game in foreign policy.

This debate on the limits of dissent is linked to the debate on limits of confrontation in a democratic system. Dissent over foreign policy has formed part of the tense and confrontational atmosphere that has characterised overall relationships between the two major parties during the parliamentary session. This need to define limits on dissent and confrontation has also become evident in other policies – such as that relating to the articulation of the Spain's territory. Foreign policy is no longer seen as a matter of political competence that is substantially different to other policies but instead is subject to the same rules of public debate and factional competence.

A new framework for Spain's foreign policy

In this new parliamentary session, the political parties will have two options: to maintain foreign policy as a domain reserved for decision-makers and academics, or accept the challenge of politicisation and democratisation that, far from being perceived as a danger, should be assumed as a reality to be managed. Faced with the impossibility of creating a new consensus, we must start to devise a policy for Spain that goes beyond consensus, and learn to manage dissent. However, for this to happen, we must also accept that the projects of both the Popular Party and the Socialist Party are legitimate and that only citizens have the right to reject or approve them. And this is something that the Socialist government has understood perfectly well.

The PSOE and the government of Rodríguez Zapatero have given significant media importance to foreign policy since its mandate began. The first measures taken on changing the direction of foreign policy - beginning with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq - consciously sought media impact. Both the form and time in which those measures were taken were decided according to internal political criteria, with the objective of conveying a clear idea: a response was being given to citizens' demands, expressed first on the streets and then at the ballot box, with an abandoning of alignment with the United States and a re-positioning of Spain in Europe side-by-side with France and Germany. The boldness of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's decision was to put democratic principle and popular legitimacy before the former criteria on consent with the main opposition forces and subordinating previous international commitments.

Thus, if foreign policy must be legitimised in the eyes of citizens then, more important than achieving a new consensus on foreign policy, is ensuring that the policies of the government enjoy the backing of the people. However for this to happen, citizens must be involved in an ongoing dialogue like that which takes place for other policies, since only with a greater level of public debate on Spain's strategic options can we effectively handle dissent between the political forces.

Undoubtedly, this will be one of the main foreign policy challenges that the new Spanish government emerging from the elections of 9 March will have to face.

Notes

¹ "Declaration by the President of the government relating to Spanish troops in Iraq", 18 April 2004, from <http://www.la-moncloa.es/Presidente/Intervenciones/ConferenciasdePrensa/p1804040.htm>

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Spain in the genesis of Europe's new energy policy

Number 7

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During the last four years energy policy has transited from a relatively discrete and peripheral role in the EU's political agenda to an increasingly central one, not only in the internal debates amongst Member States, but also in European Foreign Policy. At the same time, Spain has experienced an accelerated evolution from being an isolated and marginal player in the European game, with a high degree of external dependency, into becoming active in the genesis of a new European energy policy in which Spain can contribute new and valuable experiences.

Energy Policy at the centre of the European political agenda

The inclusion of energy in the European Union's political agenda is not entirely new. In fact, one of the objectives behind the establishment in the 1950s of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was to secure energy supply in a devastated post-war Europe. The 1973 oil crisis highlighted the vulnerability of Western economies due to their high dependency on the 'black gold', and multilateral initiatives, such as the International Energy Agency (1974), put forward the obligation, assumed by CEE, to face the physical interruption of oil supply through the build-up of strategic reserves¹.

In the 1980s and the 1990s the EU member states, by and large, left energy issues in the hands of economic bureaucracies or private firms, which had been created from national monopolies, in the negotiations for fixing the new rules of the game in a liberalised environment. Since 1996 the Commission established the integration of gas and electricity as the first step that would lead to a real energy internal market². The external dimension, in the framework of the Union's foreign and security energy policy, kept its low profile through political coordination, and the attempt to build a new multilateral framework based on the Energy Charter Treaty (1998) failed due to the lack of ratification by crucial consumers (such as the United States) and large producers (Russia, OPEC countries).

At the beginning of the XXI century, the perception of the energy policy turned to a more political approach due to both political and structural changes. First, concerning security of supply, the 2000 Green Paper, launched by then Energy Commissioner Loyola de Palacio, warned that in the following 20-30 years up to 70% of the Union's energy demand would have to be imported, as opposed to 50% at the time³. The report pointed out the EU's dependence on Russian gas. Russia supplies a fourth of EU's gas consumption and holds more than 25% of the World's natural gas reserves. Second, the commitment, derived from the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce CO₂ emissions, caused mainly by transport and energy sector, introduced a new factor in the EU's quest for a sustainable and competitive energy structure. In spite of the Commission's efforts, common energy policy remained low on the Member States' list of priorities.

Awareness on the fact that energy deserved much stronger political emphasis first arose in those member states most dependent on the declining North Sea reserves and most committed to fighting climate change, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and some new member states after the 2004 enlargement⁴. In 2003, the EU's Security agenda, deeply influenced by the British government, included a section on energy⁵. The 2004 enlargement did not produce an increase of the EU's external dependency in terms of global net imports⁶, as Central and Eastern European countries had less developed economies and their energy mix structure was mainly based on coal or nuclear energy, but in geopolitical terms it had a noticeable impact as the Central and Eastern European countries had belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence area and still were highly dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies. Moreover, enlargement transformed the EU's geopolitical environment as it modified its political approach to transit countries, which had a strong impact in relations with Russia, and incorporated the Central and Eastern European vision that suspected the German-Russian entente⁷. In December 2005, under British Presidency, the Council advocated an integrated strategy of the three dimensions: economic efficiency, ecological sustainability and the external dimension.

The decisive fact that accelerated events took place in January 2006, as it was the conflict of gas between Russia and Ukraine which resulted in a partial and temporary interruption of supplies⁸. The supply cut reached the German locomotive. The reaction was immediate. In Spring 2006 a second Green Paper was published to set up the basis of the European Strategy in energy security and an energy policy compatible with sustainability⁹. The external dimension had finally achieved the necessary level of politization and Mr PESC, Javier Solana, was asked to produce a strategy document coherent with European interests, the basis for an action plan that would transform principles into action¹⁰. Some member states, like Poland, had before seen the issue of energy policy "through the lenses of national security"¹¹. In this context the *all-for-one-one-for-all* solidarity became central and Poland proposed the creation of a European Energy Security Treaty (referred in the media with the unfortunate name of "Energy-NATO") to provide the joint response mechanisms for a hypothetical threat to energy supplies. Although the proposal was rejected, some early warning mechanisms were developed later by the Energy Correspondents¹². The external dimension, in face of a less favourable context where economic nationalism and the use of resources as a political instrument have become commonplace, takes shape in the form of global political dialogue with producers (Russia, OPEP, Mediterranean, South America), transit countries (Ukraine, Moldova) and consumers (China, India) and the quest for alternatives to Russian gas (Caspian Basin). Despite these efforts, the EU policy, fluctuating "between the geopolitics and markets", has not succeeded in speaking with one voice; external energy policy is still dominated by bilateral agreements signed by member states¹³.

In March 2007 the targets of the new Common Energy Policy were put forward. Under German Presidency the Council committed the EU to leading the global fight against climate change (with the target of limiting global warming to a +2°C increase) and the conclusions about climate and energy from the Commission's proposals were adopted.¹⁴ The long-term strategy set up high-priority targets in 2020 on interconnections (France-Spain, Germany-Poland-Lithuania, Europe-Central Asia and among Nordic countries); energy saving (reduction of 20% on consumed energy); greenhouse gas emissions (20% reduction by 2020, or up to 30% with international agreement) and a substantial increase of the share of renewable energies (20% in the energy mix in 2020) and biofuels (10% in transport).

Change and continuity in Spain's role: from energy island to relevant actor

From the point of view of European energy integration, the Iberian Peninsula is an energy island, isolated from mainland European gas and electricity networks. This isolation aggravates the problem of external dependency (81,2%, well over the EU average of 52,3%) and places Spain at the level of some Southern European (Greece, Portugal), island (Ireland, Cyprus, Malta) and small (Luxemburg, Belgium) countries with no energy resources. Spain has converged with its European partners in the growing role of gas in the overall mix, an increase in the share of renewable energy and a decline in coal and nuclear energy¹⁵. As a consequence of economic take-off and an energy sector structure deeply based on fossil fuels, Spain's dependency doubled in absolute terms between 1990 and 2005¹⁶. One of the paths undertaken by Spain to tackle this problem is the diversification of energy sources. In 1975 oil represented 70% of Spanish demand. It currently amounts to 50%, half of which is consumed by transportation where, until recently, no viable alternatives seemed at hand. The biofuel sector, strongly supported by agriculture unions, has not achieved substantial progress despite hefty private investment and public subsidies. During the last eight years government's attention focused on gas and renewable energies, while the debate on the nuclear issue has been postponed.

In the last fifteen years Spain's gas consumption has risen sevenfold, pushed by the replacement of oil with gas in electricity generation in combined cycle power plants. Zapatero's government priority has been to reduce the strong dependency on Algerian gas, up to 50% in 2004 – despite the fact that Algeria has always proved to be reliable supplier. In this strategy Spain counts on a competitive advantage: its high capacity in infrastructure to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), a technology in which it is a pioneer since 1969¹⁷. This strategy has succeeded in substituting part of Algerian LNG supplies with other imports from North of Africa (Libya, Egypt), the Persian Gulf (Oman, Qatar) and the Caribbean Sea (Trinidad and Tobago).

At the environmental level, despite the Spanish government's rhetoric in international fora, Spain is the EU's third major deviator from its Kyoto target (32,4% over target). Although both Aznar's and Zapatero's governments attributed this deviation to the process of convergence of Spain with Europe and to population increase, there is no doubt that Spanish problem has an energy efficiency problem. The Spanish alternative to its old model is based on the increase in the production of energy from renewable sources, mainly wind energy, supported by a system of subsidies inspired on the German model. Spain's wind energy sector has experienced Europe's most spectacular boom, and the country currently leads the per capita production of this kind of energy. Up to 10% of electricity generation comes from wind¹⁸. The next decade will be characterized by the development of hydrogen, a new generation of biofuels, biomass, photovoltaic energy, off-shore wind energy plants, and the energy captured from waves, all of them under research and development in Spain.

Spanish contributions to the new energy policy and future perspectives

Spain's role in the EU's energy policy is closely related to the above mentioned characteristics, and went through an unequal evolution. Spain's peripheral and unique position concerning energy supply sources limits its relevance in some important debates. Its high external dependency and its deviation over targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions do not contribute to its legitimacy in energy debates. However, progressive diversification of energy supply sources and, over all, success in the policy

of promotion of renewable energy have gradually changed Spain's role in the European context.

During its first term in power (2004-2008), the socialist government has made a difference on five main issues: the inclusion of Algeria and the Mediterranean area in the EU's energy policy dialogue, the Spanish strategy for diversifying supply sources of natural gas; the building of an European energy market, the strategies to cut the greenhouse gas emissions and, narrowly linked to this, the strategy to stimulate renewable energy production¹⁹.

The dependence-vulnerability on energy supply pushed the Spanish government to align with the "Europeanising" thesis, advocating energy solidarity between member states and the need for joint response mechanisms in the event of crises. At the same time, due to its geostrategic position, Spain benefited from the support of some Central and Eastern European countries in favour of balancing dependence on Russia with alternative connections to the South²⁰. The Spanish action in Brussels has assured the inclusion in the European documents of mentions to other states, specifically Algeria, in an attempt to balance EU external energy policy, guaranteeing that the understandable focus on Russia did not result on EU's neglect of African and Middle Eastern producers. On one hand, the Socialist government feared that Algeria might become a southerly version of Russia's highly politicised negotiation style, as Sonatrach's decision to exclude two Spanish firms from the exploitation of Gassi Touil's gas field in 2007 and a hardened Algerian position on prices might imply²¹. On the other, the intense dialogue between the Russian government and some of Spain's key gas suppliers, such as Algeria or Qatar, the signature of a memorandum of understanding between Gazprom and Sonatrach in August 2007, and the extension of activity of Gazprom in North of Africa, with the support of Italian and French companies, made Spanish government aware of the importance of the Russian factor, despite the fact that Spain does not import gas from Russia²².

The Spanish choice for natural gas has been complemented with a diversification of suppliers thanks to a large LNG import capacity. In addition to an exceptional capacity to import LNG (46% of the EU total), Spanish plans have focused on interconnections, supported by the EU Commission, and launched projects of new gas pipelines that would connect the North of Africa to EU ('Medagaz' connecting Beni-Saf, in Northeast Algeria, to Almeria, in Southeaster Spain; 'TranSaharian' connecting Nigeria to Algeria) and its own connection to Europe (with the enlargement of Irun-Biriatou and Larrau pipelines and the new project 'Medcat' connecting Southeast France with Catalonia). These infrastructures could make Spain become a new transit and distribution centre of gas to Europe.

As for the European energy market, Aznar's Spain was a relatively advanced pupil in the Commission's liberalization initiatives, and achieved a high degree of vertical unbundling among the different stages of activity in the energy sector (production, commercialization, distribution). This remains one of the battle lines between the Commission and states like Germany or France, whose operators are larger and more integrated than Spanish ones. However the relation with the European Commission has not always been easy. Spain has benefited from the intervention of Nélie Kroes, Competence Commissioner, forcing Algerian state monopoly Sonatrach, to eliminate the clauses that prevented its clients reselling gas to third countries, opening the door to a more important, transit role for Spain and Italy in the European internal gas market. This was a clear example of the EU's greater negotiating capacity than that of individual states. But in another subject the conditions imposed by the Spain's energy regulator on, firstly, the German EON's bid and secondly the Italian Enel and the Spanish

Acciona's bid for the acquisition of the electricity company ENDESA moved the Commission to launch an action against Spanish government, including infringement proceedings for incompatibility with EU laws in defence of competence.²³ This conflict highlighted that despite not questioning the ideological and normative framework, the Zapatero's government was still prepared to force exceptions for in sensitive cases for national interests, or, at least, to try to do it.

The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is a sensitive question for Spain²⁴. The population growth has been alleged by the government as one of the reasons for blatant infringement of Spain Kyoto commitment and, therefore, the Spanish authorities have demanded the inclusion of this variable in the distribution of targets to cut emissions. Spain is investing in renewable energy, but it fails to reduce consumption (energy demand has been growing faster than GNP since the 1990s with the low price tariffs policy) and does not consider the increase in nuclear energy production to be an alternative²⁵. Zapatero's government not only has proved his profound determination to close the nuclear power plants after their life cycle has finished, but also has turned Spain, together with Austria, into one of the most belligerent states against any hint of including in European documents a mention to the nuclear alternative as a viable alternative to reduce emissions, contrary to the strategy followed by France, United Kingdom or Finland²⁶.

The most striking change is, perhaps, in the area of renewable energies. The Commission included Spain in the leading group of nine member states that are on the way to reach the national targets for renewable energies²⁷. Spain and Germany had an important role in the phase of preparation of the Commission's proposal for a Directive on promotion of the use of renewable energy to reach the target of 20% of the total energy consumption in the EU, the same target that has been proposed for Spain²⁸. Both states lead the rejection to the creation of a European market of certifications, a trading scheme that would allow countries that did not reach their targets to buy additional production from other EM's. Eighteen member states, including Spain, use feed-in tariffs systems that have succeeded in guaranteeing the necessary long-term investment. The harmonised trading system, in place in 5 member states only and advocated by the Commission for the whole EU, would endangered the viability of the efficient German and Spanish subsidies system, according to their governments. The pressure of the Madrid-Berlin front, with the support of other states like Slovenia and Latvia and the European lobby of renewable energy producers (European Council of Renewable Energy) succeeded in convincing the Commission to modify its earlier drafts and to discard the trading system²⁹.

Conclusions

The genesis of the renewed European energy policy has coincided with the transformation of Spanish energy structure. Spain still is structurally vulnerable (strong external dependency, energy isolation, inefficiency and ecological impact) in its production model, and this fact jeopardizes its role in the European framework. Nevertheless, the private and public initiatives to diversify in the gas sector and the success of wind energy anticipate a more decisive and differentiated role within the EU.

Although election results may be crucial to determine possible changes in some policies, for instance whether or not the official position will remain clearly set against nuclear energy, it is highly likely that the new government, whichever political sign it has, will keep renewable energy and the improvement of connections (both electricity grid connections and pipelines) as priorities. Improved interconnection with a more

liberalized and integrated gas market, where Spain could become a new distribution hub, and the evolution of the renewable energy sector, in particular once subsidies start to decline, will be the main conditions that will determine what impact Spain can have on Europe's energy policy.

Notes

¹ Directives 68/414/CEE, 73/238/CEE and 98/93/CEE conveyed to Member States the IEA obligation to hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of net imports. The Commission tries to convert national obligations into a system of solidarity which includes gas supply, but has met the rejection of the member states.

² For a detailed analysis of the current situation, see "Prospects for the internal gas and electricity", COM(2006) 841 final

³ European Commission (2000) "Green Paper: Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply". COM(2000) 769. To see the update provisions, European Commission (2006) "European Energy and Transport: trends to 2020- update 2005"

⁴ In 2003 the United Kingdom became a net importer of energy. The UK's dependency has increased at 87,5% rate per year on average in the period 2000-2005. In 2004 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office published an international "Energy Strategy" with a specific policy view, and the following year Netherlands finished a similar document. See "UK International Priorities. Energy Strategy". London, October 28, 2004. http://www.fco.gov.uk/KFile/Energy_Report_2810040.pdf

⁵ European Council (2003) "A secure Europe in a better World. European Security Strategy". Bruselas, December 12, 2003.

⁶ After enlargement in 1004 the external dependency of EU decreased from 55.6% to 50.4% (EUROSTAT, 2007. Energy data base)

⁷ In September 2005 the Russian-German agreement was concluded on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline ("Nord Stream") through Baltic Sea and by-passing the new EU member states.

⁸ The cut of supply affected over all to Hungary and Austria and, to a lesser extent, to Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and France.

⁹ European Commission (2006) "Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy". COM(2006) 105 final

¹⁰ European Council (2006) "An external policy to serve Europe's energy interests". European Commission (2006b) "Communication from the Commission to the European Council. External Relations –From Principles to Action" COM(2006) 590 final

¹¹ Ernest Wyciszekiewicz(2007) "One for All-All for one –The Polish perspective on External European Energy Policy" *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 8(20)

¹² In December 2006, the European Council approved the establishment of the Network of Energy Correspondents as an important tool for collecting, processing and distributing reliable information relevant to the security of energy supplies

¹³ See Richard Youngs (2007) "Europe's External Energy Policy: between Geopolitics and the Markets", Centre for European Policy Studies, 278, November.

¹⁴ European Commission (2007a) "An energy policy for Europe" COM(2007) 1 final. European Commission (2007b) "Limiting Global Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond". COM(2007) 2 final. European Council (2007) "Presidency Conclusions" 8-9, Mach, 2007

¹⁵ The Spanish energy mix is 49% oil, 20% natural gas, 12% nuclear, 14% coal, 6% renewable compared with an EU average of 37% oil, 25% gas, 14% nuclear, 18% coal, 7% renewable. (Eurostat, 2007. Energy Data Base)

¹⁶ Spain's major oil suppliers are: Russia (20%), Mexico (12%), Saudi Arabia (11%), Nigeria (10%), Libya (9%), Iran (8%), Iraq (5%) and Venezuela (5%). The main differences in suppliers between Aznar's and Zapatero's governments are the irruption of Iraqi imports in 2003 - with a

69% increase – under the former, and the doubling of Venezuela's imports with the latter (Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism of Spain, 2006. "La Energía en España 2006")

¹⁷ The liquefied natural gas is transported on LNG carriers on liquid state at low temperature and when it reaches its destination it is regasified in an LNG plant. It is estimated that LNG is more profitable than pipeline gas for distances above 3000 kilometres. Spain is the third worldwide importer behind Japan and South Korea and accounts for 46% of total EU LNG imports.

¹⁸ Spain has taken the European leadership in the sector after Germany and Denmark reached a certain stagnation in this area.

¹⁹ To see the Spanish position in the European energy debate, see "Note from Spanish Delegation to the European Council, 7, February, 2006. 6084/06"

²⁰ Spain was one of the few countries that supported Polish proposal for a European Energy Security Treaty.

²¹ Sonatrach, Algeria's gas monopoly, had entered into a joint venture with Spanish firms Repsol YPF and Gas Natural to explore and commercialize in the from of LNG the gas reserves in the Algerian area of Gassi Touil, in what had been Algeria's first gas project under foreign control. Sonatrach decided to cancel its agreement and transfer Repsol and Gas Natural rights to two American firms, claiming that the Spaniards had not upheld their contractual commitments. Spain's press and the opposition interpreted this decision as a response to the Socialist government new, pro-Moroccan line in the Western Sahara issue, although this link was never made explicit or hinted by the Algerian government. See Cembrero, Ignacio and Carcar, Santiago 'Luz al final del 'túnel' energético con Argelia' *El País*, 30th July 2007, 68.

²² *El País* reported that a confidential document sent by the Spanish permanent representative to the EU mentioned the Spanish fear of being left out of the game of European bilateral agreements with Russia. "El conflicto energético europeo. Acuerdos Bilaterales". *El País*, 12 November 2006.

²³ See Commission's press releases IP/06/1265 and IP/06/1853 for EON's bid and IP/07/1858 and IP/08/164 for Enel and Acciona's.

²⁴ The Kyoto's target to cut greenhouse emissions by 8% on 1990 levels by 2012 is over as in 2004 the greenhouse emissions were up to 41,5% and in 2007 up to 49% as the Spanish Ministry of Environment has estimated (there are only official data for 2006).

²⁵ Paradoxically, the 2006 success of Zapatero's government in cutting greenhouse emissions by 4% was partially due to an outstanding performance of the nuclear sector that year. (Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism 2006. "La energía en España 2006")

²⁶ The EU Member States situations as far as nuclear energy is concerned are hugely diverse. While in France its share in electricity generation is 78% and in Lithuania it is 72% , there are 12 Member States without nuclear power plants (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal and Malta). France and Finland are the only ones that are building third generation power plants. United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania have plans for new plants. Finally, Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Spain keep nuclear moratoria.

²⁷ European Commission (2006c), *Renewable Energy Road Map. Renewable energies in the 21st century: building a more sustainable future*, COM(2006) 848 final

²⁸ European Commission (2008) *Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy for renewable sources*, COM(2008) 19 final

²⁹ In a joint letter sent to the Energy and Transport Commissioner by Joan Clos Matheu, Spanish Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism of Spain and Signar Gabriel, German Minister for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety to the Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs. Madrid, 10 January, 2008. http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/Spain%20Germany%20RE%20letter_tcm29-169554.pdf. See, for example, the open letter of the president of European Council of Renewable Energy, Arthouros Zervos, to the president of the European Commission. Brussels, 14 January, 2008. http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Documents/OPEN_LETTER_President_Barroso.pdf

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The foreign action in climate change: from opposition to accommodation

Number 8

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Throughout the last years, Spain's foreign action on climate change has undergone a significant evolution. Its stance regarding European and international climate policies has shifted from opposition to a more ambivalent attitude, which combines a generally positive approach and the desire to accommodate Spanish interests within the European scheme. Naturally, this process has taken place within a broader context characterized by an increase in public attention towards global warming and a change in the fortunes of international climate negotiations.

Certainly, from 2004 to 2008 international climate policy has experienced highly substantial changes. The previous period had been marked by the failure of The Hague meeting in 2000, by the announcement by president George W. Bush that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (March 2001) and by the bargaining between the European Union and the Russian Federation over the latter's ratification. During these years there were fears for the survival of the international climate regime, and it was only because of the EU insistence that prospects finally improved. The Russian ratification came about in 2004 and this made it possible to reach the threshold required for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force, which happened in February 2005. In turn, this triggered the negotiations about emission reduction targets for the post-2012, when the current commitments are due to end. Finally, 2007 was the year of the well-publicised Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Over these four years, moreover, several events (not linked to the negotiation process itself) have made a significant contribution to enhancing the presence of climate change on the agenda: Hurricane Katrina, Al Gore's Oscar winning movie and the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him and the IPCC, among others. In short, international climate negotiations have made a u-turn, and it is probably fair to say that very few Conferences of Parties have attracted as much attention as the one held in Bali in 2007. So, given this context, how has the Spanish position evolved regarding European and international climate negotiations? We shall start by presenting the main features of the years leading up to 2004, and we will then evaluate the 2004-2008 period.

Kyoto as a "time bomb" ¹

Throughout 2000-2004 and especially from the second semester of 2002, Spain adopted a reluctant stance -if not one of outright opposition- concerning international and European climate policies. Actually, two circumstances placed Spain in a difficult situation. First, these were the years when the EU adopted a good deal of its measures to control greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. The European Climate Change Programme was passed in 2000 and

the emissions trading directive in 2003 (2003/87/EC), to become the centrepiece of European climate policies. Global warming thus became an issue with domestic political and economic implications. Moreover, this occurred in parallel with the very negative evolution of GHG emissions (see the graph below). Spain was a long way from complying with Kyoto and the "burden sharing" agreement established by the Council, which allows for an increase in emissions by 15% between 1990 and 2008-2012. Indeed, in no other developed country did emissions increase as much from 1990 to 2003.

At a time when it was not clear whether the Kyoto Protocol was ever going to come into force, the measures to control GHG emissions were seen as a risk for economic growth. Thus, the *Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Asuntos Económicos* (Government Delegate Commission for Economic Affairs) took responsibility for the climate in 2002 and the Spanish position came under greater control of economic ministries. José Folgado, Secretary of State for the Economy, was rather straightforward in summarising the new approach: "nobody will oblige us to comply with Kyoto over a cemetery of industries"². The government was therefore hoping either to renegotiate the 15% objective, or for the EU to be understanding of Spain's in-compliance.

Business organisations were also hostile to the European policies derived from the Kyoto Protocol, especially those of sectors affected by the emissions trading directive (thermoelectric power stations, refineries, iron and steel, cement and lime, non metallic minerals -glass and ceramics- and paper industries), which spoke of industrial suffocation, unemployment and relocations. Business organization's demands therefore ranged from postponing the implementation of the directive to the public sector assuming the costs of complying with it, given that, as alleged, it was the government that had "made a mistake" when negotiating the emission target. Such was the mood about Kyoto -now regarded as a "time bomb"- that it was argued that Iberdrola had "broken the complicity maintained by electricity firms, employers' associations and the Government on the degree of compliance, or rather non-compliance, with the EU protocol (*sic*) on reductions in CO₂ emissions"³, because the energy company had defended that it was possible to comply with Spain's international commitments.

One of the most important episodes of this period occurred during the Environment Council of March 2004, a few days before the elections and shortly after UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) had questioned the convenience of complying with Kyoto. At that Council, Minister Elvira Rodríguez aligned Spain with Italy in defending that the EU should use the word "strategy" instead of "objective" when speaking of post-2012 emission reductions. Although it may seem a merely terminological difference, the proposal implied the rejection of a consensus that had arisen in the European community as early as 1990, namely, which the international regime on climate change has to include *targets and timetables*.


Two-way adjustment

The government elected after the elections of March 2004 was therefore faced with the following situation. First, there was considerable delay in the preparation and implementation of certain important measures. The emissions trading directive had not been transposed (the deadline was December 31, 2004) and the *Plan Nacional de Asignación* (National Allocation Plan, which distributes the emission allowances among

companies) was not yet even at the draft stage, though it had to be submitted before March 31 to the Commission. Moreover, the opposition to policies derived from Kyoto was now widespread, making the endeavour more difficult. The proposals put forward by the Ministry of the Environment were quickly rejected by a wide variety of actors. In addition to criticisms coming from industry lobbies, which warned against the loss of "thousands of jobs", there were also those from the *Consejo Económico y Social* (Economic and Social Council) which declared itself "worried" about the consequences that limits on GHG emissions could have on "production, investment and employment in Spanish companies" ⁴. Similarly, the discourses and proposals of many parliamentary groups (PP, CiU, ERC and Coalición Canaria) were a far cry from the enthusiasm for Kyoto that had been displayed at other times by these same groups⁵.

The scepticism also affected some of the government's own ministries. In September 2004, the Minister for Industry, Tourism and Commerce José Montilla reassured industries that their concerns would be taken into consideration by the government and that he would "evidently pass them on to the forums that they should be passed on to, certainly without giving them too much publicity, but aiming to gain in efficiency". Even more explicitly, the minister admitted that "in the relevant inter-ministerial commissions we will strive to support this perspective, from the point of view of protecting the industry's interests" ⁶. The political and social debate would not be reframed in terms more favourable with Kyoto until early 2005, coinciding with the revival of international negotiations we alluded to earlier. In this framework, the government has developed a strategy that can be characterized as one of two-way adjustment. First, Spain must adjust itself to its own international and EU commitments. In this regard, the path set by the 2008-2012 *Plan Nacional de Asignación* (PNA) provides some targets. Hence, over this period Spanish emissions shall not be higher than an increase of 37% on 1990 emissions, which is still 22% above the 15% target. This difference is expected to be covered both by sinks (2%) and the purchase of emission allowances (20%) (see graph). Along with this, some gestures have been made in support of international efforts to mitigate climate change, in particular during 2007 -a year in which climate change has attracted public attention in unprecedented fashion. Thus, in February 2007 José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero received Al Gore at La Moncloa while the latter was on tour promoting his movie.

Graph 1: Spanish GHG emissions and targets set by the PNA 2008-2012



Source: Plan Nacional de Asignación 2008-2012 (Real Decreto 1370/2006)

GHG emissions and compliance path

- Historic emissions
- Kyoto objective
- KP objective and sinks
- KP objective & sinks & mechanisms

Second, though Spain has abandoned its oppositional attitude concerning international and European climate policies, it has also sought to downwardly re-adjust the ambition of its future commitments. The change is well illustrated by the negotiation of the Environment Council's agreement on post-2012 targets. Initially, Spain was contrary to including reduction percentages in the final document. Indeed, Spain was even opposed to the text referring to a maximum atmospheric concentration of GHG (550ppmv) as a point of reference for future negotiations. However, between November 2004 and March 2005 the Spanish stance changed and the country joined the countries in favour of establishing quantifiable targets and timetables, but only in return for the inclusion of the principle of "equity" in the agreement. Therefore, Spain can now consider an old argument of its own legitimate by the Council, namely, that targets should be based on an equal share of per capita emissions. Similarly, the passing of an energy saving plan that was insufficient to comply with the first PNA (2005-2007) was interpreted "as the threshold for renegotiating" the Spanish objectives. In a way, the plan showed Spain's willingness to control emissions and it was hoped that the Commission would understand the difficulty of the task⁷.

The document presented by the European Commission on January 2008 (on the efforts of the Member States in view of the EU's objectives for 2020) seems to respond well to the Spanish strategy⁸. According to the Commission proposal, the common objective of reducing emissions by 20% between 1990 and 2020 should be distributed among the member states "by taking into account the GDP per capita of the states". So, between 2005 and 2020 Spain's emissions should be reduced by 10%. Insofar as the Spanish GHG levels in 2005 were 52% higher than in 1990 (Kyoto's year of reference), the Commission's proposal represents, in fact, a highly substantial reduction of the current commitment. This is exactly the kind of agreement that has been pursued by the Environment Ministry since 2004.

Finally, Spain apparently seeks to add an additional dimension to its foreign climate action. At the proposal of the Spanish and Colombian environment ministries, the first Iberoamerican Meeting of Climate Change Offices was held in September 2004. An agreement was reached there to establish a network of offices, with the aims of "promoting the building of capacities and knowledge", "re-approaching the stances before international forums", "promoting the integration of climate change in development aid strategies" and encouraging Clean Development Mechanism projects. This network has held regular meetings, including encounters during the annually held international climate conferences. Although it is still too early to draw any conclusion, it could well be that Iberoamerican cooperation could lend Spain a certain clout on some southern countries regarding international climate negotiations.

Conclusions

From 2000 to 2004, the lack of domestic policies to limit GHG emissions, their consequent upward evolution and the adoption of EU measures perceived to be inconvenient for economic growth, encouraged the Spanish government to oppose European and international climate policies. From the 2004 elections onward, however, the persistence of the Union's policies, the change of government and an improvement in the perspectives for international climate negotiations encouraged the government to adopt a new attitude. In short, Spain has developed a strategy that seeks to reconcile the situation of its GHG emissions and the EU's increasingly demanding policies. Thus, it is trying to reduce both its emissions and the ambition of its international commitments, being until now more successful with the latter than with the former.

Notes

¹ "Una bomba de relojería", *El País*, 8 de febrero de 2004.

² "Las empresas advierten de que el Protocolo de Kioto costará hasta 4000 millones al año", *El País*, 3 de noviembre de 2003.

³ "Iberdrola rompe la baraja", *El País*, 23 de noviembre de 2003.

⁴ Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 27th July 2004.

⁵ *Comisión de Medio Ambiente del Congreso de los Diputados*, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 15th December 2004, p.12.

⁶ *Comparecencia del Ministro de Industria, Turismo y Comercio José Montilla ante la Comisión de Industria, Turismo y Comercio del Congreso de los Diputados*, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 30th September 2004, p.19.

⁷ "El Gobierno aprueba un plan de ahorro para reducir un 20% la importación de petróleo", *La Vanguardia*, 9th July 2005.

⁸ European Commission (2008), *Proposal for Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community's greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020*, 2008/0014 (COD), Brussels, 23rd January 2008.

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Spain's Immigration Policy as a new instrument of external action

Number 9

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The period 2004-2008 has represented a significant change in the area of Spain's immigration policy. Even though the policy's lines of action have not altered, some external circumstances have changed and, as a consequence, the priorities of this policy have also been altered. In the past four years, the socialist government led by J. L. Zapatero has made great efforts to design a suitable formula for managing regular migration flows, fighting irregular immigration, strengthening border controls and improving relations with third countries.

This formula has, furthermore, made its imprint on Europe's evolution in the area of immigration issues. Following the objectives established at Tampere in 1999 and in The Hague Programme in 2004, a distinct Spanish impulse can be perceived in the Conclusions of the European Council in December 2005 and beyond.

New challenges, new responses

When Zapatero came to power in 2004, the construction of a new approach to managing immigration in Spain was on the new government's list of priorities. Though some of the main foreseen changes in orientation had already been announced during the 2004 electoral campaign, nowadays, a retrospective assessment of the migration policy, reveals that circumstances forced the government to redefine its priorities for action.

On the one hand, the socialist government had already declared that certain decisions would be taken to distance itself from the immigration management policies of the previous Aznar governments. The distinction made by the new government between flow management and integration policies was a direct attempt to disassociate the phenomenon of migration from issues of (in)security, and explains why the migration issue was moved from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Furthermore, it soon became clear that the new government was planning to commence a new process of regularisation to alleviate the pressure of irregular immigration residing in Spain. This decision, which came in for harsh criticism from the opposition Partido Popular, acquired (unlike previous processes) a notable European dimension which served as the starting point for a broader debate on regularisation processes in the European Union.

On the other hand, the events of 2005 -when immigrants (mostly of sub-Saharan origin) attempted to overpass the fences at Ceuta and Melilla, and when the so-called "cayuco crisis" took place- forced the Spanish government to re-orientate its external action on migration. At first, it seemed that the logical way ahead would be for Spain to strengthen its bilateral relations with the main countries of origin and transit by signing agreements on the management of labour flows and readmission, similarly to previous governments actions, and progressively introducing the co-development issue.

However, the course of events soon highlighted that the government needs to redefine its objectives. As a result, greater emphasis was placed on the proposal to link immigration policies with development policies and, in general, to provide the former with a coherent external dimension -a move that would make an almost immediate impact on the Europe's immigration policy progresses.

In relation with the regularisation process, it produced fierce criticism in Europe. When the Spanish government publicly announced, in late 2004, that it was planning to open a regularisation process for all foreigners in an irregular situation who could prove they were residing and employed in Spain, most European partners reacted negatively. What displeased them most about Spain's initiative was that it had been made unilaterally, and without sufficient (although it was not necessary) consultation with the other EU partners. During the process, and particularly at the informal Council meeting in Tampere in September 2006, the Spanish government received some harsh comments from some of its European colleagues. Some, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, the then-Minister of the Interior for France, claimed that regularisations were not the solution for irregularity, and that they might result in increasing the number of irregular migrants in other Schengen countries. Others, as for example Wolfgang Schaeuble, Germany's Minister of the Interior, criticised Spain for requesting economic aid from the European Union to control external borders but without had asked the opinion of its European partners before embarking on a regularisation process.

In spite of the criticism (or perhaps because of it), the Spanish process ended up providing new impetus to improve coordination between the Member States. In order to reduce the existing tensions, Luxembourg's EU Presidency at that time proposed establishing a mutual information and early warning mechanism for policy-makers in the areas of immigration and asylum for those decisions that could affect other Member States. Commissioner Frattini championed this idea, and the proposal was accepted by the Commission and formally adopted by the Council in October 2006¹. Furthermore, the Spanish government's insistence that the authentic "call effect" was the existence of an irregular labour market was gradually accepted by its European partners. In late 2007, the Commission presented a Communication recognising that irregular employment was one of the most "attraction effect" for clandestine immigration into the European Union. So that, the Communication stated that was vitally important to fight against those who hired workers on an irregular basis².

On the other side, the 2005 events highlighted the need to strengthen the external dimension of immigration policy. After the events that took place at the fences in Ceuta and Melilla, and following the increase in irregular flows from sub-Saharan Africa into Spanish/European territory (the "cayuco crisis"), the Spanish government made intensive diplomatic efforts to bring its concerns over immigration onto the European agenda, using the argument that these problems could be resolved more efficiently within the framework of the European Union. Thus, the government stressed the need to strengthen European cooperation mechanisms for protecting the Union's external frontiers, and particularly through the actions of FRONTEX. Along with encouraging multilateral cooperation in these areas, the Spanish government also began to construct a new "migration diplomacy" with sub-Saharan countries, giving to them a consideration reserved till that moment to the Maghreb countries and paying more attention to include development instruments into the negotiations. In recent years, immigration has provided a stimulus for Spain's external policy, promoting a closer relations with (till that moment) non-priority countries or which were "diplomatically forgotten".

In the first place, the Zapatero government chose to strengthen bilateral relations with countries of origin and transit by commencing a series of rounds of negotiations and

attempting to reach global agreements on migration cooperation. These agreements (named as "second generation" ones) link immigration and development policies, as well as introducing elements of technical cooperation with third countries. The consolidation of these agreements confirmed that the socialist government had opted for a strategy that was totally different to the one proposed by the Aznar government at the European Council in Seville in 2002. This Council - as far as Spain was concerned - produced both positive and negative results; on the one hand, Spain's succeeded (for the first time) in raising its concern over irregular immigration onto a European Council's agenda of priorities. But on the other, the Member States rejected Spain's request for the application of a "negative conditionality" approach (i.e. reduced development aid for countries that failed to comply in terms of agreements on readmission and flow control). Related to migration, and unlike previous ones, the Zapatero government's policy toward third countries was to promote actions and instruments of "positive conditionality", which meant more aid and benefits to those countries showing greater willingness to cooperate in promoting organised migration flows.

Secondly, and also within the framework of this new migration diplomacy, in July 2006, the government presented its Action Plan for sub-Saharan Africa 2006-2008. Although the plan was broader objectives, the managing of immigration was a crucial element in the initial justification of the Africa Plan and a key element in the "renewed spirit of Spain's foreign policy"³. Generally speaking, the Africa Plan has helped to bring Spanish diplomacy closer to sub-Saharan countries, mainly those on the western coast, and many of which have become established as countries of origin and transit for migration flows into Spain. Fourteen countries, including Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Mali and Senegal are now on the Foreign Affairs Ministry's priority list in the sphere of migration.

Finally, Spain's diplomatic offensive has led to the introduction of multilateral initiatives to foster European cooperation with African countries in regulating migration flows. In that sense, the Spain's initiative, supported by France and Morocco, to organise the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development (Rabat, 2006) was described by the Spanish government as a "boost for the Europeisation of the migration cooperation policy with Africa"⁴. Other examples include Spain's active role in stressing further cooperation and dialogue in the area of migration at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Migration (Algarve, 2007) and at the 2nd EU-Africa Summit (Lisbon, 2007).

Within the European framework, Spain's dynamism gave fresh impetus to the EU's efforts to strengthen the external dimension of immigration initiatives. As a result of the "discovery" of sub-Saharan immigration and concern over the permeability of its eastern borders, the link between migration policies and external action that was in the Tampere and The Hague agendas began to be conformed. Since 2005, several communications and European Council conclusions have reasserted the growing importance of migration for the European Union and its Member States, as well as its key role in relations with third countries, and especially in neighbouring areas⁵. Thus, the Euro-Mediterranean partners, the African countries and those that are included within the Neighbourhood Policy have become priority regions for developing dialogue, cooperation and EU action plans on immigration.

Fostering a new approach

Between 2004 and 2008, the Spanish government has made enormous efforts to promote external action in immigration policy. Until 2004, the link between external policy and immigration policies was limited to the efforts of the previous government at the Council of Seville in 2002 and the signing of bilateral agreements with the main countries of origin on the management of migration flows (particularly for labour purpose) and on readmissions.

The first socialist government in the 21st century has, therefore, represented a clear turning point by giving immigration policy an external dimension, thereby making it an indispensable element in any discussion on managing regular migration flows; fighting irregular immigration, border protection or relations with third countries. The creation of this approach of the Spanish immigration policy was reactive: it was brought about by a reaction to events, and particularly those of 2005. But in any case, this response has resulted in the articulation of a new "migration diplomacy", and has enabled Spain to play an innovative, dynamic role in the construction of a European immigration policy.

At a European level, Spain's actions to boost the external dimension of immigration policies have had two main effects, both of which are linked with the ideas of change and transformation. Firstly, Spain's decisions have reactivated the European Union's collective external action in the field of immigration. On one hand, through looking for coordination mechanisms for regularisation processes and the fight against the irregular labour market on the European scenario, and on the other, by deploying a series of instruments and mechanisms to execute coordinated actions in border control (FRONTEX actions) and in increasing cooperation with countries of origin and transit (the Rabat and Lisbon conferences).

Secondly, Spain impulses (together with other states in the south of Europe) these initiatives, and it transforms the subordinate status that, till that moment, Southern countries policies have had in front of migration policies by traditional European countries of immigration. The Spanish government has championed the introduction of a new migration model for the European Union in several areas: firstly, by stressing that Spain's borders (and the southern Europe ones) are also Europe's frontiers, and their protection requires greater cooperation; secondly, by fostering closer cooperation with third countries, and thirdly, by emphasising the links between irregular immigration flows and the attraction of irregular economy. It is an innovative and different model, far removed from the recent concerns of traditional immigration countries. Germany, France and United Kingdom, for example, are currently immersed in discussing the crisis of models for managing diversity and in establishing mechanism to attract high-skilled migrants.

Spain's approach has not received unanimous support from its European partners, but results aside, the country's role as a driving force in this political sphere has represented a 180-degree turn compared to previous governments. And considering the results, they can hardly be described as a failure⁶. The proposal for the directive providing for sanctions against employers of irregular workers directly echoes the 2005 Spanish regularisation process. The continuity produced by the Rabat and Lisbon conferences has also confirmed the aim of the Spanish government to link immigration and development policies and to promote greater dialogue and cooperation with third countries.

Conclusions

In the 2004-2008 term, the actions carried out by the Spanish government directly respond to a migratory context in transformation. Furthermore, these actions have also helped to stress the existence of a different migration model at European level and, therefore, the need for new instruments to be devised to this end. In fact, a first step has been taken to promote a new approach for immigration, by encouraging the European multilateral dimension to manage migration flows and border control, as well as fostering the creation of closer links with countries of migration origin and transit.

The next term of office should -no matter which party ends up forming a new government -serve to evaluate the continuity of the Zapatero government's purposes on migration policies, also at the EU level. Intentions that not only concerned with new political content, but also with the continuation of the transformation option. Continuing the change is the question that will be answered by the new government, and it will also reveal which is the role and the agenda that Spain wants to play in the construction of the external dimension of the EU's immigration policy.

Notes

¹ European Council, *Council Decision of 5th October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual information mechanism concerning Member States' measures in the areas of asylum and immigration*, 283/40 (D OL), 14th October 2006.

² European Commission, *Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals*, COM (2007) 249.

³ Africa Plan 2006-2008. Executive summary. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

⁴ *Ibíd.*

⁵ See Communication COM(2005) 390 on "The link between migration and development"; Communication COM(2005) 491 on "A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice"; the Conclusions of the European Council of Brussels, 15 and 16 December 2005 and its section on "Global approach to migration"; Communication COM(2006) 735 on the "Global approach to migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy"; Communication COM (2007) 247 on the "Application of the 'Global approach to migration' in the eastern and south-eastern neighbouring regions of the European Union" and the Conclusions of the Council of Justice and Domestic Affairs, Brussels, 18 September 2007.

⁶ In an interview held in May 2007, Consuelo Rumí, Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration, claimed that the EU had adopted Spain's immigration policy. *El País*, 2nd May 2007.

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FRONTEX: Projection at the European level of the vision of Spain on border control?

Number 10

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The same year the Socialist Party came into power in 2004, the European Union approved the creation of its 19th independent agency: FRONTEX. Ever since it was launched, its main focus has especially been, upon Spain's request, the deployment of border control operations aiming at the decrease of immigration flows originating from the African Atlantic coast to the Canary Islands. FRONTEX has established itself as the most visible institutional mechanism of a package of measures implemented by the EU already in the last term of the Popular Party, in which a strategy at the European level to "fight against illegal immigration" was designed¹.

What has been Spain's contribution to the creation and evolution of FRONTEX? Which impact have the operations coordinated by the Agency in the Canaries had in Spain? These questions are going to be dealt with in the following pages, as well as the analysis of FRONTEX as an EU institutional mechanism based on the principle of burden-sharing or solidarity among states. Its efficiency is going to be tested by explaining a series of negative aspects it presents from the very beginning of its foundation.

FRONTEX: intergovernmental cooperation at the external borders of the Union

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union is the full name of FRONTEX, mechanism resulted from the emergent common immigration policy of the EU, which has been integrated, despite its strong intergovernmental fashion, in the community pillar since the Treaty of Amsterdam. This policy has kept evolving since its launching, so that it has been linked to the common border policy, based on the increasing value given to the logic of security at the external borders of the Union. So, " (...), through the development of a discursive nexus between an integrated approach on Borders (Integrated Border Management) (...) and a global approach on migration" (Carrera, 2007), the creation of FRONTEX has been based.

The Council Regulation 2007/2004, from the 26th October 2004, lay the foundations for the creation of the Agency, regulating its functions and structure. The document clearly states that "[t]he responsibility for the control and surveillance of the external borders lies with the member states"². The normative framework points out the fact that this instrument does not assume the sovereign competence of states regarding border control, but acts as a coordinating nexus among them. Among the functions to be carried out by FRONTEX appear, besides that of coordinating joint operations of member states in "circumstances requiring further technical assistance and operational assistance at the external borders", those of assisting member states in the training of border control guards, elaborating risk analysis, developing research in terms of control and surveillance at the external borders and, lastly, facilitating the necessary support to member states for the carrying out of joint return operations. Given its condition as an independent agency of the EU, FRONTEX has at its disposal its own financial system, as

well as its own staff. Spain's interest in the creation of the instrument led to the presentation of a candidate to the post of executive director of the Agency, Gil Arias Fernández³, who, nonetheless, was finally not elected for the post. Later, he was appointed as deputy director of the Agency, so that Spain is represented in the executive posts of FRONTEX.

The impulse of the Government of the PP towards a common immigration policy linked to border control

The foundations of the development of a common immigration policy linked to border control at the external borders of the Union and far from the purposes exposed at the conclusions of the European Council of Tampere⁴ are to be found under the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the Union in the first semester of 2002. Even though the PSOE has supported an immigration policy linked to border control, members of the party at the European level have regretted the turn of the common immigration policy: "Slightly three years after the Tampere Council, the same heads of State and Government, gathered this time in Seville, at the summit led by President Aznar, far from giving the necessary push to the common immigration policy, modified the agenda with short-range proposals aiming exclusively at 'fighting against illegal immigration' and established a programme that, in reality, boycotted the development of the immigration policy sketched at Tampere"⁵. The Conclusions of the Council of Seville⁶ served as the base for the creation of a series of *ad hoc* mechanisms among member states, whose functions were integrated later to FRONTEX. It is worth mentioning that the development of this cooperation field in the community framework lies within the Schengen *acquis*, with all the effects it implies⁷.

Zapatero Government: the impact of the FRONTEX action in Spain

The Zapatero Government kept on the same line supporting an immigration policy linked to border control. In this respect, it firmly supported the creation of FRONTEX, whose most outstanding and visible action in Spain has consisted in the deployment of three border surveillance and control operations between the Canary Islands and the countries on the shore of the Atlantic. In view of the perception of an incessant increase of immigrants caused by the so-called '*cayucos* crisis', Spain asked the EU for help by the means of FRONTEX, according to help provisions provided to member states in the case of emergency situations. The three joint operations that have been deployed so far in the West of the Atlantic have been given the name of HERA.

The FRONTEX action in the Canaries was subject to broad coverage in the media, focused on providing updated information almost on a day-to-day basis of the human drama of thousands of Subsaharans crossing the waters between the Western African coast and the Canaries. The deployment of the operations was also subject of parliamentary debate in *Las Cortes* (Spanish Parliament), where the opposition supported the Government in its requests to FRONTEX but reproached the Government for not taking further measures at the national level. Rajoy reproached Zapatero that "FRONTEX, for the time being, is at its very beginning and, (...) you cannot use it for anything else than a plaster. (...) I'm pleased (however), about the steps forward, though little they might appear to be"⁸. On the contrary, FRONTEX has hardly aroused debate at the European Parliament, since the means to address questions to the Council has only been used once, and indeed by MEP Manuel Medina Ortega, who has raised the question on four occasions. Hence, it could be that there is a common position of the Government and the opposition in terms of the action of FRONTEX in Spain, due to the

fact that only one socialist MEP has addressed a question to the Council and no member of the Popular Party has done so.

Concerning the FRONTEX operations in the Canaries, aside from the Government and the opposition, it is important to stress the presence of another actor that has managed to be heard in the media as well as in the European institutions: the Autonomous Government of the Community of the Canaries. Its President for the period 2003-2007, Adán Martín, member of Coalición Canaria, has addressed criticisms to both the Zapatero Government and the Union for the scarcity of resources provided to FRONTEX operations. Ilkka Laitinen, FRONTEX executive director, defended himself recalling that "(..) The implementation of the operation is in the hands of the Spanish authorities"⁹. In an appearance in Brussels, Martín expressed himself in the following terms: "In order not to lose political credibility, Europe should adopt strong measures to fight against illegal immigration"¹⁰.

Spain *vis-à-vis* the (imperfect) evolution of FRONTEX

In the course of its more than three years of existence, FRONTEX has lived an institutionalisation process still in progress, through which it has developed as a European agency. It was decided to set its headquarters in Warsaw¹¹, and the first amendment to the constituent Regulation was approved, leading to the creation of Rapid Intervention Borders Teams¹², which strengthen significantly the mandate of the Agency (Carrera and Geyer, 2007). Despite this progress, some negative aspects related to FRONTEX are going to be explained.

First, the intrinsic nature of FRONTEX as an instrument dependent on an intergovernmental cooperative dynamic prevents its action from being far-reaching. The member of the European Socialist Party Manuel Medina Ortega stated it clearly as he addressed a question to the representative of the German Presidency. "I'm aware of the constitutional constraints for the development of these cooperative mechanisms and also of the resistance of many states to assume further commitments, but we are always in danger of not confirming the words of the European Union with facts, concretely in the functioning of the mechanism of FRONTEX;"¹³. This criticism shows the lack of connexion between the expectations in FRONTEX, specially from countries like Spain, and the real action capabilities of the Agency.

Second, numerous criticisms have focused on stressing the lack of independence of FRONTEX, concerning finance, dependent mostly on the will of member states, as well as the secrecy and lack of transparency of its functions, which could be considered as a democratic deficit in its action control. On the other hand, the fact that the immigration and border agenda are highly politicised and that the Agency depends on the solidarity of member states undermines its independence (Carrera and Geyer, 2007). In this respect, Spain, as a member state in which FRONTEX carries out its action, has supported the latest initiatives presented by the German Presidency strengthening the independence of the Agency, since they reduce its range of intergovernmentalism.

Lastly, Spain has not reacted to other kind of criticisms from an International Public Law perspective, referring to questions related to constraints to the free movement of persons as a consequence of the exercise of surveillance and border control, i.e., in spaces outside the external borders of the Union, according to what has been agreed with the third country with whom the member state has signed a bilateral agreement. The application of this preventive control and surveillance violates not only the Geneva Convention on the Statute of Refugees, but also the United Nations Law of the Seas

Convention, which does not foresee that the authorities of a ship inspect another one at high seas (Rijpma and Cremona, 2007).

Conclusions

To conclude, it is worth pointing out that cooperation in the field of border management in the member states of the European Union shows difficulties caused by the logic of differentiation that rules the realities of immigration among member states. Franco Frattini, European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, called on cooperation on a press conference with Vicepresident de la Vega: "Why the big ones have not participated? (...) but here we are talking about our security, about our continent. I call upon member states to show as much solidarity with Spain they did the previous week in Lebanon"¹⁴. The impulse exercised by Spain, though motivated by reasons linked to its political agenda, has been crucial for the development and increase of functions of FRONTEX. Despite the negative aspects explained above, the Agency uses decreasing figures in the number of immigrants to show efficiency. Last 31st of January on Berlin, Laitinen stated that "To the Canary Islands arrived in 2007 70% less illegal immigrants than the previous year"¹⁵. Nevertheless, the departing points of immigrants are being displaced to the south, where FRONTEX operations do not act, which has motivated diplomatic tours of Minister Moratinos in the area. For the time being, FRONTEX keeps being an Agency of scarce independence whose activity depends on states like Spain, that bring their domestic interests at the European level, regardless of the political colour of the Party in the Government. As the positions of both the PSOE and the PP regarding a common immigration policy orientated to border control at the external borders meet, an eventual change of party in the executive would not mean significant changes in respect to the continuous support and impulse of Spain to any intent of development of its most visible exponent: FRONTEX.

Notes

¹ The Union refers to the phenomenon of irregular immigration in these terms. As Carrera explains "It is somehow surprising to see how the EU still continues to use the term 'illegal immigration' and verbs like 'fight against' and 'combat' when dealing with the phenomenon of irregular immigration. The negative implications inherent in the use of this terminology have often been qualified as granting status ascribing to the people involved a status which implies suspicion and criminality (Carrera, 2007)

² Council of the European Union, *Regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Members States of the European Union*, 2007/2004, 26th October 2004, L 349 (1).

³ Gil Arias Fernández was the Chief of the Asylum, Borders and Immigration Police Central Office. The candidate elected for the executive direction was the Finnish Ilkka Laitinen.

⁴ See *Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 15th and 16th October 1999, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.

⁵ Valenciano, Elena and Terrón, Anna, "Ni compasión ni miedo", *El País*, 29th October 2006. Both authors are members of the Socialist Party. Currently Valenciano acts as an MEP of the PSE and Terrón acts as the Secretary for the European Union of the Generalitat de Catalunya.

⁶ See *Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 21st y 22nd June 2002, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf

⁷ The United Kingdom and Ireland have opted out the Schengen *acquis*, whereas non-member states such as Norway and Iceland have opted in it.

⁸ Speech by Mariano Rajoy in the plenary of the Congreso, *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales*, 20th December 2006, num. 224, p. 11350, available at: <http://www.congreso.es>

⁹ Interview to Ilkka Laitinen, *El País*, 6th September 2006.

¹⁰ Speech by Adán Martín at the Joint Parliamentary Commission, Brussels, 3rd October 2006, available at

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/shotlist_page/20061002SHL11238/default_es.htm

¹¹ Council of the European Union, *Decision 2005/358, designating the seat of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union*, 26th April 2005.

¹² European Parliament and European Council, *Regulation, establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams*, 863/2007, 11th July 2007.

¹³ Questions of the Parliament to the Council of MEP of the PSE Manuel Medina Ortega, 5th September 2007, available at

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20070905&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN#3-232>

¹⁴ Carbajosa, Ana, "Frattini: "Pido a los países de la UE que sean tan solidarios con España como con Líbano", *El País*, 1st September 2006.

¹⁵ "FRONTEX cree que el éxito de España avala la estrecha colaboración con los terceros países", *Diario Público*, 30th January 2008.

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Police cooperation in the field of the counter-terrorism: the continuity of a bottom-up approach

Number 11

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Introduction¹

Terrorism is currently one of the key concerns for the European Union. This has not always been the case, as illustrated by the lack of interest Spain faced for years to advance at the European level its agenda vis-à-vis the terrorist group ETA. However, the trend begun by the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 and followed, on European soil, by March 11 2004 in Madrid and July 7 2005 in London, in addition to the disrupted attempts in Germany and the UK in the summer of 2006, have radically changed the picture. Indeed, the EU is increasingly aware of the vulnerability of its societies to this security threat. Spain has adequately exploited this change in attitude to become a key developer of the Union's counter-terrorist policy.

This article will provide an account of how the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in power since 2004, has built on Spain's achievements to influence the European counter-terrorist agenda. The argument will focus on Zapatero's goals and accomplishments in the area of police cooperation for counter-terrorist matters and, where possible, on related measures in the areas of judicial cooperation, asylum and extradition. Measures in these other fields of law-enforcement are crucial for effective police cooperation as a successful fight against terrorism depends on developing a coherent, comprehensive strategy that can respond effectively to the multifaceted nature of this security problem.

The EU and the Fight against Terrorism

The Treaty of the European Union mentions in Article 29 the need to combat terrorism. However, the real turning point came as a reaction to September 11 and the Union's changed understanding of its security and vulnerability, a transformation that accelerated following the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In September 2001 the European Council adopted an action plan to fight terrorism that has gradually led to the introduction of a variety of measures, including the formulation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy of December 2005 and the creation of a specific budget to finance activities in this field. The 2005 strategy commits the Union to combating terrorism globally while respecting human rights, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that citizens can live in an area of freedom, security and justice. There are four strands to this strategy: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response. Within this context, police cooperation has been identified as an area in need of improvement. The EU has sought to strengthen national capabilities, facilitate European cooperation, develop collective capability and promote international partnerships².

There are two major dilemmas in the EU's fight against terrorism. First, it remains an inter-governmental area and thus, although Member States want more collaboration at the EU level, they also represent the major obstacle to greater progress (Keohane,

2005: 3). This limitation was clearly felt during the negotiations leading to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty that resulted in a disproportionate approach, with more progress achieved in criminal justice than on police cooperation. The end result was hesitant reforms to provide Europol with more powers while ensuring that the executive aspects of policing remain under the prerogative of Member States. In other words, the EU is still far from having its own FBI. Nevertheless, the treaty did help clarify the existing 'jungle' of bilateral agreements on issues such as the powers afforded to police when operating in a different EU Member State³.

The second dilemma relates to the EU's balance between freedom and security. According to Franco Frattini, European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, "the fight against terrorism must go alongside the protection and promotion of fundamental rights [...] the two must go hand in hand"⁴. However, many Member States have been criticised for using the terrorist attacks in the US and Europe since September 11 as an excuse to improve security at the expense of civil liberties. In this regard, Spain is increasingly an exception due to its strong commitment to the rule of law. In what follows the argument will evaluate to what extent the same positive conclusion is applicable to Spain's contribution to the progress achieved so far in terms of police cooperation in the fight against terrorism at the European level.

Overview of Spain's Contribution to EU Counter-Terrorism Policy

Multilateral and bilateral cooperation have always been important for Spain to defeat ETA terrorism. This domestic need explains its longstanding advocacy for the creation of a European police force, a common definition of terrorism, and the expansion of the coordination and competences falling under the domain of the TREVI group, created in 1976 to cooperate on issues of terrorism, drug trafficking and public order.

The main problem Spain has encountered in its fight against terrorism is gaining the support of other EU Member States - through bilateral meetings and agreements - to introduce its national fight against endogenous terrorism into the European agenda. Nevertheless, Spain has gradually achieved its objective by insisting that terrorism be added to Europol's competences in 1995, followed two months later by its membership to the first group of countries that came together for higher exchanges of information and intelligence. Moreover, as argued by Leticia Delgado (2007: 308-309), Spain's insistence in including the fight against terrorism in the formal agenda of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference led to its explicit mention in the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, this active role has come at times through the use of forceful actions, such as Carlos Westendorp's threat at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to use the veto unless the issue of judicial and police cooperation was dealt with through changes in the asylum policy.

Spain held the Presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2002, just after the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC to which the EU reacted by endorsing a number of initiatives. These include the common definition on terrorism, a system of automatic detention and extradition within the EU ("Euro-Order"), and a coordinating body in judicial instruction (Euro Justice). Against a complex international and domestic scenario, the government headed by José María Aznar opted for a more definite strategy to give meaning to proposals in the fight against terrorism that Spain had long supported, particularly since the formulation of the Tampere programme in 1999. In doing so it became a key actor in pushing forward the initiatives that were developed at the EU level around that time and that reinforced the recently endorsed reforms listed above (Fernández Pasarín, 2007; Barbé, 2002). The application of the

Euro-Order to 32 types of crime (including terrorism) began a year earlier in seven countries (counting Spain). Similarly, greater judicial and police cooperation was identified as a priority area, which led to Aznar's government support for a strengthened Europol and the development of the Schengen II information system (SIS II) that contains the police information shared among all Schengen countries.

Aznar's government successfully managed to introduce the fight against terrorism into the EU's second pillar, leading to the often cited passages on this subject matter in the 2003 *European Security Strategy*, and the progressive merge of internal and external security mechanisms to deal with at least some of the security threats identified in that document. Moving closer to the British and Italian governments, with whom it shared more ground on issues of terrorism than with the Franco-German alliance, the Spanish government at the time also developed a close relationship with the US. It extended beyond cooperation in the police and judicial spheres to embrace the Iraq war, which produced serious tensions within the EU.

The Socialist Government's Approach to Counter-Terrorism: A Balance between Continuity and Change

Zapatero's government came to power in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in Spain's recent history. On the occasion of his investiture as President of the Government he vowed to wage a relentless war against terrorism: "The top priority of my Government will always be to fight terrorism, to give no quarter to terrorism, to wage an unswerving battle against any and all forms of terrorism"⁵. And here lies what some analysts see as a key difference compared with Aznar's period. The previous government's fight against terrorism was foremost about defeating ETA, notwithstanding Aznar's relationship with President George W. Bush that resulted in Spain's full engagement in the global "War on Terror". Nevertheless, at the time the country did not seem directly threatened by Al Qaeda terrorism. By the same token, although there were a couple of references to the globalisation of this threat, Zapatero's electoral programme was fundamentally geared towards the fight against ETA terrorism.⁶ Three days before the general election he had to add this new dimension. His government has since approached this new type of terrorism in the same way it has fought ETA, through a clear and coherent strategy based on two main elements: (1) the primacy of the rule of law, which was overshadowed for a while by the "secret CIA flights" controversy; and (2) bilateral and multilateral cooperation, first and foremost with its European partners but also within other settings, as exemplified by the priorities of the 2007 Spanish Presidency of the OSCE.

Ever since the March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, Spain is increasingly vulnerable as a target but also as a suspected breeding ground. Zapatero's main challenge has been, as some analysts would claim, the need to re-focus its capabilities to deal with this new type of terrorism while maintaining an effective front against ETA. Leaving aside the reforms that have taken place domestically, in this new context Spain has become even more dependent on multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Zapatero opted from the very beginning of his mandate, as mentioned repeatedly during his electoral campaign, to prioritise the "European outlook" in Spain's foreign policy while maintaining a friendly partnership with the United States, which became less intense than what Aznar had fostered with the Bush administration, particularly after Spain withdrew from Iraq.

Spain has reinforced the bilateral relationships (France and Germany) that were damaged by the Atlanticist approach adopted by the previous government. Some of the

most recent examples of progress achieved in this front include the new police team created with France in January 2008 to fight ETA terrorism, and the Spanish-German summit held in Palma de Mallorca at the end of January 2008. The need for further collaboration in the fight against international terrorism was one of the conclusions of this high-level meeting. Moreover, Spain has continued to play a leading role in the development of the EU's policy to fight terrorism which, in turn, has translated into more EU support for its own fight against ETA. The European Parliament fully supported the negotiation process initiated by the Spanish government during the last ceasefire.

Spain saw the Reform Treaty as an ideal opportunity to advance with other European Member States in a number of spheres, including justice and interior matters and police cooperation. It was in favour of the creation of a European border police force and measures related to the controversial EU-US (air) Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. In fact, it was the first Member State to implement the EU 2004 directive that obliges air carriers to supply Advanced Passenger Information (API) for flights coming into the Union⁷. Moreover, Spain has pushed in this period for the development of the so-called European image archiving system (FADO) that should facilitate the exchange between Member States of information concerning genuine and false documents.

These internal measures have been complemented, on the external side, with an ongoing Spanish commitment to tackle the root causes of terrorism. It has continued to participate in ESDP civilian missions (with police contingents) and other aid programmes in the areas of rule of law and good governance, as well as in a variety of initiatives to build up the police resources (particularly gendarmerie-type forces) at the disposal of the EU for its crisis management operations.

Spain's importance for future cross-border cooperation in the field of crime prevention was clearly illustrated when invited, together with France, to sign the Schengen III Treaty (or Prüm Treaty) in May 2005. This initiative, at the time counting only with seven countries, was created to provide for:

Further development of European cooperation, to play a pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation especially by means of exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, while leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States of the European Union (Preamble to the Prüm Treaty, cited in Balzacq et. al., 2006: 1).

This highest standard of cooperation in regard to judicial and police matters included equal and automated access by law enforcement agencies to DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data; cross-border police cooperation, police cooperation in major public order incidents and protests; and the introduction of armed "sky marshals" on flights and joint deportation flights. Although Spain was not among the founding members of this initiative (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria), since joining it has positively contributed by heading the working group on terrorist experts. Despite criticisms that the Prüm Treaty weakens the coherence of EU actions in those fields, undermines trust levels within the Union and challenges the principle of transparency (Balzacq et. al., 2006), in 2007 Member States reached political agreement to incorporate this treaty into EU legislation.

Conclusion

The fight against terrorism has been a constant in Spain's agenda towards the EU. Originally conceived as a matter of democratic consolidation, successive governments have tried to win over the support of other Member States in order to externalise to the European level this vital area of Spanish politics. This "bottom-up" approach – to use Ana Mar Fernández Pasará's description of Spain's counter-terrorist policy in the EU context (2007) – was greatly strengthened by September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in European soil, which single-handedly convinced the EU of the need to incorporate this security threat into its agenda (Delgado, 2007: 310).

Zapatero's achievement has been to consolidate Spain's successes in this area while pushing the agenda further, bringing Spain back to a clear and firm commitment to the European road after the negative effects that the previous government's policy on the global "War on Terror" seemed to have had for the country's interests within the EU. The decisions taken by Zapatero's government since 2004 have clearly illustrated Spain's commitment to the full development of the EU counter-terrorist agenda by supporting initiatives that aim to limit the main obstacles (related to the exchange of information and actual cross-border police cooperation) generated by a field of action still dominated by inter-governmental interactions.

Notes

¹ The author is very grateful to Eduard Soler, Stuart Reigeluth, Pablo Pareja and the editors for their comments during the preparation of this chapter.

² Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, Document no. 14469/4/05 REV 4, Brussels, 30 November 2005, pp. 3-4.

³ Jörg Monar, *The Treaty of Lisbon and its Implications for EU Justice and Interior Affairs*, Speech given at CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona, 11 December 2007.

⁴ Franco Frattini, *The External Dimension of Security, in particular the Fight Against Terrorism*, Speech given at the Security and Defence Agenda conference "Defining a European Security Strategy", Brussels, 18 October 2007.

⁵ *Speech by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero on the Occasion of his Investiture as President of the Government*, Congress of Deputies, Madrid, 15 April 2004.

⁶ See, for example, pp. 46-47, 49-51 in Partido Socialista Obrero Español, *Merecemos una España Mejor*, Programa electoral para las elecciones generales de 2004.

⁷ *Comparecencia del Ministro del Interior, José Antonio Alonso, en la Comisión del Interior del Congreso de los Diputados para Informar de las Actuaciones llevadas a cabo en relación con la Implementación de las Recomendaciones contenidas en el dictamen de la Comisión de Investigación sobre el 11-M*, Congress of Deputies, Madrid, 27th October 2005.

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Does Spain fit in the European defence policy? Spain and EU crisis management operations

Number 12

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Post-franco Spain has found another element which marks its return to international society as a democratic country in terms of its participation in crisis management¹. Successive Spanish governments have led Spain to full participation in U.N. peace missions, focusing their efforts on geographic areas that have traditionally been area of interest in Spanish foreign policy. At the same time, Spain has consolidated its position as a European member state and active participant in the process of integration. The convergence of these two courses of action has taken place concurrently with the development of European Security and Defence Policy and the EU's undertaking of crisis management operations in all phases of a conflict.

This article specifically deals with the Spanish contribution to such operations within the framework of recent governments: the government of José María Aznar and the current socialist government. The object of this article is to evaluate the continuity or level of change between both periods, with a special emphasis on the last four years.

The government of Aznar in the development of ESDP

The successive governments of Aznar coincided with the genesis and development of European Security and Defence Policy. Since 1998 and the French – British Declaration of Saint Maló and successive councils in Cologne, Helsinki and Feira, the EU has increased its capacity to assume what have come to be known as “Petersburg” operations. The defence policies of Aznar in this period were characterised by the publication of two important strategic documents, the Defence White Paper (2000) and the Strategic Defence Revision (2003). In these, the Spanish commitment to development of EU autonomous response capacity is mentioned as well as the possibility of undertaking crisis management operations². In fact, this was one of the few points of agreement between the Spanish political parties, although they were then and continue to be divided today, on the issues of the development of NATO operations³ and *ad hoc* coalitions, as demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq.

On the other hand, in the Strategic Revision, Spain supported increasing “Petersburg” operations in order to aid multinational operations in the “fight against foreign terrorism”⁴, a position which transferred to the organised debates in the European Convention (Miralles, 2004). The final aspect of this plan is its complete rejection of the need for the existence of permanent joint rapid reaction force and the need for the ESDP to establish its own profile based on new alliances outside the nucleus of the policies formed by Germany, France and Britain. On the one hand, Aznar vehemently defended the need to maintain a strong link between European defence policy and NATO, with mutually reinforcing structures (the European Defence Identity in the Atlantic Alliance and a NATO which are fully active in the mechanisms of consultation and decision making of the ESDP).

During these debates, the EU initiated the first civil operations (operation EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina and operation Próxima in FYROM) and the first military ones (operation Concordia in FYROM and Artemis in DRC). As a consequence of his position in favour of capacity for EU crisis management in balance with Atlantic commitments, the Aznar government decided for the participation of Spain in military operations in the Balkans: the Concordia operation in FYROM⁵ and the EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (although this was initiated when the socialist government had taken power in December of 2004), both were undertaken in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreement. Shortly thereafter, the Aznar government drastically changed Spanish defence policy, when Iraq was invaded.

The socialist government and the operational development of the ESDP

The defence policy of the Zapatero government was marked by the consequences of the invasion of Iraq and the withdrawal of troops, as well as the approval of the National Defence Law⁶. These two inter-related facts became part of the debate on Spanish participation in foreign operation as their legitimacy.

On this note, the participation of Spain in multinational crisis management operations has had repercussions with the socialist government in terms of the classic triad of contemporary Spanish foreign policy: operation in the framework of the U.N., NATO and the EU. Relative to the issues which this article deals with: participation in ESDP operations, these continue to be "top priority" for Spanish defence policy⁷. This is not surprising; although disagreements between the parties concerning Spanish participation in Iraq and Afghanistan have arisen⁸, participation in European operations in the last conservative legislature as well as the current socialist one have been an area in which the Spanish political parties have been able to reach consensus⁹.

As far as the objectives of the operations are concerned, the current government has shown that it supports these types of operations, operations involving military assistance in cases of natural disasters, advancing the idea of the armed forces as an actor in humanitarian operations. This option has validated the criticisms of the left-wing PSOE party, but also those of civil society sectors¹⁰. Faced with these criticisms, José Bono, the Minister of Defence countered: "Why does the army have to be excluded from humanitarian missions?" and "it is not extravagant to say that people who support the armed forces would like it if people could identify their work in humanitarian missions with that of the NGOs"¹¹. On the other hand, the current executive body has decided to look at it the fight against terrorism in terms of police cooperation and not so much as an objective of an ESDP operation.

As far as being able to undertake EU operation is concerned, Spain has demonstrated its willingness to develop military capacity on a European level (in a civil capacity not as much, as stated previously). This is authorised in the National Defence Directive 1/04 (which continues from the directive of 2000, with the same objectives) and the Strategic Defence Revision process which was undertaken by the *Partido Popular*¹². Spain proposed to the Military Capability Commitment Conference in November of 2004 that it lead and/or participate in three groups or battalions: one is based on an Spanish-Italian amphibious force with Greek Portuguese participation which had already existed; another battalion is led by Spain with German and French participation and went into full operation in November of 2007¹³ and lastly, Spain is participating concurrently in the German-French battle group. Within the framework of the battle group, Spain also initiated *Eurogenfor*, a group made up of military police from Spain, France, Italy,

Portugal and the Netherlands which has offered to undertake operations not only for the EU, but for NATO, the OSCE and the U.N.¹⁴. Returning to the battle groups, the socialist government has tried to model its participation with the idea of 'tactical grouping', or reduced battle groups made with fewer contributing states, a model that Spain has defended since the proposal to create a model for European military cooperation. The Minister of Defence, José Bono, commented with a hint of sarcasm that the idea of multinational groups was an idea that was "... more poetic" and that Spain's view of the subject would be a reduced version, more operative and less cumbersome, but "... each one weighs what it weighs" referring to the scant presence of Spain in the ESDP¹⁵. This reduced participation stems from the small size of Spain's military compared to the rest of the European countries in terms of defence budgeting. It also stems from Spain's "opt-out" policy for certain matters, such as Spain not participating at the beginning of the European military equipment market due to a lack of national funds (Barbé y Mestres, 2007), a critical element in the ESDP since the distribution of the military of the military industrial complex is fundamental for the distribution of power.

Spanish participation in ESDP operations and the old paradigm of military conflict management

Under the government of Zapatero, Spain participated in a total of 11 ESDP operations¹⁶. As far as military operations are concerned, the star of Spanish participation was its contribution to the EUFOR-Althea operation¹⁷. Spain intends to increase its participation in the operation from 315 soldiers (currently 276), which will make Spain the leading contributing nation, even though this participation is occurring within the framework of a national strategy of withdrawal. The future position as leading contributing nation of the force will coincide with an event considered to "historic" according to the Minister of Defence José Antonio Alonso¹⁸: the assumption of command of the operation, which took place on 4 December 2007¹⁹.

Also under the socialist government, Spain initiated its participation in European military operations in Africa with its contribution to the AMIS II mission in Sudan and EUFOR DRC in Congo, although previously it had only participated in the EUPOL Kinshasa operation. While the operation was an African Union logistical support and observation operation, the EUFOR DRC was an important military operation. For Spain, this is the second largest operation in terms of personnel and the EU operation with the most risk²¹. The government justified its participation in this mission stating that "African stability (...) is of great value to Europe and Spain (...) The EURFOR DR Congo operation and our presence there are very much in line with current Spanish foreign policy" ²².

In term of the number of personnel deployed, Spain provided 121 of a total of 1,200 soldiers in this operation. It turned out to be a risky operation, the Spanish contingent made up the main body of the tactical group with one company of rapid reaction infantry. In other words, Spain was the country with the most soldiers on Congolese soil, in the conflict area, although the operation was under the command of Germany and the land was under the control of the French²³. With this operation, Spain demonstrated its capacity to effectively participate in a military operation outside of the borders of the EU, something unheard of before, and which hopefully will provide Spain with a greater voice in ESDP, where the stronger countries have traditionally ignored Spain.

This operation generated a certain amount of debate in congress, since at least one political group, *Izquierda Unida* abstained from voting on the approval of the operation.

The reason for their abstention had to do with, among other things, the legitimacy and independence of the Congolese government in term of holding elections with democratic guarantees²⁴ and the extremely fragile political situation in the country. The criticisms however, did not go unnoticed by the government, who from the very start hesitated to participate due to the lack of agreement from the president of the DRC²⁵.

After the risk taken in the Congolese operation, Spain appeared reticent to fully participate in the difficult European EUFOR Chad/CAR mission²⁶. Up to now, Spain has made logistic contributions such as two transport aircraft, despite pressure from other European countries, especially France²⁷. What's more, Spain has been unusually critical of the rest of the Member States, leading it to declare " (...) we are making a great effort in Africa, taking on problems such as illegal immigration and we believe that other EU countries should assume their own responsibilities to make Africa viable"²⁸. With statements such as this, the ministry provided proof that Spain was willing to support an African ESDP monitored by France, but not without compensation in the form of security.

In terms of civil operations, the socialist government has maintained a low level of political interest in developing civil capacities established by the former government and has put the emphasis of its discourse on "Spain's military ambition"²⁹. For example, in the presentation of the Ministry of the Interior's action programme it is only mentioned as an example of international cooperation, of the fight against terrorism, despite the fact that Spain has participated in more than one civil operation³⁰, and no mention is made of the existing cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this arena³¹.

Despite this discourse and despite the political weight that the government has put on the military aspect, it is true that Spain has participated in eight civil operations from a position of geographical interest³². Furthermore, in the primary police operation undertaken up to now by the European Union, the EUPM operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain participated with five police forces (January 2008)³³. And with regard to the Middle East, Spain has contributed to the two security sector reform operations in Palestine, EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah. In all of these operations, Spain has contributed personnel from the Guardia Civil and the National Police. Both forces regularly participate together in operations, except in missions in which the exclusive functions of one or the other is specifically required, such as the case of border control duties of the Guardia Civil³⁴.

As for operations in the two Middle-Eastern countries in conflict, Iraq and Afghanistan, ESDP missions have included Spanish participation. And, in the EUJUST Lex operation, Spain held six training courses for police, penitentiary and legal personnel in 2007 organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior³⁵; meanwhile in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, the government offered up to nine people for the purpose of supporting and training Afghan police (national and border police) of a total of 195 police officers from the Member States³⁶.

Conclusions

As we can see, deployment of ESDP operations has taken place during the recent years of the socialist government. Nevertheless, there are several lines of continuity between the two governments. In fact, both cabinets stress the need for a capacity for crisis management in the Union, while respecting Atlantic commitments. Although the conservative government has attempted to place itself among the "big shots" in the Union and the socialists have attempted to position themselves in operations as a

significant partner, what has happened is that the development of the ESDP has proved the lack of political weight that Spain holds in this area. Perhaps that is why the socialist government has chosen to actively participate in the development of capacities via *battle group* and in the military operations of the EU. Furthermore, the socialist government has continued to commit to an ESDP that provides the EU with crisis management capacity, especially in terms of the military angle, putting lesser importance on the civil aspect. In the future, whatever the political situation, the cabinet will probably ascribe to the growing perception that Spain is strengthening its civil profile in terms of crisis management (CITPax, 2006).

Up to now, the socialist government has managed its participation discretely and voluntarily, with the exception of its refusal to participate with personnel in the Chad operation, which it assessed as a course of action without too many obstacles. However, at least one controversial operation can be seen on the horizon: the European operation in Kosovo. A good hint of this came from the then Minister of Defence, José Bono, when he openly objected to Spanish presence in an independent Kosovo. Although his successor has been more cautious on the subject, it is certain that the operation in Kosovo will be a difficult decision for Spain in the framework of an ESDP that, in the difficult game of the Balkans, will see its coming of age.

Notes

¹ The author is thankful to the Subdirección General de Cooperación Policial Internacional of the Ministry of Interior for his valuable help in this article.

² Ministry of Defence, *Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa*, 13th February 2003.

³ Izquierda Unida has traditionally claimed that Spain should leave NATO.

⁴ Ministry of Defence, *Ibid.*, p.79.

⁵ Actually, Spain had a prominent role in this operation. Lieutenant general Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano was Major General of a division.

⁶ About democratic accountability in this domain, see Anna Herranz's work in this Monograph.

⁷ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar sobre las líneas generales de la política de su departamento. A petición propia", *Diario de Sesiones*, Defence Commission, VIII Term, num.32, 25th May 2004.

⁸ As an example, Izquierda Unida rejects Spain's participation in NATO and it advocates for a European defence development non offensive.

⁹ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar en cumplimiento del artículo 18 de la Ley Orgánica de Defensa Nacional, sobre el desarrollo de las operaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas en el exterior durante el año 2005, así como sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones militares derivadas de la pertinencia de España a la Unión Europea y a la OTAN, a los efectos previstos en la misma Ley Orgánica. A petición propia", Defence Commission, VIII Term, num.509, 14th March 2006.

¹⁰ See, for example, the Centre d'Estudis de la Pau J.M. Delàs's work in this sense.

¹¹ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar en cumplimiento del artículo 18 de la Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional, sobre el desarrollo de las operaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas en el exterior durante el año 2005, así como sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones militares derivadas de la pertenencia de España a la Unión Europea y a la OTAN, a los efectos previstos en la misma ley orgánica. A petición propia", *Diario de Sesiones*, Defence Commission, VIII Term, num.509, 14th March 2006, p.5.

¹² The Directive 1/04 is in line with the traditional guidelines of the Spanish Defence Policy.

¹³ The battle group groups 2603 personnel from Spain, Germany, France and Portugal.

¹⁴ *Eurogenfor* was officially created on 23rd January 2003. As far as European operations are concerned, *Eurogendfor* has participated in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia under the Integrated Police Unit.

¹⁵ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar sobre las líneas generales de la política de su departamento. A petición propia", *Diario de Sesiones*, Defence Commission, VIII Term, num.32, 25th May 2004, p.31.

¹⁶ Spain takes part in the following military operations: EUFOR-Althea, EUFOR RDC and EUFOR/Tchad; and in the following civilian operations: EUPM, Proxima, EUPAT, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL COPPS, EU BAM Rafah, EUPOL Afghanistan and EUJUST LEX. Also, Spain has participated in the EU support operation to AMIS II in terms of equipment.

¹⁷ Spanish troops have performed different tasks. The main task has been the traditional task of any peace operation which is deterrence. Also, the troops have been devoted to information gathering, training and rapid deployment tasks. In this latter sense, Spain participated together with Poland, Hungary and Turkey in a multinational battalion.

¹⁸ *Revista Española de Defensa*, num. 236, December 2007, p.6.

¹⁹ Major General Ignacio Martín Villalain has been nominated as the Commander in Chief of this operation.

²⁰ Nevertheless, Spain participates in the MONUC operation with 2 military observers.

²¹ Spanish troops were mainly deployed in N'Dolo international airport of Kinshasa.

²² "Solicitud de autorización del Congreso de los Diputados para la participación española en la República Democrática del Congo. A petición del gobierno", *Diario de Sesiones*, Defence Commission, VIII Term, num.590, 30th May 2006, p. 4.

²³ The main contributors to this operation, Germany and France, had their personnel in Gabon.

²⁴ Actually, the opposition leader was arrested and his political party decided to boycott the elections.

²⁵ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar en cumplimiento del artículo 18 de la Ley Orgánica de Defensa Nacional, sobre el desarrollo de las operaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas en el exterior durante el año 2005, así como sobre el cumplimiento de las obligaciones militares derivadas de la pertinencia de España a la Unión Europea y a la OTAN, a los efectos previstos en la misma Ley Orgánica. A petición propia", *Diario de Sesiones*, Defence Commission, VIII Term, num. 509, 14th March 2006.

²⁶ As far as this operation is concerned, Member States have not reached an agreement in order to reach a personnel strength up to 5.000.

²⁷ "Alonso descarta enviar tropas a Darfur pese a la presión de Francia", *El País*, 16th October 2007.

²⁸ "Entrevista al Ministro de Defensa José Antonio Alonso", *El País*, 4th January 2008, p. 16.

²⁹ "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Defensa Bono Martínez para informar sobre la nueva Directiva de Defensa Nacional. A petición propia", Defence Commission, VIII Term, num. 171, 15th December 2004.

³⁰ Actually, Spanish officers have demanded an institutional framework for civilian crisis management (CITPax, 2006:8).

³¹ The Foreign Affairs Ministry is in charge of deciding the Spanish participation in a civilian operation. The evaluation is met by the Ministry of Interior. The new law on defence (Ley de Defensa Nacional), however, has created the Council of National Defence in order to increase the coordination capacity.

³² As far as finished operations are concerned, Spain took part on Proxima (12 personnel) and EUPAT (1 personnel) in FYROM and in EUPOL Kinshasa (1personnel) in DRC.

³³ Spain has participated with a maximum of 62 personnel (49 Guardias Civiles and 13 National Police).

³⁴ Information provided by the Subdirección General de Cooperación Policial Internacional of the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, other sources have pointed out the existence of a competitive dynamic between the Guardia Civil and the National Police. Personal interview with a member of the National Police, 8th February 2008.

³⁵ Spain will invest 700.000 Euros in the Iraqi training programme under the EUJUST LEX Framework, *El País*, 27th February 2007.

³⁶ "Interior envía a Kabul la avanzadilla española de la misión policial de la UE para Afganistán", *El País*, 21 de agosto de 2007. The EU presence should be coordinated with the rest of international organizations and countries. The mission will start on 17th June 2007 with a 3 years term. In this operation, Spain will deploy its personnel in the ISAF's PTR of its charge. The coordinating mechanism will be EUPOL.

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Spanish participation in the new European architecture of international development: The transformation of Spanish policy

Number 13

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In less than a decade a “new global architecture” of international cooperation for development has been materializing¹. This regime includes efforts in consensus regarding orientations, policies and objectives as well as in the design and implementation of specific instruments to carry out these changes. The European Union has a leading role in this process. The transformations to adopt a new concept of cooperation in Europe, particularly in the last decade, can be regarded as a milestone. With the new Spanish government in 2004, Spanish policies in this matter undertook a Copernican turn, which allowed the country to align itself fully with European and international current tendencies.

Spanish policy of cooperation for development, during the 2004-2008 legislature, has undertaken a path that results in an increased legitimacy among other States due to the deep transformation of its policies and a greater relative weight due to the substantial growth of its funds for development. Moreover, in some specific issues Spain has been able to start promoting its vision of what an adequate European policy for development should be. In sum, Zapatero’s government has aligned itself with other European States and has approached a closer level to its relative weight in Europe and to the demands of its citizens regarding development policies.

The new global architecture of international cooperation for development

The high consensus around the need to craft a new international architecture for development arises from a long and wide questioning of the effectiveness of aid policies implemented so far. Particularly towards the second half of the 1990’s, this questioning began to take shape in concrete results and a new doctrine in the international community began to emerge. The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the renewed political compromise in the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations are the main references at international level. Indeed, this is the context that guides the design of Spanish policy of international cooperation for development during Zapatero’s government.

At the European level, the efforts to consolidate an international cooperation for development regime are even more significant, especially from 2005. In this sense, the EU had made great efforts to improve issues related to aid quality. The Paris Declaration (March 2005) and the European Consensus on Development (December 2005) are a clear manifestation of this will to deepen and improve the international cooperation for development. These compromises were renewed with the 2006-2007 Working Programme on Policy Coherence for Development. In parallel, all of this had been complemented with the European Compromise at the beginning of 2005 to improve management and increase the resources allocated to international cooperation for development.

In sum, these efforts take part in what is referred to as the new architecture or doctrine of international cooperation for development, which has been elaborated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD) and that refers, on the one hand, to the objectives of coordination, harmonization and alignment among donors to improve the results of the interventions and, on the other hand, to the rise of participation and dialogue with partners, or receptors in the more traditional conceptualization, in order to reach an advanced appropriation and sustainability of the benefits.

From a aid policy to a policy of cooperation for development

The contrasts between the Zapatero's government in the period between 2004 and 2008 and the previous local narrowly defined policy, based on the cultural and economic Spanish presence from the Aznar period, especially the second government, are very radical (Sanahuja, 2006). The new development policy represents a strategic vision of this subject seen as a State policy. That is, a qualitative change took place in the strategic definition of the Spanish cooperation policy which implies a greater integration of cooperation policies within the country's foreign policy, including a large participation of civil society and its alignment with the new tendencies of the international cooperation for development architecture and especially with European tendencies. Regarding the openness on this area, it is worth underlining that, as part of a design process of foreign policy, cooperation for development has been characterized by a greater participation from all sectors in a wide dialogue to define the strategic objectives of Spanish policy on development.

The new government initiated its legislature in 2004 with the approval of the "Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation 2005-2008". The strategy reflects the qualitative change of approach of Spanish cooperation policy, which is consistent with the PSOE's electoral programme. The main aim is expressed in "...to stop being a policy of aid to become one of development".² This document, in addition to an unequivocal government's will to align itself with international policies, includes compromises that are both difficult and highly necessary for Spain to play a relevant role in European and international policy of international cooperation for development.

At the European level, these changes in the strategic orientation and the objectives of the Spanish development policy are recognized and valued. The 2007 DAC/OECD report, for example, acknowledges that in comparison to the previous policies and practices the 2005-2008 Spanish Master Plan establishes substantial improvements.³ It is also underscored that the Spanish increased multilateral support is becoming more strategic.

Adjusting the institutions incorporating the new European architecture

This new government's strategy for cooperation required a profound transformation of national institutions in order to adequately confront the magnitude that the change of policy has implied during the four years of Zapatero's government and the considerable deterioration of Spanish cooperation due to the previous government's policies. The subsequent institutional changes have highlighted the importance that cooperation policy has acquired as a State policy and its international projection. In this regard, first the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (previously without the cooperation part) has been modified; the entity in charge of aid policies was denominated State Secretary of International Cooperation (*Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, SECI*), taking away the Ibero-American part, and the planning and evaluation sub-directorate

was upgraded to Directorate General of Planning and Evaluation. It is also necessary to underline that in October 2007 the regulatory body of the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation for Development (*Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo*, AECID) was approved. This is another step that facilitates the realization of local and international aspirations to implement a State policy that is coherent and effective.⁴ The coming into force of the regulatory body for cooperation workers, a long demand from the local civil society, also represents an important landmark in this period.⁵

To raise the standing of the planning and evaluation entity, SECI, and to increase its personnel –from 3 to 50 people– has been a key step in order to set this Directorate General as a facilitator of the strategic transformations and a provider of more adequate support at international forums such as the OECD and the cooperation meetings of the European Council.⁶ Another crucial aspect, and one that displays the political will to accomplish its objectives, is its budget's growth that had been raised from 300 millions in 2004 to nearly 760 millions in 2007.

Substantial growth on funds for ODA

In the last few years Europe has renewed its compromise to increase ODA funds. Spain is well ranked in this tendency. In the Spanish case, there is a substantial growth in the funds allocated to ODA,⁷ moving towards 0,5% in 2008 (most likely to be accomplished) and eventually to compromise to achieve 0,7% by 2013.⁸ With up and downs this is a tendency in which Spain stands out very positively within the European efforts (0,35% average at the moment) towards achieving the donors' targeted levels.

Due to its increased funds for development cooperation, Spain is acquiring a greater relative weight at the European and international level. This rising importance is not only quantitative but also significant in the sense that Spain begins to be a more active and strategic player thanks to its contributions. This takes place in a framework in which most of Spanish contributions for multilateral aid are distributed within the European context. Even more relevant is the fact that, as the DAC report highlights, Spanish contributions are directed to non-financing institutions and to the achievements of the MDGs, increasing the quality of Spanish multilateral aid. Thus, Spanish contribution goes from being marginal to be progressively more relevant for its quantity and even to initiate, more recently, the path towards a more significant contribution during the strategies' definition process. This objective will be accomplished as the political changes in development policy are consolidated internally and, in particular, what refers to effective multilateralism. In this sense it is also necessary to define Spanish development policies, especially in relation to the EU, in a more active role.

Defining a leadership

The promotion of policies regarding migration and remittances, in the framework of co-development, is a concrete example of policies fostered by the Spanish government in Europe. The government has acquired an increasingly significant role when implementing a cooperation policy on migration and development and making efforts to steer the issue of remittances in that direction as well, even surpassing internal pressure in specific periods (such as in 2005) when the urgency of the subject made way into more traditional patterns to confront the issue of illegal migration.

The manner of addressing this issue is a clear example of the Spanish government's role, which not only sought to overcome a traditional view but also tried to influence European policy on development so that it could be more consistent with the new international architecture concerning the subject. In fact, on its report about Spain the DAC underlined in 2007 the Spanish efforts to design a coherent policy on migration and development, taking advantage of its new status on cooperation for development and that even at the international level the country promotes coherent policies. This is precisely what Spain, after recuperating from an initial reaction,⁹ has fostered among its peers and within European institutions.

Another issue, especially sensible for Spanish cooperation, is the policy towards middle income countries. The current tendency is to concentrate on low income countries. However Spain's more traditional partners, Latin America, are not included in that category. Spain is in support of not reducing aid to middle income countries due to their large poverty gaps and their deep social and economical disparities. Spain's achievement on this matter can be summed up by: "Spain has been defending at the international level and, finally for our satisfaction, the need to continue supporting middle income countries has been also recognized by the EU" (De la Iglesia, 2007: 133). After a great deal of debate, a "new generation" of URB-AL programmes had been approved, officially to be announced during the first part of 2008, and that in accordance with the principles of the EuroSocial programme will provide a framework for the cooperation with Latin America very much in accordance with what Spain has been putting forward.

Future Challenges

Coherence of development policies and their effectiveness are two of the main issues of the new doctrine of international cooperation. For Spain coherence is most certainly a key issue in cooperation for development.¹⁰ Due to the extension of the changes undertaken by Spain, coherence is at the same time one of the areas where the country has progressed significantly in order to approach current European doctrine and one of the major challenges for Spanish cooperation for development during the next legislature.

Besides coherence one of the main forces of Spanish policies of cooperation for development, and another key element of the new architecture is the effectiveness of cooperation policies. In this manner, Spain aligns itself with the principles of the Paris Declaration. However, due to the level of Spanish policies for cooperation when the Zapatero government began, the country has been behind others in implementing these international principles. Despite this fact, Spain is committed to until its aid by 2012 and starts using more of budgets' support and inter-sector perspectives, just like other European actors.

Another level of debate about effectiveness concerns the division of labour among donors. The EU Code of Conduct related to the division of labour in the area of policy for development (COM (2007) 72 Final) from the European Commission has encouraged much work in this field. The issue still needs to be studied in-depth, especially its more relevant aspects and the challenges for Spain remain considerable, but the policy fostered by the Zapatero government and its new position among other European States will allow it to be a more relevant actor as this debate advances. In this manner, Spain not only could benefit from the experiences of others but could also contribute as it advances in the extensive strategic and institutional changes of its cooperation for development policy.

Definitive progress in the direction of these great challenges confronts the issue of the necessary institutional reforms to adjust better the institutions of cooperation for development to external (the new architecture of cooperation for development) and to internal (State policy) demands. As in other issues related to this area, great changes have taken place in the past four years of Zapatero's government and the results will be visible more clearly during the following years.

Conclusions

This underlines the panorama and the great challenges post 2008, the bases of which have been implemented by the current government, and the more effective participation in the European policy making process will start. The changes that occurred during the 2004-2008 legislature have permitted Spain to gain a relevant status in international and European forums where the design and implementation of cooperation for development policies are debated. Gradually, Spain has started to contribute to the elaboration of the new European development architecture, including promoting debate concerning delicate issues such as migration and remittances, in the goal to create a long and integrated cooperation policy.

In general, the impact of Spain in the policy making of international cooperation for development has been much more relevant during Zapatero's government than during the previous one (Barbé, 2006: 298). First of all, because the changes within the Spanish cooperation policies have aligned it the other European members which permitted Spain to participate in the design and the research concerning coherence and efficiency of the communitarian policies as a more involved actor. Second of all, because the amount of aid allocated to ODA has been significantly raised during Zapatero's mandate. Finally, the institutional reforms taking place are also a key aspect of the new status acquired by Spain as well as the increasing use of the multilateral approach during the last four years.

In order to sum up, during this period the government has gained prestige and legitimacy as an active actor of international cooperation for development in Europe and internationally, reputation that the previous government didn't enjoy, thanks to which Spain has high possibilities to influence increasingly on European cooperation for development policies.

Notes

¹ I thank the revision and suggestions provided by María Sabiote, Researcher, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus as well as the collaboration of Gloria Yañez, Researcher for the Master in European Policies on International Cooperation for Development, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Additionally, for this English version I thank Idoia Hernandorena, Researcher for the Master in European Policies on International Cooperation for Development, for her collaboration and editing. Naturally, all errors are the exclusive responsibility of the author.

² "Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2005-2008", Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, Dirección de Planificación y Evaluación de Políticas para el desarrollo, Madrid, 2004. p. 16.

³ Development Assistance Committee (DAC), *Peer Review: Spain*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2007.

⁴ Dirección General de Planificación y Evaluación de Políticas para el Desarrollo (SECI, *Órganos de control de la política española de cooperación internacional*, in Foro AOD, FRIDE, 2008.

⁵ Real Decreto 519/2006 from April 28th.

⁶ A Unit of Humanitarian Action was also created here, which helped to provide greater efficiency to one of the most visible aspects of Spanish policy on cooperation for development.

⁷ There are also some conflicting issues regarding the accounting the amounts and some pending reforms, especially that of the FAD credits. During the examined legislature the amounts differ, though in a general sense it can be stated that they had been doubled. Statistically there was a change in the national accounting system and for that reason in 2006 Spain appears by little not fulfilling its compromise to reach 0.39% that year. Some years are also questioned for being strongly influenced by foreign debt aid. Nevertheless, even though is a necessary condition, the increased funds are not sufficient to demonstrate a change in essence of Spanish aid for development system. There are some pending issues regarding accounting of funds as well as some institutional reforms, especially in relation to FAD credits.

⁸ It all indicates that at the end of the legislature the 0.5% objective will be accomplished.

⁹ The Official Aid for Development offer for those countries in Africa that complete repatriation agreements has been a demonstration of the unfinished stage of moving from a policy of aid to one of development.

¹⁰ See for example, Atienza and Soletto (2007).

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Spain and the Mediterranean: in defence of the Barcelona Process

Number 14

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Introduction

The Mediterranean has been one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government. The socialist government's commitment to the Mediterranean represents a continued emphasis on the classic priorities of Spain's external policy. Stability, peace and progress in the Mediterranean are of essential importance to Spain, and improving the situation in the region represents a priority area of action from both a bilateral and a European standpoint.

However, these objectives for the Mediterranean have also become important priorities in terms of European policymaking, resulting in a series of cooperation frameworks such as the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This article analyses Spain's role in relation to these cooperation frameworks over the past four years, as well as examining whether substantial changes have taken place compared to previous governments and evaluating the legacy of Zapatero's term of office¹.

A retrospective view

It has often been claimed that one of Spain's main contributions to Europe's external policy has been its promotion of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Ever since it first became a member of what was at that time called the European Community, Spain has been aware that in order to deal with the challenges present in the region (such as poverty, authoritarianism, regional conflicts, religious fundamentalism and migration flows), multilateral mechanisms were required. And furthermore, that all the countries of Europe had to assume their responsibility in the region.

As a consequence, Spain – working together with other Mediterranean countries of the EU – promoted initiatives such as 5+5 in the western Mediterranean area and the unborn Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. This activism led to the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona being held in 1995, under the auspices of Spain's presidency of the EU.

Even so, creating a more effective cooperation framework to deal with the challenges in the region was not the only motive behind Spain's Mediterranean activism. The government also wanted to rebalance the southern and eastern priorities of Europe's external policy; Spain also aspired to create a framework of action in which it could play an important role, thereby increasing the country's prestige among both its European partners and those of the south and east of the Mediterranean. Finally, Spain attempted to drag a number of

delicate issues concerning its bilateral relations with other Mediterranean countries (and particularly Morocco) onto Europe's negotiating agenda. These issues included territorial disputes (Morocco's claims for sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla) as well as the delicate area of fishing rights, a matter of great importance for the economies of the Canary Islands and Andalusia.

When the PP came to power, it was feared that the Mediterranean (and specifically Spain's activism in Europe in this respect) would be pushed into the background. It is true that the Aznar government did sometimes adopt more unilateral policies that tended to prioritise the transatlantic axis and that new priorities such as Asia began to emerge. However, it is also true that a relatively successful Euro-Mediterranean conference was held in Valencia during the PP's terms of office (which coincided with a period of great tension in the international and regional context marked by September 11 and worsening violence in the Palestine territories). Despite the adverse political situation, the Valencia conference brought significant results, particularly the fact that an Action Plan was adopted.

During this period, important steps were also taken to boost the institutional development of Euro-Mediterranean partnership (the launching of a Foundation to encourage dialogue between cultures and civilisations and the creation of a parliamentary assembly), as well as the areas of finance (the founding of FEMIP²), education (the enlargement of the Tempus programme to include the Mediterranean) and Justice and Home Affairs issues were introduced onto the Euro-Mediterranean agenda.

During that same period, the idea also arose of creating a new policy to manage the EU's neighbourhood relations. Initially, this policy was designed with the countries of Eastern Europe in mind (Ukraine, Moldavia, Belarus and Russia), but in the end it was extended to include the Mediterranean basin. Spain had little involvement in this process beyond supporting the proposals made by other actors, such as Italy and the European Commission.

Moreover, during Aznar's second term of office, a significant deterioration took place in Spain's relations with Morocco, resulting in situations such as the Isle of Perejil crisis. This deterioration upset the balance of Spain's Mediterranean policy, and even more so given that Spain was not very successful in its attempt to gain EU support neither during the aforementioned crisis, nor during the previous disputes over fishing rights issues and Morocco's lack of involvement in the fight against irregular immigration. In this respect, Spain received very little support from France, and from Jacques Chirac in particular.

The socialist government announces its priorities

The socialist programme for the March 2004 elections declared that Spain had to "redefine, recover and strengthen the main areas of its foreign policy", specifying that it had to correct the "abrupt change of direction imposed by the Partido Popular government". The PP was accused of having broken the consensus in foreign policy. In other words, the socialist party's proposals combined a determination to preserve the traditional diplomatic approach with a desire to distance itself from the methods, alliances, priorities and legacies of the Partido Popular.

With respect to the Mediterranean, the electoral programme highlighted that the incoming

government would have to tackle "the backward drift and loss of leadership of our Euro-Mediterranean policy", and that it was "of vital, urgent importance to re-launch and restructure it". The socialists even spoke of "recovering Spain's Mediterranean policy" and to that end promised to hold a "Summit of Heads of State and Government on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, in November 2005"³.

On his first speech before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Miguel Ángel Moratinos repeated this commitment, and announced that the summit would be held in Barcelona. During his address, the minister declared that Spain would ensure that the European Neighbourhood Policy did not turn into a kind of veiled pre-membership arrangement for countries from the East that would establish discrimination between regions. At the same time, Moratinos stressed that Spain would seek agreement with France and the EU as a whole in order to promote the regional integration of the Maghreb region, and that the government would distance itself from the power plays that took place in the region during the Aznar period⁴.

To what extent has the PSOE complied with these promises? This article analyses Spain's role in the development of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as its reaction to France's proposal to create a Mediterranean Union.

The Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Mediterranean Union

During the first year of Zapatero's term of office, the government and Spanish diplomacy made great efforts to bring to fruition the idea of holding a summit that would revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean process and highlight Spain's leadership in this field. Spain's first triumph was its successful bid for 2005 to be declared "Mediterranean Year", while the second came when the United Kingdom agreed to the conference being held in Barcelona, in spite of the fact that Britain would hold the presidency of the European Union at that time. The third was when Spain convinced the British government that the event should be a high-ranking one; that is to say, it would be attended by heads of state and government, something that was unprecedented at a Euro-Mediterranean level.

An intense diplomatic process was duly commenced; its objectives were that a significant number of Euro-Mediterranean leaders should attend the summit, and that a series of agreements would be signed by the Euro-Mediterranean partners, and which would give a fresh boost to the Barcelona Process. The first of these objectives was only partly achieved; while the heads of nearly all the EU Member States attended the meeting, only a few of the Mediterranean partners did so. Nor was the second objective fully achieved, even though an ambitious Work Programme was approved (and which included significant new features in areas such as immigration, education and the environment), consensus could not be reached on general conclusions, while the code of conduct for the fight against terrorism did not live up to expectations, either. To some extent, the summit's bitter-sweet results were caused by undue expectations. Both Spain and other countries had allowed expectations to become inflated, particularly if one bears in mind the regional context in which the summit was held.

In spite of this frustration, the efforts made by Spain's government and diplomats did strengthen Spain's role in Mediterranean issues. Thanks to its efforts and to the work

carried out jointly with other countries such as Morocco and France, Spain also managed to promote an orientation towards cooperation over the issue of migration that went beyond the mere coordination of police forces, and significant steps were taken towards greater judicial cooperation between the Mediterranean partners.

Nevertheless, in subsequent years, Spain's activism never again reached the heights of 2005. During 2006, 2007 and the early part of 2008, Spain has continued in its commitment to the Barcelona Process, insisting on the importance of the cooperation framework compared to other frameworks and initiatives. Spain also supported Albania and Mauritania's entry into the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. However, in recent years there has been a dearth of specific proposals to help restore confidence in the Euro-Mediterranean framework.

Within this defensive strategy, it should be mentioned that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) generated a certain amount of fear in Spain, mainly because it was perceived to be a policy that was overly slanted towards Eastern Europe, and also because it might eclipse the Barcelona Process. Even so, as the ENP became consolidated, Spain took on board the policy's philosophy and attempted to ensure that the policy was as sensitive as possible to Spain's interests.

Specifically, this meant achieving a budget framework that would not be detrimental to Mediterranean countries, and which would in turn be as generous as possible - in terms of funding and its geographical reach - to the areas of cross-border cooperation and maritime basins. Meanwhile, during José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's term of office, Spain also reached agreements with France, Portugal and the Commission to make reality Morocco's desire to achieve a deeper level of integration with the EU than that of mere association. This is what has come to be called the "Advanced Statute" and was still in the process of being defined during the last stage of Zapatero's term of office.

Thanks to Spain's involvement in the preparation of this Advanced Statute, and thanks also to the work it carried out jointly with Morocco for the Barcelona Summit in 2005 and the Euro-African Conference on Migration in Rabat in 2006, Spain stopped being perceived as a state that was hostile to Morocco's interests within the EU. Morocco had particularly felt this hostility in 2001 and 2002, under the Aznar government. This change helps to explain why the crisis that took place in Spanish-Morocco relations in November 2007 (following the visit by the Spanish monarchs to Ceuta and Melilla) had a limited impact and no repercussions at all at a European level.

In any case, what has most revolutionised Euro-Mediterranean relations in the past four years is Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal to build a Mediterranean Union. It was first mentioned by the then-candidate for the presidency of France during a speech in Toulon in February 2007, in which Sarkozy presented it as a response to the supposed failure of the Barcelona Process. Later on, in a speech he made in Tangiers that October, the now-President of the Republic stressed that the Mediterranean Union would be a complement to the already existing initiatives.

What was Spain's reaction? At first, the proposal produced great unease in political, diplomatic and academic circles. The approach of the French proposal was very different to the one Spain had reiterated so many times: to work at a European level. Spain viewed France's proposal as a backward step, in that it excluded non-Mediterranean EU countries;

the Spanish government believed that its steady, gradual involvement in Mediterranean issues had been one of its main areas of success in the past decade. Furthermore, as Sarkozy's proposal began to take form, Spain started to fear losing its central position on the Mediterranean agenda, to the extent of the eventual disempowerment of the Barcelona Process – a process into which Spanish diplomacy and government had invested enormous effort.

This explains why the Spanish government (which could not afford to enter into confrontation with France over this issue) centred its efforts on ensuring that the French proposal would have the minimum possible impact on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership or, if possible, that it would even strengthen it. At first, Miguel Ángel Moratinos even suggested that the French proposal be transformed into a "Euro-Mediterranean Union"⁵; implying that this change of name would mean that the Barcelona process would take a qualitative leap forward, at the same time as anchoring it to a European-based approach, and with the full participation of all the EU Member States.

Moratinos' idea was not followed and Spain has only managed to modify the French proposal, albeit in a limited fashion. The change was announced during the trilateral meeting held in Rome in December 2007, when Sarkozy, Prodi and Rodríguez Zapatero sealed an accord to promote the re-named "Union for the Mediterranean". Even though emphasis has been placed on the fact that the new initiative will coordinate with the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, and that the EU will also be involved (through the Commission), it is also true that the measure is being presented as a new stage in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Furthermore, this is a stage which, in the medium-term, might well eclipse the Barcelona Process.

Conclusions

As this analysis shows, the Mediterranean has been one of the main priorities of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government. During his mandate, great efforts have been made to push forward the Barcelona Process, the flagship of Spain's Mediterranean policy, which is firmly anchored in a European approach. Thus, one of the central pillars of Spain's external policy has been maintained and even strengthened.

There were some significant triumphs during the first half of the current term of office, including the introduction of the dimension of Justice and Home Affairs into Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, a global Euro-African strategy on how best to tackle the issue of migration, and the devising of new formulas for integrating Mediterranean partners into the EU (Morocco's Advanced Statute). Even so, they are incomplete achievements that did not succeed in restoring confidence and enthusiasm for Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal to create a Mediterranean Union has awoken fresh uncertainty over Spain's role in Mediterranean issues. The future of Euro-Mediterranean relations and, to some extent, Spain's Mediterranean policy is at stake in 2008. Spain cannot welcome France's renewed interest in Mediterranean issues. However, the Spanish government should also carry on emphasising the need to make use of this boost in order to help the Barcelona Process to take a qualitative step forward, though without ruling out complements based on a sub-regional approach or structures that are similar though not identical to the strengthened cooperation initiatives. Spain should also ensure that the plan

to develop an Advanced Statute with Morocco is successful, so as to provide the latter with real incentives to develop a programme of reform that could show the route to follow for other countries in the Mediterranean basin. Because this is the sphere in which Spain and every other country involved in Mediterranean issues should be redoubling their efforts: offering truly attractive incentives to the countries of the south and east of the Mediterranean, so as to regain credibility among the governments and societies of our southern neighbours.

Notes

¹ The article does not refer to Spain's actions in the Near East, an area of action that is specifically dealt with in another article in this collection.

² Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership.

³ PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] (2004) *Merecemos una España mejor, programa electoral, elecciones generales de 2004*.

⁴ "The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Moratinos Cuyaubé) appears before Parliament to inform of the general lines of action of his Ministry's policy", Committee for Foreign Affairs, Session no. 2, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, VIII Legislatura, no. 24, 19 May 2004. p 7.

⁵ Miguel Ángel Moratinos, "Del proceso de Barcelona a la Unión Euromediterránea", in *El País*, 2 August 2007.

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Spain and the Arab-Israeli conflict: a demand for a greater European role

Number 15

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The Arab-Israeli conflict plays an important role within Spain's policy towards the Mediterranean and the Arab world. Moreover, the European dimension is crucial when making sense of Spain's position towards this conflict in the last few years. The Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been crucial in the development of the European Union's foreign policy. Notwithstanding, the Union's role in this conflict (and before, that of the European Community) has been conditioned by a number of obstacles, including the internal divisions on this subject among member states, the EU's weak standing in security and defence, and the hegemonic role played by the US in consecutive peace processes. The end result has been the Union's confinement to the position of main donor.

The EU has tried to move away from this restricted image to develop, progressively, a more political role. This is clearly illustrated by the creation in 1996 of the Special Envoy, the EU's participation in the Quartet when defining the "Road Map" for peace, and the deployment of the first European Security and Defence Missions (ESDP) missions to the Palestinian Territories.

This article will provide an analysis of the Spanish position vis-à-vis some of the key recent events in the Middle East. Attention will be specifically placed on its reaction to the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections, its position towards the division of the Palestinian Territories in two, its attitude towards the war in Lebanon and, more recently, the role Spain played at the peace conference held in Annapolis and related efforts taken to move closer to durable peace in that part of the world.

The European dimension in Spain's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict

The involvement of democratic Spain in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been heavily influenced by the European dimension. Spain was forced to recognise the Israeli State during its accession to the European Economic Community, which represented a break-up of the policy followed during the Franco regime. At the bilateral level, following that recognition, Spain showed a willingness to deepen its relations with all sides of the conflict, shedding light on its total support for a solution based on the creation of two viable states and the resolution of the refugee question. By hosting the 1991 peace conference in Madrid, Spain showed its readiness to contribute to the peaceful resolution of a conflict that had always threatened to turn into a destabilising factor in the wider region.

The change of government in 1996, with the Popular Party (PP) coming into government, did not lead to modifications on traditional diplomatic policy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, notwithstanding regional events, this government was relatively less

active than its socialist predecessors. This pattern began to change during Aznar's second administration, particularly in the first half of 2002, when Spain took over the Presidency of the EU. This presidency was forced to tackle the increasing levels of violence developing in the Palestinian Territories as a result of the second Intifada. The Quartet was also created during this period, with its first meeting taking place in Madrid on the 10 April 2002.

During that first half of the year, but more generally during eight years of conservative government, Aznar's team tried to build a more impartial image in the eyes of its Israeli counterparts in order to increase Spain's chances as a possible mediator and, eventually, as a suitable host for a second peace conference involving the whole region. Despite its best efforts, the policy followed by PP towards the Arab-Israeli conflict backlashed towards the end of Aznar's second government due to its clear-cut support of the US offensive against Iraq. This decision was detrimental to Spain's image in the region.

The priorities of the Socialist government

The Socialist Party's (PSOE) electoral programme placed great emphasis on the effects of the Iraq war. The PP was vehemently accused in that document of having ruined Spain's credibility in the region. The socialists were therefore committed to supporting the Road Map adopted by the Quartet, asking for greater EU engagement in the resolution of the conflict and encouraging initiatives such as the Geneva accords¹.

The appointment of the former EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, as Foreign Minister was a clear sign of the centrality afforded to the Arab-Israeli conflict by Zapatero's government. In his first appearance in the Spanish Congress he reiterated the administration's commitment to the Road Map and to finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict that included "a solution to the problems in Syria and Lebanon" in order to "recover the balance and security in the region". Moratinos also committed himself to reinforcing Spain's links with the Arab world and Israel².

A number of events took place throughout Zapatero's administration, particularly in the second half, which would put to the test the government's commitments to realise the objectives it defined back in 2004.

Spain and the Hamas government

The results of the Palestinian legislative elections of 25 January 2006 left the international community, particularly key players in the region, in a challenging situation. From a total of 132 members of parliament, Hamas ended up with 74 and, therefore, with the power to form a new government in the Palestinian Territories. Despite calls for a Palestinian democratic regeneration, the international community felt uncomfortable with this new scenario. Hamas was portrayed as a terrorist organisation that refuses to recognise the Israeli State and promotes armed attacks against it³.

The EU ended up temporarily cancelling its economic aid to the Palestinian National Authority in order to suffocate any hope for institutional development. The international community imposed very clear conditions on Hamas: its renunciation of the use of violence, the recognition of the Israeli State and the acceptance of previously reached agreements between Palestinians and Israelis. At the same time, this boycott, to which Spain adhered wholeheartedly, included financial and political support for the presidency

of Mahmud Abbas⁴. Against this background, Foreign Minister Moratinos travelled to the Middle East in April 2006 with the goal of reaching an agreement on new economic channels for the Palestinian presidency that could elude Hamas.

This dramatic situation was compounded by the repercussions of the bombardments in Lebanon and Hamas' incapacity to meet the abovementioned conditions set by the international community. As a result the European and Spanish diplomatic offensives moved to an emphasis on the need to create a national unity government in the Palestinian Territories⁵. These demands, with the support of Saudi Arabia, came to fruition and in doing so, to a certain extent, reinforced Mahmud Abbas' position.

The fact that neither the EU nor Spain lifted its sanctions against the Palestinian government contributed months after, to the intra-Palestinian struggles of spring 2007 and the collapse of the government of national unity. Unintentionally they became accomplices in the fragmentation of the Palestinian Territories into two distinct political entities, Gaza under Hamas control and the West Bank under Fatah control.

Spain and the war in Lebanon

The break-up of the conflict in Lebanon had detrimental effects for the already explosive situation in the Palestinian Territories. The strategy followed by Spain towards this new regional episode of violence was fast and blunt, "a policy of public positioning".⁶ That policy consisted in the condemnation of Hezbollah's actions and attacks but also of Israel's disproportionate use of violence and for which it was heavily criticised by the Spanish Popular Party (Álvarez-Ossorio, 2007).

Zapatero was one of the few European leaders to react quickly and strongly against the Israeli offensive. As a result, he was heavily criticised by the Israeli Ambassador in Spain, Victor Harel, and depicted as anti-Semitic by some members of the Jewish community in Spain. Despite these attacks, the Spanish government defended its position in the Council of the European Union, characterised once more by fundamental divisions among member states on the policy to follow towards the Middle East⁷.

EU member states were divided between those supporting a ceasefire, including France and Spain, and those like Germany and the UK that preferred a more flexible formula such as the end of hostilities. At the same time, although the idea that Europe should be implicated in the resolution of the conflict was not questioned, the possibility of an international intervention was similarly divisive. Together with France and Italy, Spain was at the forefront of those countries arguing in favour of an ample international deployment to reinforce UNIFIL on the ground and to support the Lebanese government (Sabiote, 2006 and Soler i Lecha, 2006).

Zapatero's government increasingly became more committed to Spain's participation in that mission, as illustrated by the presence of up to 1,100 soldiers on the ground⁸. This deployment of Spanish troops created a controversy within Spain between the government and the opposition, particularly following the death of six Spanish soldiers in June 2007. The PP used this incident to compare Spain's role in Lebanon with the Iraq war. These tensions proved once more the existence of a split in the domestic consensus on issues of defence policy⁹.

Spain was also a firm supporter of the need for economic support to help in the reconstruction of Lebanon (Goenaga, 2007). It also put great efforts, together with France and Italy, on the diplomatic offensive targeted at the Lebanese authorities and

opposition parties to avoid the collapse of the political and confessional equilibrium achieved in Lebanon. Moratinos was able to use his political experience in the region to develop his preferred option of dialogue with all actors, including Hezbollah¹⁰, for which he has been in constant confrontation with the Popular Party.

Spain and Peace in the Region

During the first half of Zapatero's administration Spain portrayed itself as a firm supporter of the need to progress according to the Road Map but, oddly, it always defended the idea that the definite solution of the conflict depended on taking a regional approach. In this period Spain also backed a greater involvement by the EU in areas in which it had until then been rather marginal or non-existent. A clear illustration is the active participation of Spanish personnel in the two ESDP missions to the Palestinian Territories.

The changes that took place in the region since 2006 did, nevertheless, force a change in some of the principles and commitments mentioned above, while at the same time reinforcing the conviction that Spanish diplomacy needed to focus on the regional dimension. This realisation became the starting point to achieve Spain's idea that a second regional peace conference, including Syria, was needed. As a preliminary step, in October 2006 Spain hosted the Mediterranean Forum (Foromed) that culminated in a declaration that, among other things, requested the organisation of an international peace conference¹¹. A month later, a peace initiative promoted by France, Italy and Spain was launched consisting of a proposal to send an international observation mission to Gaza, the formation of a Palestinian national government, the encouragement of dialogue between the Palestinian presidency and its Israeli counterpart and, in the medium term, the organisation of a peace conference with the participation of all parties to the conflict.

Regardless of Moratinos' best efforts, this initiative was not that welcomed by other European states and even less so by some key actors. The December 2006 European Council approved a declaration on the Middle East that, despite considerably reducing the French-Spanish-Italian proposal, was declared a success of Spain's diplomacy. In that declaration EU member states had encouraging words on the issue of a new peace conference for the Middle East.

In the end it was the US, and not the EU, that organised that new peace conference. It took place in Annapolis in November 2007 and should be interpreted as an attempt by the Bush administration to obtain some positive results for its Middle East policy that had up until then produced very poor results. Annapolis represented, on the one hand, the re-establishment of direct dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, and on the other, the involvement of Arab countries, including Syria. The success of the Annapolis conference in attaining its goals remains questionable. It marginalised two principal actors, Hamas and Iran, in the negotiation of a durable peace in the region. Moreover, the dominant role of the US was, from the Spanish perspective, a setback in the commitment to make the EU a more relevant political actor in the region.

Although the EU was invited to participate, with the presence of the European Commission, the Presidency and the CFSP High Representative, its political role in the conference was secondary to that of the US. As with some other European countries, Spain was directly invited to attend by the US, which was of great significance given the deterioration in the relations between Madrid and Washington. In that framework, and

through bilateral contacts at various levels, Spain tried to ensure the participation of Syria in this conference.

The efforts just mentioned illustrate that throughout the last four years one of the lines of Spain's policy towards the Middle East has been to become an intermediary for Syria. Spain has defended at all times that Syria is "part of the solution and not the problem"¹². In some instances this Spanish position has come into direct confrontation with the US and Israel, supporters of isolating the Baazist regime. In other instances, such as during the Annapolis summit, this position has increased Spain's importance for the US and has permitted the Spanish government to build its own profile in this conflict without contradicting EU policies.

Conclusion

Throughout this socialist administration Spain has made the Middle East one of its priorities, not only within its Mediterranean policy but also as part of its foreign and defence policies. Since the 1991 conference held in Madrid, Spain's diplomatic activities in the region lessened but with the new government in 2004 there was a re-assessment of the country's role in the region. Zapatero's government turned the demand for a greater European involvement into one of the axis of its policy towards the region.

Nevertheless, during this period one can also observe that the policies adopted by the EU have not been the most appropriate. The consequences arising from the marginalisation of Hamas represent the most obvious example of this failure and, in this regard, Spain shares with other member states some of that responsibility. Another deficit in the European policy relates to its slow reaction to the Lebanese war and, unlike the previous issue, here Spain cannot be criticised for what happened. Equally problematic was that the European involvement in the region has not been accompanied by a normalisation of Spanish-US relations. If that had taken place, the efforts of Moratinos and his team would have had a greater impact on the ground.

Despite these shortcomings, Zapatero's administration represents, on the one hand, the confirmation that Spain's foreign policy supports a regional solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Spain this means, above all, that the isolation of the Syrian regime should end. On the other hand, Spain has understood that its commitment to sending Spanish personnel to the ESDP missions but, more importantly, the reinvigorated UNIFIL, is a crucial complement to increasing its credibility as a mediator in the region. Finally, this administration has been characterised by a much greater coordination both diplomatically and militarily with France and Italy.

Can a change of government in Spain, or among the highest ranks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, radically change Spain's policy towards the conflicts in this region? It is difficult to image a withdrawal of troops from Lebanon or that Spain will cease to ask for a greater European involvement in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But there might be a re-prioritisation of the objectives of the new government and a more discreet diplomatic profile in Spain's relations with Damascus or in its efforts to stabilise Lebanon's political life.

Notes

¹ The Geneva accords were reached by Israeli and Palestinian politicians and intellectuals. For more information see Partido Socialista Obrero Español (2004) *Merecemos una España Mejor, Programa Electoral, Elecciones Generales de 2004*.

² "Comparecencia del Señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Moratinos Cuyaubé) para Informar sobre las Líneas Generales de la Política de su Departamento", Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, Session no. 2, *Diario de Sesiones*, 8th Term, no. 24, 19 May 2004, p. 7.

³ The Spanish position vis-à-vis Hamas has oscillated in tandem with the EU between pragmatism and a tougher line. The pragmatic approach acknowledges the importance Hamas plays in the daily survival of Palestinian citizens, particularly in the Gaza Strip, but also for the institutional and bureaucratic viability of local politics. Despite this reality, the EU opted for a tougher line by including Hamas in its list of terrorist organisations (Youngs, 2006).

⁴ This strategy of empowering the presidency went against the policy followed up to the elections, characterised by a commitment to reinforcing the prime minister vis-à-vis a corrupt presidency.

⁵ "Comparecencia del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores para Informar sobre la Posición Española en Relación con la Crisis del Proceso de Paz en Oriente Medio. A Petición Propia", *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 8th Term, no. 634, 19 June 2006, p. 4.

⁶ "Comparecencia del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores para Informar sobre la Posición Española en Relación con la Crisis del Proceso de Paz en Oriente Medio. A Petición Propia", *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 8th Term, no. 634, 19 June 2006, p. 3.

⁷ Spain was actually very pro-active as illustrated by its proposals in the General Affairs and External Relations Committee: (1) a ceasefire and the deployment of an international force; (2) support to the Lebanese government in complying with Resolutions 1559 and 1680; (3) the formation of a new Palestinian government; (4) the dispatch of a EU diplomatic mission to the area; (5) and exerting pressure on all parties to return to the negotiation table.

⁸ Interestingly, both France and Italy – main proponents of a reinforced UNIFIL – failed to meet their initial offers of personnel.

⁹ For a detailed account on the topic of the domestic consensus on foreign policy during the Zapatero period, see the article by Albert Aixalà in this same publication.

¹⁰ As pointed out by Hurtado de Ory and Masciulli (2007), Foreign Minister Moratinos met with all external and internal actors. His interview with number two in Hezbollah's structure, Naim Qassem, on 30 July 2007 was particularly controversial. This meeting followed on the steps of the regional tour completed by the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner (*El Mundo*, 31 July 2007).

¹¹ Foromed, *Declaración de Alicante sobre Oriente Medio*, October 2006.

¹² Minister Moratinos argued that "the conflicts are interrelated and therefore it is necessary more than ever to work towards a global solution for the region that incorporates all negotiating parties, including Lebanon and Syria". "Comparecencia del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores para informar sobre la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas y de la situación de Oriente Próximo. A petición propia", *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 8th Term, no. 690, 24 October 2006, p. 3. See also *El Mundo*, 3 August 2006 and *El País*, 4 August 2006.

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Las relaciones España- África subsahariana: ¿a remolque o en la vanguardia de la UE?

Número 16

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Parafraseando a Álvaro Irazo (Director General de Política Exterior para el Mediterráneo, Oriente Próximo y África), hasta hace una década hablar de las relaciones entre España y los países al sur del Sáhara –excluyendo el espurio tema de la africanidad de las islas Canarias y de las turbulentas relaciones con la excolonia de Guinea Ecuatorial–, significaba hablar de “actividades de misioneros y pescadores”¹. Dicha imagen de trazo grueso implica que, a falta de unas relaciones políticas con la región producto de un pasado no colonial, el comercio de nuestro país con África Subsahariana (ASS) históricamente ha sido casi inexistente y que actualmente, pese a los avances producidos en esta última década, no es relevante (excepto en lo que concierne al suministro de hidrocarburos)².

Esta introducción nos da pie a vislumbrar que el triángulo establecido entre España, la UE y ASS es de muy reciente creación. Los tres vectores que lo componen son, a nivel bilateral, la evolución de las relaciones entre España y el continente subsahariano; a nivel multilateral, la evolución de las relaciones entre la UE y África y, finalmente (el motivo que nos lleva a la elaboración del presente artículo), a nivel propiamente triangular el impacto de las políticas españolas sobre la política de la UE respecto a ASS. Analizar extensamente estos tres vectores se escapa de nuestro objetivo, con lo que la siguiente explicación se centrará en el primer y tercer vector.

El Plan África: de 0 a 100 en seis años

Seguramente al mencionar España y África, a muchos les vendrá automáticamente a la mente el Plan de Acción para África Subsahariana 2006-2008 (en adelante, Plan África) aprobado en mayo de 2006 por el gobierno Zapatero. Y es que para la mayoría (tanto de los expertos como de la ciudadanía) parece como si antes no hubiese existido nada parecido. Sin desmerecer al Plan África, eso no es así. En marzo de 2002, el gobierno Aznar presentó ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores de las Cortes un Plan de Acción para África Subsahariana 2001-2002 (en adelante, Plan Aznar)³. Un Plan que, partiendo del prisma de una “globalización de la política exterior española” (Miquel Nadal *dixit*), mantiene ciertas diferencias tanto cuantitativas como cualitativas respecto al presentado por el gobierno Zapatero, pero representa un primer intento de ordenación de dichas relaciones.

El Plan Aznar planteaba seis grandes objetivos, basados en (i) la contribución al logro de la paz y el desarrollo sostenible en la región, (ii) la promoción y defensa de los derechos humanos y la democracia, (iii) la profundización de las relaciones bilaterales y multilaterales, (iv) la ordenación de los flujos migratorios hacia España, (v) la protección de los españoles en la región y (vi) el fomento de la lengua y la cultura españolas en la zona. Sin necesidad de leer demasiado entre líneas del Plan Aznar, sus objetivos prioritarios los constituían el tema migratorio (mediante la firma de acuerdos de readmisión con distintos países de África Occidental) y el económico (principalmente

a través de acuerdos para la protección y promoción recíproca de inversiones). Unos objetivos que el entonces ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Josep Piqué, mostró con una agradecida y meridiana claridad en una comparecencia que realizó ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado en febrero de 2001, estableciendo una clara vinculación (¿condicionalidad?) entre intereses empresariales (principalmente pesqueros), de cooperación y migratorios, realizando especial hincapié en el caso de Senegal, quien los reunía todos⁴. Finalmente, el Plan Aznar adoleció tanto de una falta de continuidad, como de ambición y visibilidad pública (visibilidad que sí ha sabido explotar el gobierno Zapatero), aunque estableciendo unas bases que, en cierto modo, ha continuado y reforzado el Plan África.

Dicho Plan no aparecería hasta mediados de la legislatura del gobierno Zapatero, el cual apenas había dedicado cuatro líneas (literales) del programa electoral del PSOE a su política global hacia África. Así, tras la presentación por parte de Miguel Ángel Moratinos, ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, de las líneas generales de la política exterior del gobierno durante la legislatura, los objetivos hacia la región eran demasiado amplios, lo que preveía un cierto continuismo respecto al ejecutivo anterior⁵. Sin embargo, la implicación de España en la crisis de Darfur (tanto a nivel económico como institucional a través de su presidencia mensual del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas en septiembre de 2004), la reactivación del diálogo con Guinea Ecuatorial y la visita de Moratinos a seis países de la región para tratar temas migratorios en diciembre de 2005⁶ mostraron un cambio paulatino en la política hacia ASS que conocería su cenit con la presentación del Plan África en julio de 2006, realizada por la Vicepresidenta Primera del Gobierno, constituyendo un claro símbolo sobre la importancia otorgada por el ejecutivo a dicho Plan.

Presentado como la "superación de una política superficial, parcial y defensiva"⁷ hacia la región, el Plan África consta de siete grandes objetivos, pese a que desde sus inicios se ha visto lastrado por un enfoque monopolizado por el binomio entre cooperación al desarrollo y control de la inmigración (y que tanto el ministro como su secretario de Estado han intentado desmentir reiteradas veces). Los objetivos son (i) Afianzamiento de la Democracia, la Paz y la Seguridad, (ii) la Cooperación al Desarrollo, (iii) la Cooperación en materia migratoria, (iv) el desarrollo de la Estrategia de la UE hacia África, (v) la Promoción de los intercambios comerciales y la inversión, (vi) la Cooperación cultural hispanoaficana y (vii) la Proyección política e institucional de España en la región, además de contener una referencia específica al caso de Guinea Ecuatorial⁸. Como la intención del presente artículo no consiste en entrar a fondo en el análisis del Plan África, a continuación mencionaré resumidamente tres de los principales avances: perteneciente al objetivo (i), el aumento de la aportación española a la AOD dirigida a la región (triplicando la aportación del anterior ejecutivo), respecto al objetivo (iii) los numerosos acuerdos de cooperación migratoria firmados mayoritariamente con países de África Occidental (los llamados de "nueva generación", más allá de la simple readmisión que había hasta el momento) y en relación al objetivo (vii) la ampliación de la presencia diplomática en la región con la apertura de nuevas embajadas, agregadurías sectoriales y oficinas técnicas de cooperación (un cambio muy importante respecto al Plan Aznar, el cual no contemplaba aumentar dicha presencia en la región).

La política europea hacia África subsahariana y el papel de España: ¿bandwagoning o liderazgo?

A la hora de analizar la aportación de nuestro país a la política de la UE hacia el subcontinente africano, la pregunta que se nos plantea es hasta qué punto España ha ido

a remolque de la política europea o si, en cambio, España se ha convertido en uno de los países que ha liderado dicha política.

Durante la última legislatura del gobierno Aznar (2000-2004) la respuesta hubiese sido fácil: de hecho, el propio Plan Aznar hacia ASS no dejaba de representar una actitud reactiva ante el inicio de una nueva fase en las políticas de la UE y el continente mediante el Plan de Acción de El Cairo de abril del 2000. En este sentido, España intentó introducir la dimensión migratoria en dicho Plan de Acción a través de la condicionalidad (negativa) de la ayuda al desarrollo a un mayor compromiso de los estados receptores con el control de la inmigración ilegal: una propuesta española presentada en el Consejo Europeo de Sevilla de junio de 2002 que finalmente consiguió suavizarse en sus conclusiones finales. Por otro lado, los avances conseguidos en la política europea hacia África durante la presidencia española de la UE en el primer semestre de 2002 (Kabunda, 2002: 187-196), como los diálogos bilaterales UE-SADC o UE-CEDEAO o las renovaciones de sendas posiciones comunes sobre prevención de conflictos y sobre derechos humanos y buen gobierno política en África, son producto de la inercia de las nuevas relaciones UE-África, con lo que el valor añadido de la aportación española a dicha política hacia ASS brilla por su ausencia, calificándola como de "piloto automático".

Respecto a la postura del gobierno Zapatero, de entrada cabe mencionar que la interdependencia entre el Plan África y la política de la UE hacia ASS queda patente en el hecho de que el propio Plan contempla como uno de sus objetivos (el iv) el desarrollo de la Estrategia de la UE hacia África (aprobada en diciembre de 2005 y en adelante citada como la Estrategia). Pero más allá de la voluntad genérica de aumentar la implicación española en la política UE-ASS y de explicitar la potenciación de la presencia de españoles en las instituciones comunitarias, el Plan apenas desarrolla a priori instrumentos para conseguirlo. De este modo, el gobierno constantemente se adjudica el rol de principal estado promotor de la Estrategia, pero dicho liderazgo sólo aparece cuando nos referimos al tema de la inmigración⁹. En este caso, la aportación española si que ha resultado de vital importancia, proponiendo un enfoque global frente al fenómeno de la inmigración que no solamente lo aborde desde un punto de vista policial (punitivo/paliativo) sino también desde otro más preventivo que implique tratar las raíces del problema en los propios países emisores mediante la cooperación y el codesarrollo. Otra cuestión es que dicho liderazgo en temas migratorios acabe perjudicando de rebote la imagen que el gobierno constantemente ha querido defender que el Plan no está pensado exclusivamente para tratar dicho fenómeno.

Así, tal y cómo desgranó Moratinos en el Congreso en su balance sobre el Plan África en febrero de 2007¹⁰, en materia migratoria España ha conseguido a nivel europeo la adopción del Enfoque Global de la UE sobre Migración (Consejo Europeo de diciembre 2005), la adopción de los elementos de una Política Migratoria Común (Consejo Europeo de diciembre de 2006), la puesta en marcha de FRONTEX y la preparación de cuatro nuevos Fondos UE para Fronteras, Asilo, Retorno e Integración a partir de enero 2007. A todo esto cabe añadir el impulso español a las dos conferencias euro-africanas sobre migración y desarrollo como fueron las de Rabat (julio 2006, en formato reducido) y Trípoli (noviembre 2006, en formato ampliado y continental). Pero quizás la imagen más clara de dicho liderazgo español en temas migratorios respecto a las relaciones europeas con África resida en el hecho de que Zapatero fuese designado el ponente europeo en la II Cumbre UE-África de Lisboa (diciembre 2007) para tratar el tema migratorio, presentando un pacto intercontinental (de factura luso-hispánica) que incluye la escolarización, la generación de empleo para los jóvenes y la construcción de infraestructuras. Este pacto ha quedado finalmente recogido en la Asociación

euroafricana sobre migraciones, movilidad y empleo, dentro del Plan de Acción 2008-2010 para la implementación de la Estrategia Conjunta UE-África¹¹.

Más allá del tema migratorio, la influencia de España en la política europea hacia ASS se ha canalizado a través de otros dos ámbitos correspondientes a los objetivos (i) y (ii) del Plan África. En el caso del afianzamiento de la democracia, la paz y la seguridad, España ha destacado su compromiso con la seguridad en el continente africano mediante la financiación de la Agenda para la Paz de la Unión Africana¹² (convirtiéndose en uno de los principales contribuyentes) y la aportación de un contingente militar español formado por un centenar de hombres para la misión EUFOR RD Congo de apoyo a las elecciones en la República Democrática del Congo (junio-noviembre 2006). Respecto a la contribución a la agenda africana de desarrollo, España es el principal Estado Miembro donante del Fondo Fiduciario UE-África para Infraestructuras (creado por la UE en abril de 2007), además de haber participado en el ejercicio de programación conjunta del décimo Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo (FED), incrementando en un 34% su aportación respecto del noveno FED¹³.

Esta sectorización del liderazgo español a nivel europeo exclusivamente en el tema migratorio ha recibido diversas críticas. Así, el Observatorio de Política Exterior Española (OPEX) de la Fundación Alternativas, en un reciente documento sobre los objetivos españoles en su política exterior (Opex, 2008:43) solicita que España se involucre más en la Estrategia UE-África (la cual va mucho más allá del tema migratorio: recordemos que la Asociación euroafricana sobre migraciones es sólo una de las ocho aprobadas en el Plan de Acción de Lisboa). Una manera de diversificar dicho liderazgo vendría de la mano de las negociaciones de los Acuerdos de Asociación Económica (EPAs, en inglés) entre la UE y África, el verdadero tema caliente en las relaciones intercontinentales y que a punto estuvo de bloquear la pasada cumbre de Lisboa. En este sentido, OPEX propone que España lidere al grupo de países que consideran que las EPAs han de ser más un instrumento de desarrollo que comercial. Por su parte, investigadores de HEGOA, a través de un documento de debate publicado en FRIDE respecto al Plan África, consideran que España aún no ha aclarado su postura respecto a los EPAs y sobre los posibles efectos económicos adversos que pueden tener para las economías africanas (Alberdi y Bidaurratzaga, 2006: 4). En este sentido, Ainhoa Marín destaca que España ha mantenido una postura alineada con la de la Comisión respecto a las EPAs, aunque manteniendo reservas y objeciones a la liberalización de la importación de plátanos procedentes de los países ACP (Marín, 2007:48-53).

Conclusiones

A la hora de evaluar el papel de España en la política de la UE hacia ASS podríamos concluir que, en relación al papel jugado por el anterior ejecutivo Aznar, la actitud del gobierno Zapatero ha sido mucho más activa, tendente a buscar un cierto liderazgo de dicha política europea, aunque ese liderazgo se ha focalizado y sectorializado en el tema migratorio. En este sentido, sin perder de vista las evoluciones de los acuerdos euroafricanos en cuestiones migratorias (al tratarse de un tema sensible para España), la política del futuro ejecutivo que salga elegido de las próximas elecciones debería diversificarse hacia otras esferas como, por ejemplo, las de la consolidación de la paz y la seguridad africanas. España debería aprovechar su "ventaja comparativa" histórica de no haber sufrido el desgaste propio de las antiguas potencias coloniales en la región (exceptuando el tema de Guinea Ecuatorial¹⁴), para poder contar con la receptividad de los estados africanos y validar su papel como nuevo interlocutor o promotor de las relaciones UE-África. Un papel que no sólo reforzaría su perfil de potencia en temas de política exterior en el seno de la UE, sino también a nivel internacional.

Notas

- ¹ IRANZO Álvaro, (2006), *El Plan África 2006-2008*, Fundación Carolina, septiembre 2006, p.1
- ² Según Ainhoa Marín, en el 2006 las exportaciones españolas hacia el subcontinente representaban el 1.2% del total, mientras que las importaciones (concentradas en los hidrocarburos y en cuatro países como Nigeria, Sudáfrica, Camerún y Guinea Ecuatorial) eran el 3% (Marín, 2007:44).
- ³ Comparecencia de Miquel Nadal, Secretario de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores), 12 de marzo de 2002, núm. 27, pag. 14432. Para más información sobre dicho Plan puede consultarse el capítulo de Miguel Calabia (Kabunda, 2002: 223-228). A destacar la dificultad de acceso a dicho Plan, el cual no he podido consultar en su versión original, pese a solicitarlo directamente al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (MAEC).
- ⁴ Comparecencia de Josep Piqué, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado), VIII Legislatura, núm. 82, 8 de febrero de 2001,
- ⁵ Los objetivos consistían en crear una Casa África, la búsqueda de la normalización de las relaciones con Guinea Ecuatorial y afianzar las estructuras políticas y de seguridad en el continente. Comparecencia de Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores), 19 de mayo de 2004, núm. 24 pág.8
- ⁶ Desde su toma de posesión hasta finales de enero de 2008, el ministro Moratinos ha realizado seis giras por ASS visitando un total de 18 países.
- ⁷ Expresión de Bernardino León (Secretario de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores) recogida en el *Acta de la Reunión Constitutiva de la Mesa para África*, Madrid, 23 de Abril de 2007, MAEC.
- ⁸ A la hora de elaborar este artículo he decidido no evaluar las relaciones con Guinea Ecuatorial, ya que dada su complejidad por motivos históricos y políticos merecería un artículo en su totalidad. En este sentido, sólo añadir que desde finales del 2006 el gobierno Zapatero ha restablecido las relaciones diplomáticas y empresariales con el régimen de Teodoro Obiang, el tercer mayor productor de petróleo africano desde el descubrimiento de nuevas reservas en el Golfo de Guinea hace una década. Muestras de dicho acercamiento por parte del gobierno español han sido la retirada del asilo político al líder opositor guineano Severo Moto y las fructíferas gestiones para el desbloqueo de fondos europeos pertenecientes al noveno FED destinados al país africano a proyectos de buen gobierno, fortalecimiento institucional y promoción de los derechos humanos
- ⁹ En la presentación del Plan África, el ministro Moratinos destacó que "*gracias en buena medida a la insistencia española se incluyó en la estrategia [de la UE hacia África] la cuestión migratoria como una de las líneas prioritarias de actuación*". Comparecencia de Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado), 14 de marzo de 2006, núm. 285 pág.15
- ¹⁰ Comparecencia de Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados* (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores), 28 de febrero de 2007, núm. 41 pág.6-7
- ¹¹ Tanto la Estrategia Conjunta como el Plan de Acción que la acompaña pueden consultarse a través del siguiente enlace: http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4CB3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_formatado.pdf [consultado el 09.02.2008]
- ¹² La Agenda para la Paz de la UA (*African Peace Facility*) fue creada por la UE en el 2003 a petición de la Unión Africana con el objetivo de financiar las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz en el continente que sean dirigidas e implementadas por los propios africanos.
- ¹³ En el noveno FED (2000-2007), la aportación española fue de 806 millones de euros (5.84% del total), mientras que para el décimo FED (2008-2013) la aportación española pasará a ser del 7.85%.
- ¹⁴ En diversas ocasiones el ministro Moratinos se ha referido a dicha ventaja histórica al comentar que "*los africanos están revisando sus relaciones tradicionales con potencias coloniales del pasado, y nos ven a los españoles con una política mucho más objetiva, mucho más comprensiva y mucho más solidaria*", lo que otros han traducido como llegar a África "con las manos limpias" o

"sin prejuicios". Comparecencia de Miguel Ángel Moratinos ante la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado, 14 de marzo de 2006, *op.cit.*, p.20

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España y América Latina durante el gobierno Zapatero: La difícil reconstrucción de los puentes

Número 17

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José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tuvo su debut en política latinoamericana a finales de mayo de 2004, durante la III Cumbre Unión Europea-América Latina y Caribe que se celebró en Guadalajara, México. La V Cumbre UE-América Latina se celebrará en mayo de 2008 en Lima, Perú, y paradójicamente los retos que se le plantean hoy a la política exterior española hacia Latinoamérica se parecen mucho a los que se tenían hace cuatro años. La herencia de los gobiernos de José María Aznar en política hacia Latinoamérica fue una de rompimiento y enfrentamiento. Pese a los esfuerzos iniciales de cambio de Rodríguez Zapatero, su gobierno se vio en serias dificultades para restablecer los vínculos con la región. La estrategia inicial de “ser amigo de todos” (o diplomacia blanda como la han denominado algunos comentaristas¹) rápidamente probó sus límites, porque durante el periodo 2004-2007 se evidenció aún más que América Latina no es una región homogénea, y que requiere cada vez más de políticas diferenciadas por parte de la diplomacia española.

El nuevo acercamiento a América Latina

En 2004 había enormes expectativas de mejora de las maltrechas relaciones que había heredado Zapatero de la política de José María Aznar hacia la región: una política caracterizada por la dureza del discurso contra los líderes de izquierda, por la defensa de la intervención estadounidense en Irak (llegando incluso a intentar convencer a los gobiernos de Chile y México para que se alinearan con Estados Unidos), y por la promoción y “defensa economicista” de los intereses económicos y comerciales españoles en América Latina. Ante este escenario Zapatero se planteó retomar la idea de España como interlocutor privilegiado entre América Latina y la UE, e iniciar la reconstrucción del diálogo político con todos los países de la región promoviendo una política “autónoma” con respecto a la estadounidense. La decisión de retirar las tropas españolas de Irak en la primavera de 2004 fue interpretada en este sentido por la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos.

Asimismo, una de las primeras decisiones de política exterior hacia la región estuvo orientada a confirmar el nuevo compromiso de España con América Latina. En 2004, después de negociaciones con Brasil y Chile, el gobierno de Zapatero decidió participar en la Misión de Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH), primero con fuerzas militares y después con efectivos policiales. Así, en octubre de 2004 llegaron a Haití 200 infantes de Marina españoles (las tropas se retiraron en marzo de 2006), y el país caribeño pasó a formar parte prioritaria del Plan Director de la Cooperación Española para el periodo 2005-2008. El compromiso iberoamericano por la estabilización de la situación y el desarrollo en Haití parecía augurar un periodo de reconstrucción de puentes y de estrecha colaboración entre España y América Latina. Sin embargo, la realidad política latinoamericana y la agenda diplomática española no fueron del todo compatibles.

La Unión Europea, España y América Latina

En una entrevista en octubre de 2005, el Ministro de Exteriores español, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, reconocía que no obstante los esfuerzos de su país, no había las condiciones para

esperar un gran avance en las relaciones euro-latinoamericanas. Explicaba Moratinos: "Desgraciadamente, y hay que decirlo a nuestros socios iberoamericanos, Iberoamérica no está en la agenda europea" ². Año y medio después, en marzo de 2007, la Secretaría de Estado para Iberoamérica³ no tenía más remedio que reconocer, nuevamente, que había "cierto abandono" de las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina³. Aunque hay quien pueda atribuir esta situación a una falta de ímpetu de España, y también de los países latinoamericanos, para empujar hacia adelante la relación bi-regional, gran parte de la explicación sobre el estado de la relación eurolatinoamericana se puede encontrar en las dinámicas intra europeas. Entre 2004 y hasta finales de 2007 los países miembros de la UE tuvieron que gestionar una importante ampliación hacia el Este, el fracaso del proceso de ratificación de la Constitución, la reordenación de sus relaciones con Estados Unidos, Rusia y China, y la discusión y puesta en práctica de nuevas dimensiones de las políticas comunitarias. Para nadie era un secreto que con esta cargada agenda comunitaria, las relaciones con América Latina se iban a ver relegadas a los puntos más bajos de la política exterior de la mayoría de los países miembros de la UE. Sin embargo, para España, esta situación resultaba sumamente grave, en tanto que su papel de "puente" o de interlocutor privilegiado entre Europa y América Latina es uno de sus principales activos en política exterior ⁴.

Las relaciones iberoamericanas como puerta de acceso a la Casa Blanca

La estrategia diplomática del gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero buscó tener un papel de "facilitador" de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y algunos gobiernos latinoamericanos a los cuales Washington consideraba como problemáticos o abiertamente hostiles (sobre todo los de Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia y Argentina). Si bien esta iniciativa permitió un espacio de acercamiento entre los gobiernos de Bush y Zapatero, que se habían distanciado enormemente a raíz de la salida de las tropas españolas de Irak en 2004, los resultados no fueron positivos en términos de un mayor acercamiento EEUU-América Latina gracias a la participación española. Aún más, el acercamiento español a algunos países latinoamericanos vía un acuerdo con Estados Unidos fue sumamente costoso para el gobierno de Zapatero, ya que para muchos sectores de esos países la independencia de la política exterior española en la región disminuyó enormemente y presentó rasgos de continuidad con la orientación de la política de Aznar. En este contexto, el argumento de que España ha venido desarrollando una estrategia de "reconquista" económica de sus antiguas colonias americanas ha venido cobrando relevancia, sobre todo en un entorno latinoamericano sensibilizado a estas cuestiones ante la cercanía del bicentenario de los proceso de independencia de la gran mayoría de los países de la región en 2010. Además, es importante destacar que el activismo político de Aznar en la región ha sido un elemento que ha dificultado el restablecimiento de puentes de diálogo.

La nueva pérdida de "poder blando" y la "reconquista económica"

En varios momentos de la historia contemporánea de las relaciones iberoamericanas, pero sobre todo con el ascenso de los gobiernos socialistas en España, a la denominada *madre patria* se la percibía desde América Latina como un ejemplo a seguir en términos de desarrollo político, económico y de justicia social. Pero para muchos sectores sociales latinoamericanos España ha dejado de ser un modelo, en tanto que con mucha frecuencia gobiernos y empresarios españoles se han aliado con oligarquías locales que no están interesadas en promover la democracia, la justicia social, la promoción de los derechos humanos, la conservación del medio ambiente, y menos aún comprometidos con la erradicación de la corrupción y la impunidad. El hecho de que connotados líderes socialistas tengan estrechas relaciones con los sectores económicamente más privilegiados de América Latina plantea dudas respecto al compromiso de los gobiernos socialistas en España con los temas antes mencionados. El "poder blando", o poder de atracción, que había perdido España en América Latina durante los dos gobiernos de Aznar no se recuperó durante el gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero. Incluso es posible decir que la imagen positiva de España

ha disminuido aún más entre los sectores políticos de izquierda, ya que la defensa de los intereses económicos y políticos de España llevó al gobierno español a aliarse con algunos gobiernos conservadores en el continente Americano (Estados Unidos, México y Colombia, por ejemplo).

En este contexto, vale la pena mencionar el caso de la actuación del gobierno de Zapatero ante el proceso electoral mexicano de 2006, que causó un rompimiento con la izquierda política de ese país y arrojó serias dudas sobre la voluntad del gobierno español para promover elecciones transparentes y justas en América Latina. El reconocimiento apresurado, por decir lo menos, que dio el gobierno de Zapatero al triunfo del candidato presidencial de la derecha (Felipe Calderón) generó una enorme ola de rechazo a la figura de Zapatero entre varios sectores de la sociedad mexicana; rechazo que se ha ampliado a varias empresas españolas con presencia en México. Dada la polarización que se produjo en México a raíz de la contienda electoral, el apostar tan claramente por un candidato que garantizaba la continuidad de unas condiciones enormemente favorables al capital español en México fue interpretado por algunos sectores latinoamericanos como un ejemplo del retorno a una política exterior economicista y excesivamente pragmática hacia la región.

En el ámbito de las relaciones económicas, Rodríguez Zapatero anunció al inicio de su gobierno que defendería los intereses económicos españoles en Latinoamérica de una forma menos "economicista", promoviendo la estabilidad democrática, la cooperación al desarrollo, la cohesión social y los vínculos con Europa. Al respecto, varios sectores sociales en América Latina tenían la expectativa de que el gobierno de Zapatero influyera de alguna manera en el comportamiento de los empresarios españoles en la región, a fin de que éste fuera diferente al de los empresarios de otros países, por ejemplo los de EEUU o los de China (con una presencia cada vez más importante). Sin embargo, las prácticas laborales, corporativas y los estándares de servicio y respeto del medioambiente de algunas multinacionales españolas continúan distando mucho de los comportamientos que tienen en España y otras partes de Europa. A esto se suma otra fuente de conflicto derivada de la llegada al poder de organizaciones y políticos que integran gobiernos que se oponen a las estrategias locales de algunas empresas españolas en América Latina. Sobre todo cuando el capital español ha incursionado en sectores considerados estratégicos por los nuevos gobiernos (gas, petróleo, electricidad, agua, entre otros) o que tienen un fuerte impacto en la orientación del crecimiento económico (como el sector financiero).

Por otra parte, los datos del desempeño del gobierno de Zapatero como facilitador de la inversión española y del intercambio económico con Latinoamérica son mixtos. Según los datos del Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, la inversión española acumulada en América Latina entre 1996 y 2007 (hasta septiembre) asciende a 110 mil millones de euros, de los cuales 93 mil millones se invirtieron entre 1996 y 2003⁵. Si bien las inversiones españolas han venido disminuyendo paulatinamente hasta llegar a un ritmo de 2,200 y 2,600 millones durante los años 2006 y 2007, respectivamente, las exportaciones españolas a Latinoamérica se recuperaron de la estrepitosa caída que tuvieron al final de la segunda legislatura de Aznar. Durante el periodo 2004-2007 las exportaciones crecieron continuamente, hasta contabilizar un total acumulado de 30 mil millones de Euros en noviembre de 2007 (en el periodo 2000-2003 se contabilizó un total de 27 mil millones de euros).

Conclusión

Durante los primeros dos años de su gobierno, la política exterior de Zapatero recuperó cierto margen de maniobra para España en América Latina, pero la voluntad de colaborar con EEUU restó credibilidad a una "nueva" aproximación de la diplomacia española hacia la región. Al respecto, un objetivo importante para una posible segunda legislatura sería lograr una actuación triangulada Madrid-México-Brasilia, aunque la diplomacia española tendrá que trabajar mucho para convencer a los dos gigantes latinoamericanos de los beneficios

concretos que esto puede generar para la estabilidad y el desarrollo de la comunidad iberoamericana.

Por otra parte, la creciente presencia e importancia del capital español en varios países de América Latina fue fuente de tensiones en las relaciones políticas y sociales. Y la forma en que se defendieron los intereses económicos españoles en América Latina debilitó el peso político de España en la región. En este contexto, un segundo gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero debería impulsar activamente la idea de que la cohesión social, la consolidación democrática y el desarrollo social no son incompatibles con la defensa de los intereses económicos de España en Latinoamérica. La promesa de superar una visión economicista de la proyección económica exterior de España debe volverse realidad, promoviendo entre las multinacionales españolas la idea de una mayor responsabilidad social. Si las empresas españolas, actuando conjuntamente con el gobierno, no comienzan a desarrollar iniciativas que muestren cierto compromiso social (más allá de la mera creación de empleos), los gobiernos latinoamericanos pueden plantearse que da exactamente igual recibir el capital español que el de China, como de cierta forma lo sugirió el presidente peruano, Alan García, en su visita a España en enero de 2007⁶. En este contexto, una mayor difusión de las iniciativas de cooperación bilateral con América Latina tenderían a fortalecer el poder blando de España en la región⁷.

Muchos políticos en España no entienden por qué en Latinoamérica se cuestiona la presencia de las empresas españolas. En muchos casos estos políticos hablan con desdén de las "políticas populistas" pero sin entender las causas profundas del creciente respaldo social que en Latinoamérica tienen este tipo cuestionamientos. El Ministerio de Exteriores debería contribuir a explicar a la sociedad española en su conjunto, pero sobre todo a los sectores políticos y económicos, que los discursos "antiespañoles" tienen más que ver con las condiciones de desigualdad y exclusión social que prevalecen en Latinoamérica que con cuestiones ideológicas o sentimientos xenófobos. En este sentido, si Zapatero triunfa en las elecciones del 9 de marzo, su gobierno deberá evitar hacer caso a las voces que desde España le reclaman que lidere una alternativa iberoamericana al gobierno de Hugo Chávez. Este tipo de iniciativas, promovidas por políticos de derecha como el portavoz del partido *Convergència i Unió*, Josep Antoni Duran Lleida⁸, no haría sino alejar las posibilidades de colaboración con otros gobiernos que, si bien están preocupados por las políticas instrumentadas por el gobierno venezolano, no quieren ver a España "liderando" alianzas políticas latinoamericanas. Además, centrar el discurso en la descalificación de las posiciones que se califican como populistas lo que único que logra es tensar aún más las relaciones iberoamericanas.

Si España realmente quiere ejercer un liderazgo para que la UE preste más atención a Latinoamérica, deberá invertir más peso político y diplomático a esa voluntad. Por ejemplo, contribuyendo a acelerar las negociaciones con la Comunidad Andina, Centroamérica y MERCOSUR, e impulsando los procesos de integración regional latinoamericanos. Aunque no está del todo claro si la UE seguirá impulsando el inter-regionalismo, o negociando alianzas bilaterales (como en el caso del reconocimiento a Brasil como socio estratégico en 2007 –que España y Portugal promovieron), España debería mantener abierta su participación en ambos "carriles".

Finalmente, el gobierno que surja de las urnas en marzo deberá pensar detenidamente qué tipo de iniciativas de política exterior hacia Latinoamérica va a poner en práctica de cara a 2010. Será un año difícil para las relaciones iberoamericanas si no se gestionan adecuadamente los eventos que tendrán lugar a raíz de los bicentenarios de independencia. Además puede ser un año muy provechoso si España logra contribuir a que las iniciativas que ese año adopten conjuntamente Brasil y México, como miembros no permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, encuentren un amplio respaldo en la UE. Asimismo, probablemente en 2010 España será la sede de la VI Cumbre UE-América Latina y Caribe (probablemente a celebrarse en Canarias), y, un impulso fundamental a los acuerdos de la UE con Centroamérica, con la Comunidad Andina o con MERCOSUR debería ser parte

indispensable de los resultados de esa reunión. No podría ser una cumbre más si España quiere consolidar un liderazgo iberoamericano. En definitiva, en este momento se abre un periodo importante de reflexión sobre la presencia y el papel de la diplomacia española en América Latina, una región estratégica para los legítimos intereses políticos, económicos y culturales de España.

Notas

¹ Crawford, Leslie, "Juan Carlos' words conquer the net", *Financial Times*, 15 de noviembre de 2007.

² Véase, "Cumbre.- España lamenta que Iberoamérica no esté en la agenda europea y que la UE sólo atienda las 'grandes crisis'", *Europa Press*, 13 de octubre de 2005.

³ En septiembre de 2006 el gobierno de Zapatero dio un impulso a la coordinación de sus esfuerzos diplomáticos en América Latina creando una Secretaría de Estado para Iberoamérica dentro del Ministerio de Exteriores. Anteriormente, el seguimiento de los temas latinoamericanos estaba bajo la responsabilidad de la Secretaría de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores y para Iberoamérica. Con esta decisión, el Ministerio de Exteriores pasó a tener cuatro secretarías de estado: Asuntos Exteriores, Asuntos Europeos, Cooperación e Iberoamérica. Esta nueva configuración permitió además aliviar la enorme carga de trabajo que sostenía la Secretaría de Asuntos Exteriores, encargada de reestablecer los vínculos con EEUU.

⁴ Véase, "Ministra de Estado española para Iberoamérica pide a UE buscar relaciones individuales con América Latina", *Servicio de Prensa*, Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA), 6 de marzo de 2007. Versión electrónica en: <http://www.sela.org/sela/prensa.asp?id=9594&step=3> [consultada el 12/02/2008]

⁵ Un elemento importante para España fue que en 2007 un Eurodiputado español (José Ignacio Salafranca, PP) fue nombrado para presidir la sección europea de la *Asamblea Parlamentaria EuroLat*, un foro fruto de trabajo conjunto del ParLatino y el Parlamento Europeo.

⁶ Véanse las estadísticas del Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio en <http://www.comercio.es/>

⁷ Véase, "Alan García cree que España puede perder su papel en Latinoamérica", *El Correo*, 22 de enero de 2008.

⁸ De los más de 5,500 millones de Euros que durante 2008 se destinarán a la cooperación internacional, el 40% (cerca de 2,200 millones) se destinarán a Latinoamérica. Véase, *Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2008*, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación. La versión electrónica del documento se puede consultar en: <http://www.mae.es/es/MenuPpal/Cooperacion+Internacional/Publicaciones+y+documentacin/>

⁹ Véase, "Duran pide que Zapatero sea líder en Latinoamérica", *El Periódico de Catalunya*, 15 de noviembre de 2007.

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Spain before Cuba and its allies of the Latin American left

Número 18

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Introduction

Two of the most important circumstances the Spanish diplomacy has had to respond to in its relations with Latin America during the 2004 and 2007 period have, on the one hand, been the need to reorient the deteriorated relations with Cuba and, on the other, the emergence of sharply anti-liberal Central and Latin American governments with a leftish orientation.

This article analyses the Spanish response to both situations, linking the argument when relevant to the broader context of the European foreign policy.

Cuba, the double challenge

Spain, since its accession to the European Communities, has played a key role in the definition of the European policy towards Latin America. That role was born both from the historical ties the country maintains with the Latin American continent as well as a deliberate strategy of the Iberian country to increase its weight internationally selling to their European partners the idea that Spain possesses a "privileged relationship" with Latin America.

Over the years, the latter presumption became a reality thanks to the large flows of Spanish direct investment and development aid¹, as well as Madrid's concerted strategy to place Spanish officials in key positions in the European institutions from where they could affect policies toward Latin America².

The European Union's relations with Cuba are one of the areas in which the Spanish leadership towards Latin America has been most evident. Thus, when Spain under Felipe González opted for a policy of cooperation and pressure towards the island, the EU adopted a similar position; and when his successor, José María Aznar, decided upon a hardening of the Spanish positions towards the Castro regime, the EU again followed suit.

From that perspective, perhaps the main novelty in the relations between the European Union and Latin America which the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has had to deal with has been the fact that since 2004, Spain has encountered difficulties to lead the European position towards Cuba.

Difficulties have arisen primarily from two sources. The first has to do with the 2004 Eastern enlargement which (since May 2004) has added a set of former communist satellite countries to the rank and file of the EU – notably the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – which by their recent history maintains a hard line towards the Cuban

regime. The second source relates to the autonomy achieved by Havana in its relation to the EU thanks to the growing investments, commercial ties and aid from Venezuela and China, which has enabled Cuba to shield itself from the Europeans demands for democratization.

To these circumstances one must also add the Aznar government's difficult legacy. When Zapatero arrived at La Moncloa, the relations between Cuba and Spain, as well as between Cuba and the European Union, were seriously damaged as result of the EU sanctions against the island in 2003 following the imprisonment of 75 dissidents and the execution of three men who hijacked a passenger vessel with the aim to flee to United States³.

The sanctions were not working for any positive change and hampered Spanish and European political dialogue with the island. Moreover, the sanctions had proved futile to bring about a change of attitude on the part of Havana.

The lack of political dialogue had, however, left the big economic interests Spain has in Cuba without political coverage policy. These economic interests are sizeable and whose importance and size can be illustrated by the following two facts: 1) Cuba is, in absolute values, the third market for Spain in Latin America, after Mexico and Brazil; 2) Spanish tourism companies manage nearly 22 thousand hotel rooms on the island.⁴

This is thus the scenario with which the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's incoming government finds itself with in 2004, and before which it proposes a radical change to try to push the end of EU sanctions and to reposition Spain as a privileged interlocutor with the island.

To achieve the first objective, Spain has had to face resistance and skepticism within the EU such as, for example, from the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland and most of the members from the former East bloc⁵. In January 2005, Madrid achieved, however, a partial victory when the EU Council of Ministers decided to suspend the sanctions. Although it is worth noting that the Spanish victory is partial given that the suspension is deemed as only temporary and submitted to periodic revisions. The EU decision has since been renewed in June 2005 and in June 2006, in spite of the fact that there were no signs of significant political liberalization by the Cuban government.⁶

The second objective is achieved through a bold diplomatic action on the part of the Spanish government: the Foreign Affairs and Cooperation minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos visits Havana in April 2007. Madrid declares the intention of the trip to be a bid for a reopening of the high-level bilateral political dialogue with Cuba. Another concrete result of the trip to Havana was the announcement of the lifting of veto on intergovernmental cooperation, interrupted in 2003, and the establishment a procedure for political consultations and dialogue on human rights without restrictions.

The Spanish move is risky given that since the suspension of sanctions in January 2005, there had been no progress in Cuba in terms of democratization or respect for human rights to merit a revision of the current status of relations similar to that attempted by Moratinos. It was thus a largely unwarranted "boon" for the Cuban regime. In that sense, the only novelty that had occurred on the island was the replacement of Fidel Castro by his brother Raul, in front of Cuban government. This change, described by many as a mixed deal, has, however, led to the possibility that sooner rather than later a transition on the island will take place. This is essentially why Spain could not continue without ensuring proper political coverage to its major economic interests in

Cuba.

The Spanish Cuban overtures were also considered as bold because they take place without previous consultation with Spain's EU partners. At a posterior meeting in Brussels, Moratinos would insist that his Cuban visit as an act consistent with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Spain's European partners were, nevertheless, divided between those who call for intensifying contacts to foster a peaceful transition (with Italy, France and the European Commission at the helm), and those who are skeptical about the usefulness of dialogue given the few results obtained so far (again Poland, the Republic Czech and Eastern States).⁷

Despite the objections of the latter, the Spanish view on Cuba would, however, finally win the day at the European level, leading to the adoption at the June 2007 EU Council of Ministers of a resolution which, although it is recognized that the "[p]olitical, economic and social Cuba remains essentially the same", the EU states its willingness "to resume a open political dialogue with the Cuban authorities on all matters of mutual interest".⁸ In addition, the resolution point to that the dialogue should cover all possible fields of cooperation and, in that framework, "the EU will signal to the Cuban government their views on democracy, universal human rights and fundamental freedoms". The Council of Ministers also agreed that in order to inquire about the possibility to engage in this dialogue they would invite a Cuban delegation to Brussels.

The not-so-good relationship with the "axis of good"

It has also fallen onto the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to try to manage the relationships with a number of left-wing governments that, alongside Cuba, have been dubbed by the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as the "axis of good." These are the democratically elected governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, which coincide in their anti-liberal, economic neopopulist political views and style.⁹

Despite the supposed ideological affinity between the socialist Zapatero and the leaders of the countries mentioned, Spanish interests in those states have been subjected to constant attacks which have often not even tried to observe minimum diplomatic form and courtesy.

In the case of Venezuela, the legacy of Aznar – who Chávez accuses to have supported the coup against him in April 2002 – meant that Caracas welcomed the arrival of Zapatero to power after the elections in 2004. However, relations since have undergone ups and downs. There was a sort of "honeymoon" between late 2004 and early 2005, when the two countries signed agreements for the sale to Venezuela of 12 military aircraft and 11 ships (8 military and 3 civilians) for an approximately €1,300 million, in what was described as the "[l]argest single operation of the Spanish military industry"¹⁰, and when Zapatero served as a mediator in the diplomatic conflict between Caracas and Bogota.

In late 2007 during the Ibero-American Summit held in Santiago, Chile, relations would deteriorate, however. In one of the meetings, King Juan Carlos of Spain would let off a not so diplomatic "why don't you shut up?" when Chávez interrupted the turn of speech of Zapatero with insults against José María Aznar.

In the Summits aftermath Spain would become the focus of successive weeks of verbal attacks by the Venezuelan President, including threats of nationalization of Spanish banks operating in Venezuela. The Spanish response was subdued given that in Madrid

– where there was no interest in stoking the controversy and where intuition was that Chávez' disproportioned response had a lot to do with the referendum on the Venezuelan Constitution to be held a few weeks later – the course of action of choice was to normalize relations by lowering the tone and/or avoid responding to Chávez more outrageous statements.

This crisis was a surprise to many, in spite of the fact that Chávez had already alerted to a chill in relations in mid-2007, when he was bothered by Spanish criticism in regards to his arbitrary decision not to renew the concession to the independent television broadcaster RCTV located in Caracas.

A source of constant concern of Spain in its relations with these Latin American governments stems from the tendency for nationalization and unilateral change of the rules under which foreign companies, including Spanish, operate in these countries.

In Venezuela, these policies affected Telefónica, which in 2007 had to sell their shares in CANTV, the main telecommunications company. Another company which was to feel the brunt was Repsol, which in 2006 lost control of its projects in that country, when it was forced to become a minority partner of the Venezuelan state oil PDVSA.

The so-called "energy nationalism" also characterize the Bolivian government of Evo Morales, who just four months after its arrival at power and with the participation of the Bolivian armed forces, implemented his plan for nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry. Repsol was affected again, but this time doubly. Apart from losing their share in the oil industry, several Repsol top executives were also charged by the Bolivian Prosecutor for smuggling, an accusation which would later be rejected by the courts. The onslaught against Repsol forced to Madrid to implicate the Vice President of the Spanish Government, María Teresa Fernández de la Vega, the Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Bernardino León¹¹ (who made two trips to La Paz), the Foreign Minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, and even the President himself Rodríguez Zapatero, who held a meeting with Evo Morales to settle existing differences.¹²

Faced with the burgeoning energy nationalism, Spain received support from the European Union, whose leaders took advantage of the EU - Latin America Summit held in Vienna in 2006 to warn Latin American governments about the negative consequences of such acts.

The Spanish position was openly shared by the then Prime Minister British Tony Blair, the Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the President of the Commission José Manuel Durao Barroso.

In early 2007, Ecuador and Nicaragua joined the alliance of Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia. Although the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa participates fully in the move toward using energy for nationalistic purposes, we should say that there are elements to doubt about the depth of these governments involvement in the "axis of good", given their reluctance to join the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and their relative moderation in terms of confronting the US.

In the last half of 2007, the Ecuadorian government adopted a decree to increase the portion of extraordinary earnings from oil that must be paid to the state coffers from 50% to 99%, leaving transnational companies operating in the country with only 1%. Similarly, Correa decided to change the regime under which foreign oil companies

operate in order to have these become mere service providers. Repsol once more found itself affected.

Beyond the energy field, the Ecuadorian government announced the revision of the licensing of foreign companies, a process that could affect Telefónica and Repsol among other companies. This led to the Spanish Vice President, Fernández de la Vega, to require that Correa clearly define what the new rules of the game were before reviewing licenses.

A central theme in the Hispano-Ecuadorian relationships is immigration, since the Ecuadorian community in the Iberian country is the second largest after the Moroccan. In this area there have been converging interests between the two governments, which have agreed upon a program to encourage the "voluntary, dignified and sustainable" return of immigrants, pushing family reunification in Ecuador and not in Spain.

As for Nicaragua, the government of Daniel Ortega made a common cause with Chavez in attacks on Spain during the Ibero-American Summit in Chile. At that time, the Nicaraguan President aimed its guns at the Spanish energy company Unión Fenosa, which was charged with settling in Nicaragua through acts of corruption. In addition, during a mass meeting held following the conclusion of the Summit, he accused Europe of being part of the global dictatorship of capitalism".¹³

It should be noted that the Nicaraguan government, unlike Venezuela, opted for easing the return to normalcy in relations with Madrid once the Summit concluded.¹⁴

Conclusions

The balance sheet of Spain's relations with Cuba and its partners in the "new" Latin American left during the period 2004 to 2007 is complex. Regarding Havana, there has been significant progress in repositioning Madrid as a privileged partner and, in spite the resistance encountered, Spain has managed to maintain leadership in the definition of the European policy towards the island.

In the case of other governments in the "axis of good", Spain has acted in a more reactive fashion and tried to control damages caused by the unilateral changes of rules, to energy nationalism and the victimizing speech that characterizes these governments. As for the Spanish legislature to come (2008 – 2012), the Spanish government should continue to work with discretion, patience and agreement with companies interested in defending the necessity of establishing a more stable framework of rules that would reduce the Spanish exposure and risk to Spanish investments to the vagaries of neopopulism.

Notes

¹ An example of the magnitude of these flows is in the plan that governs cooperation Spanish development for the period 2005 to 2008, which states that 70% of the resources are destined to 10 countries in Latin America, cf. "La ayuda española al desarrollo se centrará hasta 2008 en una decena de países latinoamericanos", *El País*, 9 June 2006.

² This tendency began in 1989, during the tenure of Jacques Delors in the European Commission, with the appointment of Abel Matutes as commissioner for Latin American Affairs, and continued

during the Santer Commission in 1993 with the appointment of Manuel Marin as commissioner in charge of Development and Cooperation.

³ "El Gobierno cubano ejecuta a tres hombres que secuestraron una embarcación para huir a EEUU", *El Mundo*, 12 April 2003.

⁴ Cuba, commercial and economic report prepared by the Spanish economic and trade office in Havana, February 2007.

⁵ "Bruselas dice que la UE en bloque debe reanudar el contacto con Cuba", *El País*, 6 January 2005.

⁶ In June 2006, the EU Council of Ministers reviewed the situation in Cuba and did not find improvement of the situation but rather a worsening during the previous 12 months: "[t]he Council regrets the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in Cuba since the previous evaluation in June 2005. The Council notes that, according to Cuban human rights defenders organizations, the number of political prisoners in Cuba has increased during the last twelve months, reaching a figure of more than 330 documented cases".

⁷ "Bruselas afirma que la visita no contradice la postura de la UE", *El País*, 3 April 2007.

⁸ Council of Foreign Ministers of the European Union, Press Release 10657/07, June 18, 2007.

⁹ In connection with neopopulism, Francisco Rojas Aravena has indicated that it is a phenomenon that manifests itself in a kind of leadership in which the role of institutions is very limited, as it is based on direct communication between the leader and people (...) This speech and policy response possess the ability to generate major mobilizations. Populism is a catalyst for instability and deepens the crisis of representative democratic institutions. The change in the rules, deinstitutionalization, the concentration of power and clientelism are transformed into recurring political expressions. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "El nuevo mapa político latinoamericano", *Nueva sociedad*, number 205, 2006.

¹⁰ Finally, the sale of the planes could not be finalized because they were using American technology and Washington did not give his approval. "EEUU impide definitivamente que España venda aviones a Venezuela", *20 minutos*, 18 October 2006.

¹¹ Foromed, *Declaración de Alicante sobre Oriente Medio*, octubre de 2006.

¹² "Morales rectifica sus críticas y encauza el diálogo con Zapatero sobre los hidrocarburos", *El País*, 13 May 2006.

¹³ "Ortega dice que Europa es parte de la dictadura del capitalismo", *El País*, 11 November 2007.

¹⁴ "Relaciones entre Nicaragua y España siguen normales", *El Nuevo Diario*, 12 November 2007.

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En busca de la relación perdida con Estados Unidos o cómo (des)iraquizar la relación transatlántica

Número 19

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La primera decisión a nivel internacional del gobierno de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, la retirada de las tropas de Irak, ha marcado la política exterior de España en el periodo 2004-2008 y ha supuesto una ruptura radical con el atlantismo de José María Aznar. No es nuevo que las relaciones con Estados Unidos afecten al núcleo duro de la política española: la legitimación internacional del franquismo vino de la mano de los acuerdos firmados entre España y Estados Unidos, en 1953, y la transición española en materia de política exterior se vio retrasada en el tiempo por la necesidad de normalizar las relaciones de España con Estados Unidos (convenios defensivos) y con la Alianza Atlántica. Se podría decir que, a partir de 1989, con España integrada en la Comunidad Europea y en la UEO (Unión Europea Occidental), y con el mundo iniciando la postguerra fría, las relaciones de España con EEUU y con sus socios atlánticos dejaban atrás los años del *reluctant partner* (término atribuido a España durante la década de los ochenta). El perfil de España como socio fiable en el terreno de la seguridad se solapa con el crecimiento económico que acaba por hacer de España la octava economía mundial plenamente integrada en la moneda única europea.

Mucho ha cambiado España desde los acuerdos de 1953, pero una cosa sigue ahí: la economía y la seguridad constituyen los dos ámbitos de mayor interés para el analista de las relaciones entre Madrid y Washington. Y una pregunta relevante se plantea a partir del momento en que Zapatero hace un giro de ciento ochenta grados en las relaciones con Washington en materia de seguridad; en palabras de Paul Isbell (2004), ¿qué importancia tienen los vaivenes Aznar-Zapatero en las relaciones económicas entre España y Estados Unidos? A lo que podemos sumar otra pregunta, ¿qué ocurre con las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y los otros países europeos en el mismo período? En otras palabras, el análisis de la política española (y de sus relaciones con Estados Unidos) es, a pesar de sus particularidades, indisociable del contexto en el que se produce. Nos referimos al contexto de "brecha transatlántica" que patentiza las diferencias entre Estados Unidos y sus socios europeos, y que afectan no sólo a la gestión de la crisis iraquí sino también a los fundamentos de la relación transatlántica, creando una crisis de confianza. En el caso de la España de Zapatero, la crisis ha sido mayúscula y los intentos de solución planteados por su gobierno tuvieron también un impacto en sus relaciones con otra área estratégica para la política exterior española: América Latina.

Los vaivenes Aznar-Zapatero

La noción de vaivén en las relaciones de España con Estados Unidos está absolutamente ligada al ámbito político y de la seguridad. Es en ese ámbito en el que Aznar lleva a cabo una transformación de la política española, de tal manera que el perfil de socio

fiable (creado en la década de los noventa y equivalente al de muchos otros socios europeos) deja paso a una "relación especial" entre Washington y Madrid, personalizada en la relación Bush-Aznar (la famosa química entre ambos líderes). Situación que sólo fue posible gracias al 11-S, a pesar de que ya en 1999 Aznar hubiera apoyado ataques anglo-americanos sobre Irak contra la opinión de los demás líderes europeos. La foto de las Azores de febrero de 2003 constituye el "momento de gloria" de un líder que comparte la visión neoconservadora de las relaciones internacionales y que se suma a la misión de Estados Unidos en el mundo (lucha contra el terrorismo e imposición de la democracia por todos los medios), a la vez que persigue objetivos personales y nacionales (potenciar el papel de España con fines tales como la incorporación en el G-8 o la asunción de un papel destacado en un espacio atlántico ampliado (América Latina incluida), gracias al potencial inversor de España al otro lado del Atlántico y a su especial relación como interlocutor con la comunidad hispana en Estados Unidos. Aznar deja atrás la España que se proyecta a través de Europa para potenciarse gracias al desarrollo de una relación de aliado incondicional de Estados Unidos.

Frente al pensamiento y a la actuación de Aznar, el PSOE llega al poder en 2004 con un programa que promete un giro radical en materia de política exterior y, en concreto, en el ámbito de la seguridad. Si todo proyecto de política exterior requiere, para ser exitoso, del apoyo interno y de capacidad de adaptación al contexto internacional, hay que apuntar que el proyecto de Rodríguez Zapatero contaba con el apoyo de la opinión pública española, mayoritariamente contraria a la presencia de las tropas españolas en Irak (presencia que algunos veían como fundamento de los ataques terroristas del 11-M en Madrid). Zapatero utiliza un discurso en política exterior radicalmente diferente del de la época Aznar. Ahora las referencias a la legitimidad, basadas en la expresión de la opinión pública o a los valores (legalidad internacional, solidaridad, justicia social, multilateralismo) constituyen la preocupación inicial del gobierno. De ahí, las referencias que se han hecho respecto a una "visión ética y solidaria," o de "giro social", en los análisis de los fundamentos de la política exterior de Zapatero. Lo que en términos de alianzas se traduce en un discurso de "regreso a Europa". De ahí, por tanto, que la España de Zapatero se alinee con la Europa más tradicional (eje franco-alemán), con el reclamo de la legalidad internacional (deslegitimación de la actuación de Estados Unidos en Irak) y, por encima de todo, con el reclamo del multilateralismo efectivo, en línea con la Unión Europea. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de la política Zapatero se va a encontrar con un contexto que le va a ser adverso, ya que ahí donde se esperaba un mundo sin Bush y con Constitución Europea, el gobierno español se va a encontrar con Bush y sin Constitución Europea (además de con una Unión ampliada hacia una Europa Central, poco afín con la sensibilidad de los socialistas españoles). Además, imprudencias personales de Rodríguez Zapatero, como haber insinuado en una conferencia de prensa en Túnez, en septiembre de 2004, que otros países deberían también retirar sus tropas de Irak o su posterior apuesta pública por el candidato demócrata, John Kerry, durante las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses sirvieron para enfriar aún más, si cabe, la relación del renovado presidente de Estados Unidos con la administración española. Desde la reelección de George Bush, los esfuerzos por (des) iraquizar la relación bilateral con Estados Unidos han sido constantes a todo lo largo de la legislatura.

La "relación fría" con Estados Unidos

Tras el triunfo de George W. Bush y el replanteamiento de las relaciones de su gobierno con los países europeos que se habían manifestado en contra de una acción militar contra Irak (el caso alemán es bien evidente), se abrió una ventana de oportunidad para que el gobierno de Zapatero buscara un acercamiento con el gobierno

estadounidense. La visita de George W. Bush a Bruselas, en febrero de 2005, fue un paso evidente para la reconstrucción de las relaciones con sus socios europeos. La aceptación por parte de Washington de la política de diálogo con Irán, impulsada desde Europa frente a las amenazas americanas de ataque anticipatorio, también encuentran contrapartidas en Europa. El discurso en los últimos años, a ambos lados del Atlántico, se ha centrado en la constatación de la necesidad mutua en un mundo con desafíos en todos los ámbitos. España no es un caso aparte.

De modo general, a partir de las reuniones entre altos cargos de los gobiernos de España y Estados Unidos, que se iniciaron en 2005, se comenzó a hablar de "relaciones satisfactorias" y de que se rompía "una situación de frialdad" y, por tanto, que se normalizaba la relación. En un primer momento la diplomacia española planteó que esa normalización se concretaría en una entrevista formal entre Bush y Rodríguez Zapatero. Sin embargo, esa reunión, que era el objetivo más ambicioso de la reconciliación, nunca llegó a producirse y se ha convertido en el tema por excelencia de la "relación fría" entre Bush y Zapatero. En efecto, los encuentros entre ambos no han ido más allá del intercambio de saludos protocolarios en las reuniones internacionales en las que han coincidido ambos mandatarios.¹ Desde las filas del Partido Popular ha habido una equiparación sistemática entre la falta de un encuentro bilateral Bush-Zapatero y la pérdida de perfil internacional de España. Asimismo hay que recordar que durante esta legislatura Bush ha recibido en diversas ocasiones al ex presidente Aznar e, incluso, al líder del PP, Mariano Rajoy. Al final de la legislatura, y ante las preguntas relacionadas con la falta de contacto bilateral personal entre los más altos mandatarios, la evaluación que hacía la vicepresidenta de gobierno, María Teresa de la Vega, era que las relaciones habían mejorado "considerablemente" desde el "desencuentro" de 2004, nada más.²

Sin embargo, dicho desencuentro Bush-Zapatero no es indicativo de la salud de las relaciones entre ambos países en todos los ámbitos. Así, las relaciones económicas gozan de buena salud. En lo relativo a las relaciones comerciales y a las inversiones (de Estados Unidos en España y de España en Estados Unidos), los vaivenes en materia política y de seguridad no quedan reflejados en los últimos cuatro años. El "business is business" se confirma tanto en este caso, como de manera genérica en las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y los países de la Unión Europea, incluso con los más antiamericanos, como la Francia de Chirac, durante el periodo álgido de la crisis de la guerra de Irak. Mientras que, de acuerdo al Ministerio de Industria y Comercio, entre 2004 y finales de 2007 se ha registrado un incremento importante de exportaciones e inversiones españolas en EEUU, Estados Unidos se ha convertido, por su parte, en 2007, en el primer inversor extranjero individual en España y en el sexto socio comercial de nuestro país.³

Sin embargo, el término de ambigüedad es más apropiado para definir lo ocurrido en las relaciones España-Estados Unidos en otros ámbitos; caso de la seguridad (más allá del tema concreto de Irak) y de América Latina. En materia de seguridad, un factor que permitió un acercamiento importante entre ambos gobiernos fue la decisión del gobierno de Zapatero de ofrecer un mayor compromiso de España con la OTAN, especialmente incrementando su nivel de compromiso militar en Afganistán. Con ello, Zapatero quería presentarse ante EEUU como un aliado "activo y constructivo", para lo cual planteó a Washington que además participaría en la reconstrucción de Irak y en el entrenamiento (fuera de territorio iraquí) de las fuerzas de seguridad de ese país y que elevaría a rango de Embajada la representación diplomática española en Irak. En ese terreno, la actuación española no ha sido tan decidida como hubiera deseado Estados Unidos.⁴ Es el caso, por ejemplo, de la resistencia española a desplegar tropas en el sur de Afganistán, donde se están llevando a cabo combates con fuerzas talibán. En este punto, la actuación española no es única y responde claramente a la actitud de muchos

gobiernos europeos (significativamente el gobierno alemán) de no sobrepasar el mandato de ISAF. Con lo que nos encontramos no frente a un desencuentro entre España y Estados Unidos sino a una situación de brecha transatlántica.

Sin embargo, hay otros ámbitos en los que el gobierno español ha colaborado plenamente con Washington. Es el caso de la búsqueda de mecanismos de cooperación en la lucha antiterrorista, con acuerdos, como el de Extradición y Cooperación en materia de Justicia, o intercambio de información. Sin embargo, los costos del acercamiento en gran medida recayeron sobre el gobierno de Zapatero. Por ejemplo, el gobierno se vio en serias dificultades para explicar a la opinión pública una serie de vuelos que hicieron escala en aeropuertos españoles con origen o destino a Guantánamo. Los vuelos, que habían comenzado en enero de 2002 durante el gobierno de Aznar y que continuaron hasta octubre de 2006, presumiblemente trasladaban a decenas de presos acusados de terrorismo por el gobierno de EEUU. Con actuaciones como ésta el propio gobierno español ponía en entredicho su imagen de legalidad y de comportamiento ético en relaciones exteriores. En el terreno de las contrapartidas por parte de Estados Unidos, es muy factible que la compra de armamento estadounidense (los 24 misiles Tomahawk adquiridos en 2007 por 72 millones de euros) haya estado relacionada con una mejor disposición de la administración Bush a atender las solicitudes de mejora de los vínculos entre ambos gobiernos planteadas por España. Es importante mencionar que la solicitud española de compra de estos misiles se toma en 2002, durante el gobierno de Aznar, pero el Pentágono no autoriza la venta a España hasta junio de 2005, un mes después de la visita de José Bono a Donald Rumsfeld en Washington.⁵ Si bien la adquisición de dichos misiles supone mayor capacidad para el ejército español también constituye un vínculo de mayor dependencia respecto de las capacidades tecnológicas estadounidenses, ya que su posible uso dependería de los sistemas de guiado de Estados Unidos.

Madrid quiso, además, buscar otras áreas de colaboración con Washington, explorando sobre todo una mayor complementariedad en América Latina. El gobierno de Zapatero planteó a Washington que, ante las dificultades que tenía EEUU para dialogar con ciertos gobiernos latinoamericanos (por ejemplo Venezuela o Cuba), España podía ofrecer a EEUU su capacidad de interlocución "con todos" los actores políticos de América Latina.⁶ En 2006, Miguel Angel Moratinos llegó a hablar de "políticas complementarias y no coincidentes" con EEUU respecto a Latinoamérica.⁷ Un caso evidente sería el papel desempeñado por la España de Zapatero, junto a otros países (Francia, Italia) para conseguir que el Consejo de la Unión Europea aprobara, en junio de 2007, el inicio de un diálogo político con Cuba. Sin embargo, es difícil pensar que EEUU realmente viera a España como un actor complementario en una región que sigue considerando como zona de influencia exclusiva (a pesar de las incursiones chinas).

Al final de la legislatura la diplomacia española apareció ante varios sectores políticos y sociales en América Latina (una región estratégica para España) como cada vez más dependiente de las posiciones estadounidenses. Específicamente, en los sectores políticos de izquierda de México, Nicaragua, Argentina, Venezuela y Bolivia se consideró que el gobierno de Zapatero actuaba en la región defendiendo los intereses de Estados Unidos. Dos ejemplos de esta situación se dieron en 2006: el reconocimiento inmediato del triunfo electoral de Felipe Calderón en México y el fiasco de la venta de aviones militares a Venezuela.

En el caso de las elecciones presidenciales en México, el gobierno de Zapatero se apresuró a reconocer el triunfo de Felipe Calderón, el candidato conservador, ante las impugnaciones de la oposición de izquierda al proceso electoral. Este reconocimiento, junto con el de EEUU, resultaron ser elementos clave en la estrategia de legitimación

internacional del candidato del Partido Acción Nacional en México. Por su parte, la cancelación de una parte del contrato de venta de armas que el gobierno de Zapatero había acordado con Venezuela, en 2005, fue vista como un signo o de debilidad (o de alineación) frente a la política de Washington hacia el gobierno de Caracas. Mientras en Washington se "demonizó" la relación entre Madrid y Caracas, vista como la legitimación de Hugo Chávez por parte de un miembro de la OTAN y se acabó por denegar el permiso de la venta de aeronaves (patente estadounidense de algunos componentes), en Madrid se acabó por cancelar dicha venta con argumentos pragmáticos (elevado coste de la sustitución de los componentes estadounidenses)

Conclusiones

El pragmatismo adoptado por Zapatero en sus relaciones con EEUU arrojó resultados positivos. Por una parte, las relaciones bilaterales se volvieron más políticas, en el sentido de que se produjo una constante negociación y búsqueda de espacios de colaboración pese a diferencias evidentes entre ambos gobiernos sobre algunas cuestiones. Y por otra parte, las relaciones España-EEUU se volvieron menos ideológicas, en el sentido de que se alejaron del apoyo sin límites de Aznar a la cruzada neoconservadora de transformación internacional emprendida por el gobierno de George W. Bush.

Para Estados Unidos también fue importante establecer cierto tipo de colaboración con España, sobre todo debido a la importancia geoestratégica de las bases militares estadounidenses en la península ibérica, en términos de su lucha contra el terrorismo, y a la participación de España, a través de la OTAN, en la estabilización de Afganistán. Además, las transformaciones políticas en América Latina en los últimos cuatro años generaron una serie de condiciones que EEUU vio propicias para un acercamiento con España debido a los intereses económicos y políticos de ambos países en la región. Aunque en este caso quizás el precio que tuvo que pagar Zapatero fue demasiado alto: el distanciamiento con algunos gobiernos y sectores políticos en América Latina.

En cuanto a las relaciones Europa-EUU, hoy se enfrentan de nuevo a un reto importante: la continuidad de la presencia de la OTAN en Afganistán. Las crecientes recriminaciones desde el otro lado del Atlántico (tanto por parte de EEUU como de Canadá) sobre el nivel de compromiso militar de sus socios europeos, augura un nuevo periodo de tensiones y enfrentamiento que incluso podría afectar a la viabilidad misma de la Alianza Atlántica. Y en este contexto, el nuevo gobierno español, independientemente de quién triunfe en el proceso electoral de marzo, tendrá que hacer frente a una cuestión clave sobre su presencia militar en Afganistán: ¿fortalece o disminuye la seguridad de España? Seguramente serán muy importantes las consideraciones que se hagan sobre el impacto de la respuesta española a esta cuestión en sus relaciones con EEUU y con los demás aliados europeos en la OTAN. Pero la detención en Barcelona, en enero de 2008, de un comando terrorista que presuntamente planeaba atentarse en esa ciudad, y que al parecer había sido entrenado en Afganistán y Pakistán, reconfigura radicalmente el marco de la decisión, de uno básicamente político a uno de seguridad territorial.

En retrospectiva, es posible decir que los problemas en la relación entre Estados Unidos y España derivados de la retirada de las tropas españolas de Irak en la primavera de 2004, y los posteriores intentos por reestablecer el diálogo político con el gobierno de George W. Bush, marcaron enormemente la relación bilateral EEUU-España e impactaron en casi todas las áreas prioritarias de la política exterior española. El gobierno de España en el cuatrienio 2008-2012 sin duda tendrá mayores espacios de

maniobra en su relación con Estados Unidos, sobre todo porque las diferencias personales Zapatero-Bush dejarán de empañar las relaciones, pero también porque es muy factible que el giro pragmático de la política exterior española con Zapatero se consolide si él continúa al frente del gobierno.

Notas

¹ En Moncloa ha habido una voluntad constante de desdramatizar dicha ausencia de encuentro bilateral. Véase, por ejemplo, el discurso del que fuera director general de información internacional de Moncloa, Javier Valenzuela, *Viajando con ZP*, Debate, 2007.

² Véase, "De la Vega descarta un encuentro entre Zapatero y Bush antes de que acabe la legislatura", *El País*, 2 de diciembre de 2007.

³ Véanse las estadísticas del Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio en: <http://www.comercio.es/>

⁴ Esto quizás ayude a explicar en parte la derrota que sufrió el candidato español a presidir el Comité militar de la OTAN en noviembre de 2007. Derrota a la que el gobierno de Zapatero restó importancia pero que sin duda fue un duro golpe a la imagen de España en la Alianza Atlántica.

⁵ Véase "La Armada inicia este verano la compra de sus 24 primeros misiles Tomahawk por 72 millones", *El País*, 14 de mayo de 2007.

⁶ Véase, "EE UU nos pide consejo sobre América Latina. Entrevista: Bernardino León Secretario de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores", en *El País*, 8 de diciembre de 2006.

⁷ Declaración del Ministro Miguel Ángel Moratinos durante la conferencia de prensa conjunta con la Secretaría de Estado Condoleezza Rice, en Washington D.C., en junio de 2006. Véase, "Condoleezza Rice acepta visitar España como muestra de la mejora de relaciones", *El País*, 20 de junio de 2006.

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The Kosovo Juggling Act? Zapatero's delicate balance act between Spanish constraints and European imperatives

Número 20

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At the outset of the VIII Legislature of the Spanish Parliament (2004-2008) José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was to put up two major political objectives for his incoming Socialist government. These objectives were designed to mark a sure and fast political contrast with the Conservatives (*Partido Popular; PP*) the Socialists (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PSOE*) were succeeding at the helm of the Spanish state.

First, at home Zapatero would announce the opening talks to reform the regional statutes (*estatutos*) of Spain's autonomous regions (*comunidades autónomas*). This was hailed as a small revolution in Spanish political landscape, given that the existing statutes had not been updated since they elaborated in the post-Franco Spanish transition process towards democracy. Already as they were penned in the late 1970s many of these statutes were to their critics deemed as too limited and lacking in ambition. They were, nevertheless, adopted – and arguably have been left unreformed since – as a consequence of that they represent a delicate equilibrium between different conceptions of Spain, whether as a unitary, centralized state or as a more pluralistic, decentralized and/or (con)federated scheme.

Second and abroad, the newly instated Socialist government would charter a decisive course to 'return' Spain to Europe, i.e. distancing it from the unabashed Atlanticism legacy of preceding prime minister José María Aznar and his attempt to divide Europe into the 'Old' and the 'New' by joining the latter in support for the US over Iraq. The Socialists were determined to replace the 'photo at the Azores' – figuring the former Spanish Prime Minister together with Tony Blair, George Bush and Jose Manuel Barroso at the eve of the Iraq invasion – by another image of Spain. After a trilateral meeting with (then) German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and (then) French President Jacques Chirac, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero arranged for all three to pose smiling for cameras and Zapatero told reporters present that this meant that "Old Europe has taken on a new lease of life" with Spain in its midst¹. To further prove his staunch European credentials, Zapatero declared that Spain would be the first EU member states to submit the European Constitution (May 2004) to public referendum.

However, as the VIII Legislature drew to a close it seemed during a few months that these two political objectives, apparently unrelated, would threaten to clash and create a potential electoral backlash for the incumbent government. As the international debates in regards to the final status of Kosovo took off in 2007, the Socialist government would find itself in an uncomfortable position between the domestic proverbial "rock" and the European "hard place".

The Socialist conundrum

Kosovo, as a territorial reality, means relatively little to Spain in geostrategic terms. Nor are there any close linguistic, historical or cultural affinities between the international

protectorate and Spain². Kosovo, as the Balkans in overall, has therefore a relative low political significance to Spanish foreign- or domestic policy making³.

However, as UN Envoy Matti Ahtisaari's attempts to find a mutable acceptable solution between Serbia and the Kosovar regional government in regards to the final status of the international protectorate failed and when throughout the fall of 2007 Kosovar authorities declared repeatedly that they would settle for no less than independence, the Spanish government inevitably found itself in a tight spot.

Spanish media would jump on the opportunity to draw parallels between the Serbian central government's handling of Kosovo's secessionist ambitions, on the one hand, and Madrid vis-à-vis Vitoria (the Basque Countries) or Barcelona (the capital of Catalonia), the two Spanish regional capitals with greatest aspirations in terms of their respective autonomies, on the other. In particular the media's interest centered on the precedent that Kosovo could create in international law if the territory secedes from Serbia without one of the two explicit covers which the international law foresees: either as a consequence of mutual agreement (as was e.g. the case over Serbia and Montenegro) or more exceptionally by ways of a United Nation Security Council decision. Should a unilateral declaration of independence be issued by the Kosovo regional assembly, it may serve as a precedent for other regional realities with secessionist ambitions.

Along a similar vein, in the Spanish Parliament the *Partido Popular* would show their strong opposition of a Spanish diplomatic recognition of any new state not adhering in its creation to the established principles of international law⁴. Hence at repeated occasions the PP demanded in the Spanish Parliament's Lower House (*el Congreso*) that the Socialist government make its policy on Kosovo explicit and that the Spanish stance would be an unambiguous statement in favor of current international practice. An opinion, published in an influential conservative Spanish daily, would put a voice to Partido Popular's fear that "[t]he self-determination of Albanians in Serbia constitutes a dangerous precedent for Spain, because it will incite [regional] nationalists to demand even more strongly the right to unilaterally declare their independence"⁵. Such a view may not be entirely unfounded given that to the mind of at least one regional nationalist delegate in the Spanish Parliament, Kosovo indeed held value as a political analogy, stating: "[w]hat is evident is that Kosovo will become independent, Montenegro already is, Scotland will hold a referendum in 2010 and it is evident that [regional] nations of the Spanish state also have the right to decide"⁶.

The Socialist government found itself thus under considerable pressure to adopt a coherent stance on Kosovo. The domestic political situation was indeed an awkward one. On the one hand the Socialist government did not want to fuel longstanding debates within the Basque society or Catalonia about their relation to the Spanish state. But the Socialists could not simply adopt the *Partido Popular's* propositions on a rigid interpretation of international law as a consequence of sitting in a minority government, sustained in the Spanish Parliament by key regional nationalist parties.

The PSOE, fearful of a revival of the acrimonious debates which preceded the reform of the Catalonian statute in 2004-5, therefore quickly reacted to the media's and the opposition's propositions by adopting the contrary view that the government saw no parallels between the Serbian-Kosovo situation and Spanish domestic matters. Indeed, Zapatero would in December 2007 remark that the situation between the central Serbian government and the Kosovar regional government was "exceptional"⁷. This position had also been defended earlier in the year by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who in an interview affirmed

unequivocally that "Kosovo has no relation to territorial and administrative divisions in Spain from either a political, diplomatic or a legal position"⁸.

Spain, Kosovo and Europe

However, matters would come further to a head as a consequence of Spain's international commitments. On the one hand, Spain held the OSCE Presidency during 2007 and on the other hand, as a member of the European Union Spain needed to clarify its stance on Kosovo. The Socialist government would therefore find, as debates within the EU over Kosovo heated up, that the Spanish domestic situation constrained the government's desire to be a constructive contributor to the European "common good" by ways of these two institutions. The result was inevitably to be a delicate diplomatic juggling act.

As the President of the OSCE Spain has had to walk a tight line to bridge the growing divergences between OSCE members, even if the organization was not the principal forum for deliberations over Kosovo's final status. The Organization would not entirely be able to escape the effects of the escalating diplomatic tension pitting Russia, Serbia and a few others against the view of the US, France and others over Kosovo. To avoid the OSCE to deadlock, the Spanish Presidency therefore adopted a 'neutral' stance on the issue of the final status Kosovo – something which was noted with some critique by the regional authorities in Kosovo. At the same time Spain would declare that "[b]eing unbiased does not mean being non committal" and that the Spanish Presidency would act positively in favor of European imperatives for finding solutions for a potential post-independence scenario in Kosovo. As a result of its "constructive non-engagement" on Kosovo, at the end of the OSCE Presidency Spain affirmed that to its mind the "attempts to find a just and lasting formula that will contribute to the stability of the [Western Balkans] region have been backed by the OSCE and by the Spanish Chairmanship"⁹.

Within the EU, Spain would defend the position that on Kosovo the Kingdom "would always be more in favor of uniting than dividing" nation-states, such as Serbia¹⁰. Nevertheless, this preference pitted Spain against other EU member states. In fact, Spain would find itself in minority within the Union on its reluctance to recognize Kosovo diplomatically as a result of a unilateral declaration of independence. The Spanish position thus jeopardized Spain's ambition to be perceived as a 'good' European, especially since the European debate in relation to the final status of Kosovo was driven by the overarching objective to maintain a common EU position. The insistence on having all member states onboard was due to the fear that a divided Europe would once more cause conflicts in the Balkans as it did over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Finding and keeping a common position would have been fairly easy had the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) authorized the independence of Kosovo as the United States had petitioned. However, as the UNSC approval was not forthcoming, the labor in Brussels to articulate a common EU position became increasingly difficult. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero indicated in the aftermath of the December 2007 European Council that he understood that "the first objective is to guarantee peace and stability" in the Western Balkans and that to this end there was an imperative to establish and maintain an EU "common and unique position" with regards to Kosovo's juridical status. However, in his view this could still not translate into a blank check on diplomatic recognition¹¹. However, to avoid creating further frictions with his EU homologues Spain opted to play for time. Zapatero would note that if unilateral independence were to be declared "the government of Spain will decide on a clear and conclusive stance on this matter" thus delegating the decision to the future¹².

At this point it could be argued that the Socialist government was effectively 'saved by the bell', not having to make any further concrete decisions on the delicate matter of Kosovo's final status. In mid-January 2008 the government dissolved the Spanish Parliament in view of general elections on 9 March 2008. The Zapatero government has, in other words, managed – in pending election times – a difficult juggling act both at home and abroad over Kosovo. At home the Socialist government has managed to delink the issue of Kosovo with those of the Basque Country/Catalonia to avoid reopen the wounds barely healed from the governments' perhaps boldest political initiative during the legislature – the revision of the statutes of the Spanish regional autonomies¹³. In Europe, Spain has tried to balance its domestic constraints with diplomatic juggling by ways of playing neutral-constructive and/or ambiguous.

Conclusions

The incoming government – whether Socialist or Popular Party – will thus be left with a formidable task to first assess to grant Spain's diplomatic recognition, or not, should the independence of Kosovo materialize. Second, it will need to evaluate whether Spain's priorities to one single principle of international law (respect for territorial integrity of States) outweighs or not other principles of international law such as guaranteeing peace, stability and peaceful cohabitation between citizens, implementation of democracy and rule of law in a prospective independent Kosovo. The new Spanish government will also have to reaffirm or revisit the Spanish commitment to the international entities it is a member of. The most concrete expression of the Spanish position on in the circumstance of independence will be to determine the continuation of the Spanish troops in the region and the Spanish participation in an EU mission foreseen to the new statelet. While the Spanish diplomats showed flexibility at the 2007 December European Council in voting in favor of the adoption of the EU mission, it is not clear whether Spain will and can contribute with personnel to that same mission. Currently in Kosovo Spain contributes with 600 troops to KFOR, ranking eight out of the 35 contributing countries with 15,000 troops in total¹⁴. The Spanish deployment in Kosovo is only overtaken in numerical importance by that of Afghanistan (790 Spanish soldiers) and Lebanon (1,000 Spanish soldiers). The Spanish military presence could, however, come to be questioned if the Kosovar independence is not deemed by the international community as in more or less concordance with the principles espoused by international law. According to Defense Minister Alonso "in order for our troops to continue on in Kosovo it is imperative that the final status has a strong, very strong, international legitimacy"¹⁵. However, were Spain to withhold diplomatic recognition from an independent Kosovo, or otherwise engage in some kind of elaborate juridical game to avoid recognizing the state outright, and/or not supply a, however, figurative military presence in the EU Mission to Kosovo, some of Spain's partners in Europe may take offense and withhold political support from Spain when needed on other unrelated issues. Part II of the Spanish political balance act over Kosovo is therefore due to begin in April 2008 when the Spanish Parliament reconvenes for the IX Legislature.

Notes

¹ Cited on "Spanish Foreign Policy" *News from Spain* blog, 14 September 2004.

² JOHANSSON, Elisabeth and SOLÉ PADRÓ, Mònica, (2002) "Los Balcanes occidentales: ¿tema de oportunismo español?" in Esther Barbé (Ed.) *España y la política exterior de la UE. Entre prioridades españolas y los desafíos del contexto internacional*, Quaderns de Treball 40: Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, October 2002.

³ The Western Balkans is not an area of major foreign policy interest for Spain, but the area is still home to substantial Spanish military peacekeeping contingencies and other civilian personnel. This Spanish presence can above all be interpreted in key of Spain's firm and bipartisan commitment to complying with its felt obligations as a member of international entities such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, all of which are engaged in the Western Balkans in one form or other.

⁴ The strict adherence to international law in terms of the principle that both central government and regional authorities must agree to divide the state has been the guiding principle in successive Spanish government's treatment of the Basque Country's aspiration to independence.

⁵ "Opinión: España ante el error de Kosovo", *ABC*, 23 January 2008.

⁶ Joan Tardà i Coma, Member of the Spanish Parliament for Grupo Parlamentario de Esquerra Republicana. Cortes Generales, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Los Diputados Pleno y Diputación Permanente* Año 2007, VIII Legislature number 308, plenary session 286, 18 December 2007, p.15348. Author's translation.

⁷ "La escisión de Kosovo incomoda a Zapatero" *Público*, 14/12/2007.

⁸ "If the OSCE did not exist, it would have to be created – Interfax Interview with Miguel Ángel Moratinos", *Interfax*, 29-30 August 2007.

⁹ *Speech Delivered by the Chairman in Office of the OSCE and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation before the Security Advisor of the United Nations*, undated.

¹⁰ The President expresses his 'deep satisfaction' at the election of Felipe González to lead the 'reflection group' regarding the future of the EU", *La Moncloa News*, Friday, 14 December 2007.

¹¹ The President expresses his "deep satisfaction" at the election of Felipe Gonzalez to lead the "reflection group" regarding the future of the EU", *op. cit.*

¹² "La escisión de Kosovo incomoda a Zapatero" *Público*, 14 December 2007. Author's translation.

¹³ According to some reports he has also had good help from within the European Union. A Croatian newsroom quotes EU sources saying that the CFSP High representative Javier Solana (former Spanish foreign minister for the Socialist party) has been trying to delay EU firm discussions of Kosovo's prospective independence and the concrete details of the EU mission until after the Spanish general election on 9 March 2008 to avoid causing a political fall-out for the Zapatero government. As reported in "EU Looks to Launch Kosovo Mission After Serb Poll," *Javno*, January 11, 2008.

¹⁴ Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, Comisiones, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados*, VIII legislatura, num. 913, 11th October 2007.

¹⁵ Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, Comisiones, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados*, VIII legislatura, num. 893, 25th September 2007. Author's translation.

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Rusia y Ucrania: frías relaciones con el otro extremo de Europa

Número 21

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Durante la administración del Presidente Zapatero las relaciones comerciales entre Rusia y España han vivido un ligero incremento, producto en gran medida del buen momento económico de ambos países. Sin embargo, las relaciones políticas se han llevado a cabo casi exclusivamente por medio de los intereses y los instrumentos de la Unión Europea. Ello se debe a la priorización de los intereses energéticos y estratégicos de otros Estados de la UE, especialmente Alemania, en la política comunitaria, así como a la supeditación de la política española a las directrices de Bruselas en la política exterior española en zonas que no son de interés estratégico directo para España.

Importancia de Rusia para España

La política de la Unión Europea hacia Rusia y hacia los países de su área de influencia se ha visto presidida por una prudente colaboración en el marco de una intensa y creciente relación comercial y del Acuerdo de Asociación y Cooperación (AAC) con Rusia. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre Bruselas y Moscú han vivido momentos delicados en que se han hecho evidentes la fragilidad y la delicadeza de estas relaciones, garantizadas sobre todo por la necesidad de un equilibrio estratégico y de mantener unas relaciones comerciales en que la UE supone más del 60% del comercio exterior ruso, al tiempo que Rusia ya es el mayor proveedor de hidrocarburos de la UE. La fragilidad de estas relaciones se ha mostrado especialmente en momentos como las elecciones ucranianas de 2004, en que Rusia ha percibido una clara injerencia comunitaria en su área directa de intereses, o en las crisis que han rodeado el abastecimiento de hidrocarburos rusos a Occidente a su paso por Ucrania o Belarús. A pesar de la clara voluntad de ambas partes por mantener una estrecha colaboración, las sucesivas tensiones e incertidumbres han impedido la elaboración de un nuevo AAC tras su expiración en 2007, por lo que dicho acuerdo ha sido prorrogado automáticamente a la espera de elaborar un nuevo texto que permita crear un marco de mayor colaboración. Por otra parte, Rusia rechaza formar parte de la política comunitaria de vecindad, que abarca otros países de su área como Ucrania, por considerarla poco apropiada para el carácter privilegiado de las relaciones entre los dos colosos europeos. En cualquier caso, la política europea hacia Rusia viene dictada por los intereses de aquellos países que guardan un mayor interés en la buena vecindad y en las relaciones comerciales con el Este, principalmente Alemania, el principal cliente comunitario de Rusia.

De este modo, una vez más, la política española en Europa oriental ha quedado eclipsada por intereses energéticos y geoestratégicos de otros países europeos mucho más cercanos geográficamente y con intereses más definidos en el área. Aunque España ha incrementado sus intercambios comerciales con Rusia, e incluso se ha podido percibir un aumento de la actividad diplomática en este sentido, no se puede decir que exista una estrategia propiamente española hacia los países de la antigua Unión Soviética más allá de los intereses marcados desde Bruselas, debido en gran medida al escaso flujo de

intercambios económicos entre España y los países de esta zona, pero sobre todo por la supeditación del abastecimiento energético español a otras fuentes de hidrocarburos, especialmente en el norte de África, que relativizan la atención de Madrid hacia los grandes países del Este de Europa. A pesar de ello, la economía española ha incrementado su interés hacia estos países; de este modo, las importaciones españolas de productos rusos se han incrementado un 250% desde 2001 hasta 2005, mientras que las exportaciones españolas hacia la Federación Rusa han aumentado en este mismo período un 147%. Cabe decir que el peso de los hidrocarburos en las importaciones rusas no ha dejado de crecer, hasta suponer en la actualidad más del 75% del total. A pesar de este notable incremento en el comercio, Rusia no deja de ser un socio menor para España: en concreto, ocupa el puesto número 11 entre los proveedores y el 17º entre los clientes en el mercado español, cifras que no impulsan una relación privilegiada entre ambos países. En cuanto a la inversión directa española en Rusia, en 2005 alcanzó los 14,6 millones de euros; aunque esta cifra triplica la del año anterior, apenas representa un 0,1% de la inversión extranjera directa española¹.

Al mismo tiempo, cabe resaltar que la sociedad española ha mantenido hacia Rusia una posición de curiosa lejanía no exenta de empatía pero también de un gran desconocimiento. Según las encuestas realizadas periódicamente por el Instituto Elcano, los españoles reconocen a Rusia el carácter de potencia por una puntuación de 5,9 sobre 10, por debajo de Estados Unidos (8,8), Alemania (6,6), Reino Unido (6,5), Francia (6,2) o China (6,1), pero por encima de la propia España (4,3). Hay otro dato que sorprende más en cuanto a la percepción positiva general de los españoles hacia Rusia, y es su europeidad. Para los españoles, Rusia no sólo es un país plenamente europeo, sino que no ven inconveniente alguno en que en un futuro no lejano se incorporase en la Unión Europea. Ya a mediados de los años noventa los eurobarómetros indicaban más de un 50% de opiniones en España favorables al ingreso de Rusia en la UE; significativamente, se trataba en aquel momento del segundo país de la UE con una actitud más favorable hacia Rusia, por detrás sólo de Grecia; pero en recientes encuestas del Instituto Elcano (2004) vemos que este apoyo se sigue manifestando en un segmento entre el 58 y el 62 por ciento de la sociedad española. Se trata, según estas fuentes, del mayor apoyo que recibe por parte de los españoles un país no miembro de la UE para su ingreso, por delante de Turquía (43%), Marruecos (25%) o Israel (21%). ¿Estos datos nos hablan de simpatía o siquiera de interés de los españoles en la actualidad hacia Rusia, su política y su cultura? No necesariamente. De hecho, según una vez más el barómetro de Elcano, un 72% de los españoles declara estar "poco o nada" interesado en lo que sucede en Rusia². Simplemente, España y Rusia se han movido tradicionalmente en esferas de intereses raramente coincidentes, lo cual ha repercutido en una falta de competencia, pero también en una ignorancia mutua que ha estimulado tópicos (negativos y positivos) en las relaciones entre ambos países.

Ante estos datos económicos y ante la evidencia de un cierto distanciamiento entre las sociedades de ambos países, no es extraño que España haya mantenido unas relaciones políticas distantes con Rusia, condicionadas a los intereses económicos de la Unión Europea, condicionadas a su vez por la demanda energética de los países de Europa central altamente dependientes del abastecimiento energético ruso. La España de la administración Zapatero ha estado ausente de las polémicas y fricciones que han presidido las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Rusia en asuntos como el respeto de los derechos humanos en Chechenia, la libertad de prensa y opinión en Rusia, las elecciones ucranianas de fines de 2004, la crisis de relaciones entre Georgia y Rusia en 2006-2007, el sórdido asesinato del espía ruso Litvinenko en Londres, las limitaciones a la exportación de carne polaca a Rusia o las tensiones entre Rusia y la OTAN a raíz de la implantación de un escudo defensivo antibalístico en Polonia y la República Checa. En

ninguno de estos casos estaba amenazada la economía, la seguridad o los intereses estratégicos españoles más allá de los que concernían a la propia Unión Europea, y por ello no podemos percibir un movimiento autónomo español en este sentido ni una opinión diferenciada en los foros europeos respecto a Rusia. A pesar de esta aparente apatía, podemos percibir un cierto interés por parte de España y Rusia en ahondar los vínculos diplomáticos, lo que podría llevar en un futuro a un incremento de las relaciones económicas entre ambos países. De este modo, en febrero de 2006 el Presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, visitó Madrid, donde firmó con el Presidente de Gobierno español José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero varios acuerdos de cooperación, incluyendo una declaración conjunta de condena del terrorismo. Recíprocamente, José Luis Zapatero visitó Moscú en septiembre de 2007.

Las servidumbres de la estrategia y del abastecimiento energético: papel secundario de España en la política UE

A pesar de todo ello, hay que remarcar las profundas diferencias en la perspectiva en cuanto a política internacional entre las administraciones de ambos países. Ya bajo la administración de José María Aznar se percibía una clara falta de coordinación entre los gobiernos de Rusia y España, a pesar de determinadas coincidencias en campos tan estratégicos como la necesidad de combatir el terrorismo, de endurecer las estructuras globales de seguridad y, sobre todo, de vincular los respectivos procesos internos de combate al terrorismo con las tendencias emergentes en materia de terrorismo global. Ambos dirigentes veían un cierto liderazgo (o, cuando menos, buscaban una complicidad) en la administración de George W. Bush, en un sistema internacional presidido por la seguridad y la preeminencia de la jerarquía del poder de los Estados por encima de las organizaciones internacionales e incluso del Derecho Internacional. A pesar de estas coincidencias, Aznar y Putin nunca desarrollaron estrategias de colaboración bilaterales, tal vez precisamente por su fe en las áreas de interés estratégico y en los liderazgos preestablecidos. Con Rodríguez Zapatero, el Presidente Putin tiene muchos menos puntos de vista compartidos, por lo que habría sido difícil llegar a un acuerdo o ni siquiera a una perspectiva común no alcanzada en la administración anterior. En un momento en que Zapatero defendía una política de diálogo en los conflictos internos (incluso en los casos de terrorismo) y de multilateralismo internacional en que las organizaciones internacionales deberían garantizar la estabilidad global, las coincidencias con Putin no dejaban de ser meras escenificaciones diplomáticas sin una auténtica voluntad de crear un área de entendimiento o de seguridad común. Por otra parte, la visión de Rodríguez Zapatero y su ministro Moratinos en cuanto a la diplomacia española o a la política internacional no sólo diferían enormemente de la que podía tener Rusia, sino que gozaba de pocos avales entre los socios económicos o estratégicos de Moscú que pudieran facilitar un acercamiento entre ambas posiciones.

A pesar de todo ello, el peso de España en las instituciones europeas, aunque relativo, ha conllevado determinadas tomas de posición que han comprometido las en principio pacíficas relaciones entre Madrid y Moscú. Tal ha sido el caso en dos ocasiones específicamente: en 2007, a raíz de la presidencia española de la OSCE, el Ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, tuvo que ceder a las presiones del Kremlin para evitar la presencia en la reunión de la OSCE de septiembre de 2007 de una ONG de defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Chechenia, en pos de una estabilidad considerada tan necesaria en las relaciones de Occidente con Rusia. Por el contrario, en el caso de la independencia de Kosovo, España trató inicialmente de mantener un posicionamiento ambiguo ante las iniciativas de Bruselas de incentivar este proceso contra el parecer de Serbia y de Rusia. Ello ha comportado una cierta tensión entre

Madrid y Moscú que ha llevado al gobierno de Moscú a recordar al de Zapatero sus propias fragilidades territoriales y sus contradicciones en cuanto al reconocimiento de la autodeterminación de los pueblos. Tal vez a raíz de esta reflexión, a medida que se ha acercado la declaración de independencia kosovar España ha ido remarcando su oposición al proceso, alineándose así con Rusia y con escasos países de la UE enfrentados a la declaración de independencia de Kosovo³.

En cuanto a las relaciones con Ucrania, tampoco se halla una política específicamente española diferenciada de la europea o que pudiera influirla. El gobierno de Madrid no tuvo una posición definida en la crisis de la "Revolución Naranja" ni planteó objeciones a la deriva que mantuvo entonces Bruselas, cuando se hizo evidente e influyente el posicionamiento parcial de países de reciente incorporación como Polonia o Lituania. España ha seguido incrementando sus relaciones comerciales con Ucrania dentro del consenso europeo de aceptación de la influencia rusa sobre el país, a pesar del apoyo que en su momento otorgó Bruselas al nacionalista y europeísta V. Yúshenko. El comercio español con Ucrania se sigue recuperando de la crisis vivida en 2003, aunque no se ha llegado todavía al nivel de importaciones ucranianas anterior a dicha crisis, y la inversión española en el país ha vivido un espectacular repunte durante el período estudiado. De algún modo España, como toda la UE, ha apostado por la estabilidad en las relaciones con Kíev, a costa de privilegiar una intensa relación directa que obviase la presencia de los intereses rusos en la región.

Conclusiones

Podemos decir que la administración de José Luis Zapatero, entre 2004 y 2008 no ha tenido una posición claramente definida ni activa en las relaciones con Rusia y su área de influencia y ha optado por una inserción en las políticas generales de la Unión Europea en la zona. En este sentido no podemos observar grandes cambios en relación con las políticas de su predecesor, José María Aznar, con la salvedad que en el gobierno del PSOE hay una menor sintonía ideológica con las directrices del Kremlin y de otras potencias internacionales, lo cual se circunscribe en las dificultades de Zapatero para hacer oír su mensaje en los foros internacionales durante este período. En cualquier caso, los intereses de la política exterior española van dirigidos a otras zonas de mayor colaboración tradicional y las políticas dirigidas desde Moscú difícilmente afectan a los intereses directos de Madrid. Por ello, a pesar de un cierto incremento en las relaciones comerciales y diplomáticas de España con Rusia, no se percibe un aumento del interés hacia esta zona, dadas las prioridades actuales del gobierno Zapatero en materia exterior.

Notas

¹ Véase <http://www.ine.es/prodyser/pubweb/anuario07/aunu07_11comer.pdf>

² Véase <<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/publicaciones/libros/incipe.pdf>>

³ Junto con Rumanía, Grecia, Bulgaria, Eslovaquia y Chipre. Se trata de países tradicionalmente vinculados a Rusia y Serbia por razones culturales e históricas y/o con recelos hacia hipotéticas correcciones de fronteras en el futuro. En este caso, España y Rusia parecen haber encontrado un área de interés político compartido.

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Spain: a new European motor in relations with Central Asia?

Number 22

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Central Asia represents a new element in terms of Europe and Spain's foreign policy, as no antecedents existed to the rapprochement that took place between 2004 and 2008. This article describes the reasons and actions taken by the European Union and Spain to bring this about. Within this process, the foreign policy of José Luis Zapatero's government has played a particularly active role, working through the EU and also (and especially) through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the presidency of which was held by Spain in 2007. To conclude, the article highlights the existing opportunities that Spain has to confirm its role as a driving force to strengthen relations with Central Asia, which is effectively a nerve centre of Eurasia.

Central Asia reassessed within the EU

Until recently, the EU has paid very little attention to the old Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Only a few member states with an historical tradition of interests in Eurasia have shown any notable presence in the region. These include the United Kingdom and particularly Germany, the only EU country with embassies in all five Central Asian republics. Geographical distance, the strong influence exerted by Russia in the region and a lack of lobbies in Brussels to raise the region's political profile -these are just some of the reasons why political relations between EU and Central Asia have been rather insubstantial until quite recently. Even so, the EU and its member states have been among the Central Asian countries' main external trading partners, as well as being their main suppliers of technical assistance.

This relative distancing, however, began to change following the September 11 attacks in 2001, which placed security at the head of political agendas. The subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in a decisive re-evaluation of the strategic position of the neighbouring states, and thus the countries of Central Asia became valuable bases for accessing Afghan territory, as well as necessary allies to prevent the situation in Afghanistan from destabilising the region.

In addition, the steadily rising price of oil has turned energy security into a crucial sphere of concern. One particularly significant event was the Russia-Ukraine crisis over gas prices which -following Russia's interruption of its supply in January 2006- affected the rest of Europe, thereby highlighting the dangers of energy dependence. In response, EU countries have tried to introduce a common energy policy and to diversify their sources of supply; hence the resulting strengthening of relations with Central Asia (and particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the Caspian and Black Sea regions, initiating projects such as the *Nabucco*, a gas pipeline that could transport gas from the Caspian to Central Europe¹. As a European Commission statement put it

(and employing unusually sincere language), energy has become a “central part of all external EU relations; [...] crucial to geopolitical security”².

Within this context, and with the European Parliament focusing mainly on monitoring human rights, the Commission has gradually ceded its initial dominance in relations with Central Asia to the Council. This has, in turn, caused a shift from an essentially regional approach consisting of technical assistance to one that places greater emphasis on the bilateral component and political content. Meanwhile, some of the EU's revolving presidencies have been decisive in granting greater importance to this region within the EU agenda.

The Danish presidency in 2004 launched a regional political dialogue between the EU (represented by the *Troika*) and Central Asia, with the aim of fostering mutual trust. Austria's presidency in 2006 was also noteworthy in this respect, as it made Kazakhstan regional leader and the main interlocutor with the EU. Furthermore, in the intervening period, the post of EU Special Representative for Central Asia was created, a position that was initially held by Jan Kubis, ex-Secretary-General of the OSCE. It was a difficult time, politically speaking, as a serious deterioration took place in relations with Uzbekistan over the Andijan crisis³. Thus, even though some signs of detente began to appear during 2007, the sanctions applied to Uzbekistan by the EU and the United States caused Tashkent to take an abrupt about-face, and turn toward Russia. The sanctions also resulted in drastic measures such as the banning of NATO flights through Uzbek airspace, and the closing of the US airbase at Karshi-Janabad, a site of great importance for operations in Afghanistan.

In view of all this, it was hoped that the German presidency of 2007 would be the one that could organise strategic relations and draft a consistent policy on Central Asia. And in fact, the foundations for this were laid in June 2007, when the Council produced a strategic document that highlighted the instruments for the required actions and the priority areas for cooperation with the region. Though it can not exactly be called a strategy (given that it did not define specific objectives or analyse the complex, dynamic regional geopolitical context), the document represents an important step forward as a referential framework for relations with the region. Since then, the challenge has been how to implement the measure; how to formulate specific policies.

As the document itself states, the enlargement of the EU, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Baku Initiative (which brings together the countries of the EU and those of the Black Sea and Caspian regions in order to integrate energy markets) are all processes that have brought Central Asia closer to the EU⁴. This rapprochement has also led to the region being included within the EU's concern for the stability of the European space, which is the sense of the European Security Strategy. In this way, as “neighbours of the neighbours” (the unofficial denomination the Commission has been using), the EU and its member states have developed a new interest in Central Asia, especially the countries that had some kind of previous link with the region, such as Spain.

Central Asia in Spain's external agenda: contributing to set the pace for Europe

Albeit with modest beginnings, Spain has caught the spirit of the EU's new stance towards Central Asia, and to a certain extent it has even acted as a leader in terms of Europe's influence in the area. In 1999, Spain opened the first Embassy in the region - in the old Kazakh capital of Almaty- with the main objective of providing support for business initiatives in Kazakhstan. Soon, important informal links were forged, such as

the friendly relations between King Juan Carlos I and Nursultan Nazabayev, the president of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, while greater attention was being paid to Asia (as demonstrated by José Maria Aznar's last government in the year 2000, with the approval of the Asia Pacific Plan) interest in Central Asia was still marginal.

Within this context, the foreign policy of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government has brought about a qualitative change with respect to Central Asia, resulting in a perceptible strengthening of relations and a general broadening of the field of dialogue, both in the multilateral sphere and in bilateral relations. And both the tempo and the motivations of Spain's actions have been in harmony with those of the EU.

Apart from economic interests, Spain's advances toward Central Asia are also based on security; referring to security in its broadest sense, including areas such as support for deployment in Afghanistan, energy diversification, care of the environment, migrations and management of water resources. Spain's agenda for Central Asia has focused on promoting regional cooperation and economic and institutional development as well as supporting democratic reforms and respect for human rights.

The opportunity Spain was given to promote this agenda during its presidency of the OSCE in 2007 considerably raised the Spanish government's interest in the region, providing as it did an opportunity to learn more about Central Asia and to explore the increasing possibilities for cooperation. The OSCE presidency also enabled Spain to take the unprecedented step of sending Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, on a tour of the Central Asian republics.

Thus, the multilateral approach has been of primary importance in the establishing of a structured policy on Central Asia. Within the EU, Spain -together with Germany- has been one of the main driving forces in the drafting of a strategy for the region, though notable roles were also played by the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy and France. Spain was one of the countries that worked hard to prepare the ground ahead, foster a mood of possibility and to minimise friction with countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, who were reluctant to intensify their relations with countries from the old Soviet Union without clearer advances in terms of democratisation. In contrast (and drawing on its own experience of transition to democracy), Spain's policy in Central Asia has used dialogue as an instrument to encourage modernisation and the progressive transformation of Central Asian political regimes, which still show distinct elements of authoritarianism.

It is also noteworthy that, during the drafting of the EU strategy, Spain was one of the countries that were most vocal in defending the need to make express mention of the OSCE as a complementary instrument with which EU institutions should coordinate. It was, in fact, the OSCE presidency that enabled Spain to develop a stronger agenda of multilateral actions with Central Asia. Spain's main line of action here was its support for Kazakhstan's candidacy to chair the organisation.

The vote of confidence was resolved favourably, and should come to fruition in 2010. It was by no means an easy enterprise, given that despite the support Kazakhstan received in its bid from Germany and Russia, other countries had serious reservations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Poland, all of whom objected to Kazakhstan's lack of respect for human rights and the insufficient development of democracy in the country. Spain helped to wear down some of this resistance, at the same time as it played the role of facilitator through its presidency of the OSCE, offering support to Kazakhstan in the reform of aspects related with electoral legislation, the media law, NGOs, etc. In this way, Spain's commitment to Kazakhstan

was a success on several different levels: it promoted the sense of belonging to the OSCE community among the Central Asian countries, it strengthened the existing trust between Spain and Kazakhstan and it ensured the OSCE presidency until 2011, by approving also presidencies of Greece (2009) and Lithuania (2011).

However, the OSCE also made other achievements with respect to Central Asia, and which are a consequence of Spain's presidency. These include the agreement through which the organisation is collaborating in the stabilisation of Afghanistan from Central Asia through the managing of borders, training police and providing support in the fight against drug trafficking. Another example with implications for Central Asia is the declaration on water management and the one that links security and the environment, which represents a pioneering step in the multilateral sphere. As for the OSCE human dimension, it was remarkable the willingness to collaborate with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) expressed by the new Turkmen leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, as well as some activities carried out in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Finally, by involving Uzbekistan in the organisation's activities, Spain has helped to gradually improve relations with the country.

Beyond the work being carried out in the multilateral sphere, Spain's focus on Central Asia has also had an effect in terms of increased bilateral relations. With bonds of friendship at a high level, one could particularly highlight the excellent relations that exist with Kazakhstan, and which the recent transferral of the Spanish Embassy to Astana -the new Kazakh capital- has helped to strengthen. However, Spain's perspectives are widening to include other countries and this and other gestures of diplomatic rapprochement⁵ are fostering greater complicity and mutual interest between Spain and the Central Asian republics, a situation that opens up a new scenario of opportunities for cooperation.

Conclusions

By way of conclusion, two closely-related windows of opportunity are highlighted here to strengthen relations with Central Asia, and which Spain should take into consideration if it wants to be one of the European motors in fostering cooperation with the region, taking advantage of the fact that it already has a good track record there.

On a bilateral level, and regardless of whether closer relations are developed with other countries in Central Asia, Spain could strengthen its links with Kazakhstan -a priority country for Spain and the EU, and the one that currently holds the regional leadership. With economic opportunities in sectors such as energy, transport, telecommunications and the space industry, Spain could also develop more its political relations with the country, taking advantage of the trust that it has generated during its presidency of the OSCE. For example, by offering assistance in preparation for Kazakhstan's presidency of the OSCE -especially in the training of diplomats and other specialists that will be required in 2010.

On a multilateral level, the most significant opportunity is the fact that Kazakhstan's presidency of the OSCE will coincide with Spain's next EU presidency in 2010. The two countries' capacity for cooperation will then be put to the test, as well as Spain's ability to manage new challenges, such as the following ones which the EU is facing with respect to Central Asia:

- Pushing forward in the implementation of the strategy adopted by helping to define specific objectives, coordinating the action of EU institutions and linking it up with other European policies.
- Providing Europe's foreign policy with greater terms of reference with respect to democratisation and human rights, so that the requirements of stability and energy security do not relegate this dimension to the background, thereby calling the EU's credibility into question.
- Improving European diplomatic representation in the region and the EU's visibility in the Central Asian media, an area currently dominated by Russia.
- Coordinating the actions of the European Commission and the OSCE to ensure that they do not end up mutually excluding each other as suppliers of technical assistance. In this sense, it might be useful for the EU to take on board what the OSCE has learned during the years it has been working on the ground in Central Asia.
- Improving energy cooperation with Russia, maintaining Spain's policy of not entering into competition with Russia in Central Asia.

Spain's future EU presidency will, therefore, offer an opportunity to work toward the progressive integration of Eurasia, where Central Asia could become a bridge for traffic between the most dynamic economies of Asia and Europe. However, in order to face this challenge with the highest expectations of success, Spain and the EU should continue to develop a global view of this space and of Europe's foreign policy there, by taking up a position in the complex network of actors and dynamics that intervene in the region. The geopolitical configuration of the continent is at stake -or, to put it another way, the balance of power and influence between the EU, the United States, China and Russia.

Notes

¹ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament - An energy policy for Europe*, COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10th January 2007, pp. 9 and 23.

² European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament - An energy policy for Europe*, COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10th January 2007, p.17.

³ In May 2005, Uzbek special forces crushed a popular revolt in Andijan which, according to official sources within the country, was led by Islamic extremists. Though the events and the number of victims have never been established, it is believed that unarmed civilians may have been among them.

⁴ Council of the European Union (2007), Note 10113/07, with the appendix *The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership*, Brussels, 31st May 2007, pp. 2 and 4.

⁵ In addition to the efforts currently in progress to open a Spanish Embassy in Tashkent, important work to strengthen relations has also been done in the opposite direction by the Kazakh Embassy in Madrid and its Consulate in Barcelona, as well as by the Uzbek government, by opening recently its Embassy in Madrid and a Consulate in Barcelona. Other actions are in progress to ensure that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are represented in Spain.

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Continuity of the Asian factor in Spanish foreign policy: beyond strategic links

Number 23

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The last four years have shown that the Asia-Pacific region's importance to the European Union is now no longer merely commercial. The Asian continent has not only emerged as one of the main centres of world economic growth, with China, India and Japan leading the way, but these powers are also playing an increasingly important role in the structuring of regional security and, consequently, global security, thus strengthening their geopolitical position. The EU no longer sees Asia as a little brother, to the extent that both continents now view each other as global players who share a common interest in maintaining a stable international order and a commitment to effective multilateralism (Van der Geest, 2006).

Since 2004, the level of economic interdependence between the two regions has reached limits that would have been unthinkable in the past, with Asia now being the EU's main trade partner, ahead of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). Bilateral trade with China reached 254 billion in 2006, with India 46, and with the ASEAN¹ countries 127, for whom the EU is now the second most important trade partner. Japan, one of the world's economic centres, with an economy that represents 12% of the world total, is the fifth leading export market for the EU, only surpassed by USA, Switzerland, Russia and China², and is one of the main investors in Europe.

These data show that the Asian region exports much of its production to EU countries and maintains excellent trade relations with them; in particular with Germany, France, UK, Holland and, to a lesser extent, Spain. In turn, the EU is taking advantage of the technological divide with these countries –except Japan, for reasons already outlined– to export its technology and investments, as the region has made itself extremely attractive for these kinds of enterprises.

Nonetheless, despite this honeymoon period, these economic links are not without their drawbacks. Firstly, in order to be able to develop the scientific and technological cooperation required, the EU is pressing East Asian countries, and China in particular, to respect intellectual property rights, a delicate subject over recent years and one that is ever-present in the meetings held between the two regions, both under the auspices of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Van der Geest, 2006).

Indeed, the tense standoff in the WTO between the EU and most of the region's countries shows how free trade is not something that benefits all sectors and countries equally, even being disagreements within the regions themselves. The mass importing of products from the Asian region has led to increased job relocations and disputes with certain countries over the last three years such as that seen in the textile sector in Spain in 2005. For many European manufacturers, opening up sectors such as textiles has led to the loss of thousands of jobs and this has been the case despite the fact that European governments have been aware since 1995 that the market was to be opened

in 2005. In short, this latest crisis was the result of a serious EU trade deficit, made worse by the state of the Chinese currency, the yuan, which was greatly undervalued. Both the EU and USA have been pressing over recent years for China to revalue its currency to thus compensate for their serious deficit with the Asian giant.

Likewise, one of the effects of the world's economic interdependency is the creation of inter-regional and multi-level cooperation processes within the framework of the so-called global governance. ASEM has become a tool to strengthen relations between both regions and discuss aspects of mutual interest, including trade and economics, but also in terms of political, cultural, educational or environmental issues. In the ASEM Summit in Hanoi in 2004, as well as adopting measures to strengthen economic ties between both regions and discussing free trade and their positions with regard to the WTO, the Declaration on Dialogue Among Cultures and Civilizations was approved, which, as we shall see later, was subsequently taken on by the Spanish Prime Minister³. In the latest meeting held in Helsinki in 2006, alongside the incorporation of five new states (Bulgaria, Romania, India, Pakistan and Mongolia), the Declaration on Climate Change was also approved, which stated that ASEM member states agreed to implement the Kyoto protocol and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This is indication of ASEM's ability to act as a clearing house and to set an agenda, demonstrating its effectiveness as a forum, despite at times being paralysed by the interests of individual members.

However, Asia's potential as an area for economic development cannot hide another of the realities to be seen there: the massive challenges to regional and global security. The conflict between China and Taiwan, the nuclear problem in North Korea following its announcement a few months ago to enrich uranium, the latent face-off between India and Pakistan, the poor relations between Beijing and Tokyo or the recent political situation in Myanmar have made the zone volatile.

The EU, represented by its troika, participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where, alongside Russia, USA, Canada and Australia, issues affecting Euro-Asian security are discussed. Although the forum is essentially about dialogue and the fact that the EU has not yet been able to institutionalise the initiative, recent meetings have looked at issues as difficult as terrorism, the delicate situation in Myanmar or the problem in the South China Sea. Faced with these problems, the EU has looked to use its experience in Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) or Preventive Diplomacy. Without doubt, an important change came in the proposal in 2007 to create a troika of three foreign ministers to take direct charge of those regional and international problems that affected security in the area. The fact that China, the EU, Russia and USA took part in an initiative of this kind means that the forum, despite its consultative nature, is working as a mechanism for cooperation in security issues.

The lines of action and aims of the current and previous government

Spain, well aware of the economic and geopolitical revaluing of the zone, decided to focus its foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific during Aznar's second mandate, in particular by first launching a Framework Plan 2000-2004 and then by creating Casa Asia, an institution that has helped introduce a whole series of initiatives for the development of an active foreign policy for Asia.

Since its being set up in 2003, the three administrations involved in the project –the Spanish foreign ministry, Barcelona city council and the Catalan government– have turned the headquarters in Barcelona into a centre for promoting projects and activities

linked to Asia in the economic, institutional, cultural and academic fields. With the expansion of the offices in Barcelona and the opening of Casa Asia Madrid, the PSOE government has continued and reinforced the previous lines of action to overcome the serious deficiencies in Spanish foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Rodríguez Zapatero's government has not only consolidated this institutional initiative, but has also tried to expand on the Framework Plan with a Plan of Action 2005-2008. The Plan of Action included the aid contributed to help rebuild the area devastated by the tsunami in 2004, the campaign to rebuild Afghanistan, the opening of an Instituto Cervantes in Beijing, Tokyo and New Delhi, the incorporation of the Spanish sub-regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas) into the foreign policy in the region, or the creation of so-called Comprehensive Market Plans to strengthen trade relations with Japan, India and China. With regard to Afghanistan, Spain has an important presence in the Forward Support Base (FSB) in Herat and a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Qala-i-Now. These activities, which began in 2005 under the auspices of the UN and NATO, form part of those carried out by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, this Plan of Action requires not only an important level of funding, but also the development of a real diplomatic corps and civil servants to counter what some reports have described as the "alarming lack of staff in the Asia-Pacific Office" (Esteban, 2007), the PSOE government has opened two new embassies in Afghanistan and New Zealand, as well as a number of consulates, such as Mumbai, and expanded the Spanish Defence Councils in the region.

According to the Plan, the Asian factor is one of the keys for Spain in order to "reinforce the country's international position as a medium-sized power with global interests"⁴. Thus, Zapatero's government has used certain mechanisms it had available from European institutions to drive its Asian policy. Spain has made important changes to its stance in ASEM with respect to the previous government under Aznar, promoting a European strategy with regard to Asia based on multilateral programmes (ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism 2004), reinforcing international human rights promotion and protection instruments, and supporting the actions of the IAEA and UN Resolution 1373.

The penultimate ASEM in Hanoi, 2004, heralded Zapatero's idea of creating an Alliance of Civilizations and, at the behest of Malaysia, the Declaration on Dialogues among Cultures and Civilizations was agreed on. At home, this initiative has been manifested in the continued support for Casa Asia, with the PSOE government organising the East-West Dialogue each year involving high-ranking officials from both continents.

Conclusions

In short, as we have seen, Rodríguez Zapatero's government has continued the previous line in terms of its interest in the Asia-Pacific area. The consolidation of Casa Asia in Spain, the approval of a Plan of Action 2005-2008 for Asia-Pacific or the opening of new Institutos Cervantes highlight a certain level of continuity between the two governments.

The real change can be seen in the creation of an Alliance of Civilizations to combat security problems in the international arena and terrorism in particular. In other words, the proposal presented by Zapatero in the 59th UN Assembly in 2004 was designed to

bring an end to terrorism via a great alliance between East and West able to fight with means other than the use of force. This represented a clear break with the preceding Aznar government and its support for the war in Iraq. Likewise, it also helped Zapatero find new allies in Asia in the fight against the US unilateralism of the Bush government, a former ally of the Partido Popular government.

However, beyond that achieved in the political arena, there is still reason to be cautious. Spain continues, year after year, to be one of the European partners with the largest trade deficit with Asia, which will represent an important challenge for the incoming government in 2008. Although Spain's trade deficit with the region is not much greater than that with other regions –EU and North America–, should the trend continue, it could turn into a real concern for future Spanish governments.

En el presente artículo, se tratará precisamente de la contribución de España a tales operaciones, situando el marco temporal en los últimos gobiernos: la época del gobierno de José María Aznar y del actual gabinete socialista. El objeto de este empeño es valorar la continuidad o cambio entre ambos periodos, con especial énfasis en estos últimos cuatro años.

Notes

¹ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is an organisation created in 1967 to fight the rise of communism, above all in Vietnam. Since the fall of the communist bloc, the association has expanded to include 10 states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

² Data taken from the European Commission website: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade>

³ http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asem/asem_summits/asem5/08_asem_decl_cult.pdf

⁴ Plan de Acción Asia Pacífico 2005-2008: <http://www.casaasia.es/documentos/plan_accion_asia2005.pdf>

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Las relaciones España-Irán: tras la estela de la Unión Europea

Número 24

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El objetivo de este artículo es abordar la vinculación española a la postura de la Unión Europea (UE) en el período 2004-2008 hacia la República Islámica de Irán. Durante este arco de tiempo, Irán ha aparecido en la agenda de la política exterior de España sobre todo por su programa nuclear, siendo éste el elemento central sobre el cual ha girado también la diplomacia europea en cuanto a su relación con Irán.

La victoria, en marzo de 2004, del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) liderado por José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, supuso en materia de política exterior española un viraje. Durante la etapa anterior, el gobierno del Partido Popular (PP) quiso mantener una relación privilegiada con los Estados Unidos de América (EE.UU.); en cambio bajo el gobierno socialista se ha producido un renovado interés por la UE, buscando especialmente recuperar el diálogo con Francia y Alemania: en definitiva, reintegrarse al motor europeo a la vez que se producía un alejamiento de EE.UU.

Desde entonces, España ha expresado su europeísmo y su voluntad en colaborar en la consolidación del proyecto y participar en la construcción europea. De hecho, fue el primer país en el cual se celebró el referéndum sobre la Constitución Europea. Asimismo, ha apostado por la consecución de una política exterior común europea, representada por el español Javier Solana.

Ya desde el discurso de investidura como presidente del gobierno, el 15 de abril de 2004, Zapatero anunció su convencido compromiso europeísta, así como reivindicó las Naciones Unidas (ONU) como único garante efectivo de la paz y la seguridad internacional.

Teniendo como punto de partida esta situación, se plantea la cuestión sobre la cual gira el artículo, es decir, analizar la implicación de España en la política exterior de la UE en su relación con la República Islámica de Irán. Para ello, se realiza una breve aproximación a la situación política de Irán, se presenta la postura de la UE en referencia al programa nuclear iraní, así como la actitud de España respecto a ello. Finalmente, se plantean unas consideraciones finales sobre la situación analizada.

El nuevo contexto político de Irán

A fin de comprender mejor la situación, debe tenerse en cuenta la organización del sistema político iraní, que sigue hoy en día el modelo surgido tras la Revolución Islámica de 1979. Irán es una teocracia, cuyo primer líder fue el "padre" de la Revolución, el Ayatollah Jomeini, que reflejó su poder en la nueva constitución, mediante el concepto del *velayat faguih*¹, el instrumento de control del poder político por parte del guía espiritual. Actualmente, este poder recae en el Ayatollah Jamenei, que representa la autoridad suprema cuyo control se extiende a todos los demás ámbitos.

De forma esquemática, el sistema político iraní es un complejo entramado que garantiza que las decisiones más relevantes en cuestiones tales como la seguridad, la defensa y la política exterior dependan de varios filtros institucionales y religiosos, no sólo del presidente².

Así, el diseño de la política exterior iraní está basado en una serie de principios generales tales como "el compromiso con los intereses nacionales, el esfuerzo para alcanzar la paz y la seguridad, la independencia y la integridad territorial" (Jarrazi, 1998). En las actuales directrices de la política exterior, se ha observado un viraje hacia el Golfo Pérsico, Irak y Afganistán, (a diferencia de las anteriores que se guiaban hacia un acercamiento a Europa) así como las repercusiones surgidas por el programa nuclear³.

El 24 de junio de 2005 Mahmud Ahmadineyad ganaba las elecciones presidenciales en la República Islámica de Irán, en segunda vuelta. Su victoria como presidente de Irán, ha representado el regreso al poder de la facción conservadora, en contraposición al estilo moderado de su antecesor, el reformista Jatami (Farzamnía, 2005), y también ha abierto un nuevo capítulo en la política exterior iraní.

Desde el primer momento Ahmadineyad esgrimió un discurso populista y hostil hacia Occidente; retomando aspectos propios de la Revolución Islámica de 1979, como pretender convertirse, en el seno de la comunidad musulmana, en el líder aglutinador, alrededor del cual podría frenarse la presencia de EE.UU. en la región (Nasr, 2007). Se inició un proceso de provocaciones hacia Occidente, cuyos momentos claves fueron en agosto 2005 el anuncio de la reanudación del programa nuclear iraní y en diciembre de 2006 la organización en Teherán de una conferencia sobre el Holocausto, retomando el discurso revolucionario contra Israel y su propia existencia (Zaccara, 2007).

Debe tenerse en cuenta que el aislamiento impuesto por EE.UU. a Irán ha provocado un acercamiento de éste último a otros países, tales como India y Japón, que están ávidos de recursos energéticos. También a estados como Rusia y China, ya que ambos países tienen intereses energéticos, económicos y militares respecto a Irán. Asimismo, la sensación de acorralamiento y de país cercado que tiene Irán, incide en la inestabilidad de la zona, ya de por sí candente.

Europa frente al difícil tema iraní

No debe olvidarse que Irán goza de una posición geográfica y estratégica privilegiada, es lugar de encuentro entre Asia Central, Medio Oriente y el Sudeste asiático; y puede representar un factor clave tanto para el desarrollo de la zona como para alcanzar el estatus de potencia regional.

Justamente por dicha relevancia geoestratégica, Europa, ha intentado mantener y potenciar un contexto estable a fin de garantizar sus necesidades energéticas, asegurar los suministros tanto de gas como petróleo provenientes de Oriente Medio. Es por este mismo motivo, que la UE ha buscado rebajar el nivel de tensión en la zona, y promover una mayor seguridad y estabilidad regional, desde el ámbito económico y político, así como ha favorecido la diversificación de las rutas de exportación del petróleo y del gas, especialmente a través de inversiones en proyectos de mejora de las infraestructuras y los transportes de la zona⁴. Las relaciones entre la UE e Irán también se han visto enturbiadas por la postura de

EE.UU. hacia este último y por la guerra contra Irak que fue en detrimento de su venta de crudo a los mercados europeos.

EE.UU., con sus recientes intervenciones, ha provocado, muy a su pesar, un aumento de la importancia de Irán como potencia regional en la zona, sobre todo por el hecho de haber neutralizado a dos de sus principales enemigos: Saddam Hussein y los talibanes. A pesar de la política de aislamiento internacional promovida por EE.UU. contra Irán, la UE ha intentado mantener las relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales, de gran relevancia estratégica. Especialmente, destacar el volumen de negocios de Francia, Alemania, siendo España su octavo partner europeo.

Es en este contexto que se logra comprender el por qué de los intentos de la UE de buscar una vía diplomática en la crisis provocada por la reanudación del programa nuclear iraní. Así, entre 2004 e inicios de 2008, el principal interlocutor y mediador ha sido la UE-3 (formada por los ministros de exteriores de Francia, Alemania y Reino Unido); intercediendo para el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA). Ya en 2003, la UE reconocía el derecho de Irán al uso de energía nuclear siempre que fuera para fines pacíficos y de acuerdo con el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (que Irán había ratificado en 1970).

Pese a las rondas de negociaciones finalmente el Consejo de Seguridad adoptó la resolución 1696 de 31 de julio de 2006 en la cual se exigía a Irán el cese inmediato de su programa nuclear, de lo contrario se enfrentaría a sanciones económicas y diplomáticas. Según la parte iraní, el diálogo no tenía una base de confianza mutua, elemento clave para llegar a un acuerdo satisfactorio para ambas partes.

Las conversaciones para solucionar la cuestión nuclear iraní llevadas a cabo por la UE-3 representan una vía alternativa, diplomática, frente a la opción bélica de EE.UU., que durante todo este período ha aumentado su nivel de "advertencias" a Irán en caso de proseguir con su programa.

Ahmadineyad presenta el actual discurso de EE.UU. como una muestra de la voluntad de injerencia hacia un asunto de índole interna, el derecho al uso de energía nuclear con fines pacíficos. A pesar del descontento de la población y de la difícil situación económica del país, la sociedad iraní ha aparcado sus diferencias con el gobierno para defender lo que consideran un derecho propio.

España: ¿uno más en la política europea común?

Desde el primer momento, el gobierno español afirmó que respaldaba el proceso de negociaciones de la UE con Irán, ya iniciado en octubre 2003, teniendo en cuenta que la situación había cambiado por la nueva configuración del poder en Irán, tras la llegada de Ahmadineyad a la presidencia. Asimismo, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación valoraba dichas negociaciones y apoyaba la firmeza de la UE para que Irán suspendiera definitivamente toda actividad de enriquecimiento de uranio. De esta forma España convergía con los demás estados miembros, enviando un mensaje claro y unánime a Irán⁵.

El 7 de septiembre de 2006 Zapatero reiteraba su apoyo para lograr una salida diplomática y negociadora de la crisis, entrevistándose con el negociador iraní en cuestiones nucleares, Ali Lariyani. Asimismo, el ex presidente español, Felipe González que realizó una visita privada a Irán en septiembre de 2006, reconoció frente a la comunidad internacional el derecho iraní a la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos.

Asimismo, mantuvo reuniones con el presidente iraní, el responsable del programa nuclear y con el ministro de asuntos exteriores.

Finalmente, es necesario mencionar y tener en cuenta la iniciativa de la Alianza de Civilizaciones. La propuesta de Alianza la lanzó Zapatero en la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas en septiembre 2004, con el apoyo de Turquía, para promover la democracia y la cooperación internacional en la lucha contra el terrorismo. Asimismo, busca adoptar modelos de convivencia social, basados en la dignidad y las garantías de respecto de la pluralidad. De esta forma España vuelve a remarcar que la solución de los conflictos pasa por el Derecho Internacional, en el marco multilateral de Naciones Unidas. La función principal de la Alianza de Civilizaciones es ser un instrumento potencial para lograr una mayor comprensión mutua, siendo un mecanismo de diálogo, de entendimiento entre las diferentes sociedades.

Conclusiones

A modo de conclusión, tener presente que la UE, a diferencia de EE.UU., intenta mantener canales abiertos con Irán, a través de la negociación y la diplomacia, sobre todo por los intereses estratégicos y económicos, siendo una tarea a largo plazo, que requerirá esfuerzo y voluntad política para alcanzar una resolución pacífica y dialogada de la cuestión nuclear iraní. Un posible cambio en las relaciones EE.UU. e Irán sería muy positivo para alterar el contexto regional, lo que podría permitir un desarrollo mayor del país.

De la misma forma, deben integrarse en el análisis los intereses comerciales y económicos así como energéticos que dependen de la resolución del conflicto. La relación mantenida con los varios actores regionales y extra-regionales se puede comprender mediante la importancia del petróleo, elemento clave del área.

Tanto Europa como España no deberían olvidar que en el futuro, Irán cuenta con una serie de factores que le permitirían convertirse en un elemento clave para la configuración de un nuevo equilibrio regional. Destacar una estabilidad política interna única en la zona (aunque con problemas de índole democrático y económico), su posición geoestratégica y el papel que podría desempeñar en la resolución del conflicto de Irak, en Afganistán, Golfo Pérsico, sin olvidar el Mar Caspio. En el momento actual, España debe seguir apoyando las políticas negociadoras de la UE en sus conversaciones con Irán, marcadas sobre todo por la cuestión nuclear. La opción europea, a través del diálogo y de la diplomacia es una alternativa más segura, pero que necesita un plazo mayor para lograr sus objetivos, y debe seguir contando con el apoyo de los estados miembros, para poder alcanzar un acuerdo con Irán satisfactorio para las partes.

Notas

¹ Significa literalmente "gobierno del jefe religioso". Véase KHOSROKHAVAR, F. y ROY, O. (2000) *Irán de la revolución a la reforma*, Barcelona, Ed. Bellaterra, pp. 72-91; HAHERI YAZDI, M. (1995) *Hekmat va Hokumat*, Teherán, Ed. Shadi, pp. 177-214; HUNTER, SH. (1992) *Iran after Khomeini*, New York, Praeger.

² Para mayor información, véase: BANI SADR, A. (1989) *Quelle révolution pou l'Iran?*, Paris, Fayolle; CHEHABI, H. E. (1990) *Iranian politics and religious modernism. The liberation movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*, London; HAGHIGHAT, Ch. (1985) *Iran, la révolution islamique*, Bruselas, Complexe; MENASHRI, D. (dir.) *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*,

Westview, Boulder; ARJOMAND, S.A. (1988) *The Turban for the Crown, the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, Oxford, University Press; SHIRAZI, A. (1997) *The Constitution of Iran. Politics and State in the Islamic Republic*, London, I.B. Tauris.

³ Véase BERGARECHE, B. "Enfrentamiento entre dos líderes. Las posibilidades de un acuerdo", *Política Exterior*, núm. 111 (mayo/junio 2006), pp. 21-28; MESA DEL MONTE, L. "El programa nuclear iraní. Entre derechos legítimos e incertidumbres estratégicas", *Anuario CIP 2006*, Barcelona, Icaria, (2005), pp. 297-305; GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V. "El programa nuclear iraní y las dificultades para visitar a los amigos", *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (REEI)*, núm. 12/2006 <www.reei.org>; ZACCARA, L. "El protagonismo de Irán en Oriente Próximo". *Afkar/Ideas* (invierno 2006/2007), pp. 34-36.

⁴ Así, programas como el TACIS (Ayuda Técnica para la CEI, en su sigla inglés) o el TRACECA, representan para la UE un comienzo para poder, beneficiarse de las potencialidades del Mar Caspio. El TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) es un programa de la Unión Europea puesto en marcha desde 1993 cuya finalidad es crear un corredor entre Europa, el Cáucaso y Asia Central. Una parte importante del mismo está constituido por el INOGATE (Interestate Oil and Gas Transport Europe) para fomentar la construcción de oleoductos desde la región del Caspio hasta Europa. Respecto al TACIS, véase: SLIM, A. "Le programme TACIS pour la Russie: un bila est-il possible?", *Le courrier des pays de l'Est*, núm. 1025 (mayo 2002), pp. 17-26.

⁵ Comparecencia del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, D. Miguel Ángel Moratinos Cuyaubé, ante el Senado, *Diario de Sesiones*, VIII Legislatura, número 53, 28 de septiembre de 2005, pp. 2856-2857.

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